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Abstract: 
 
Two of the main challenges in contemporary strategy are the challenges of complex 
conflicts and the increased reliance on alliances and coalitions. This study explores the 
challenges of coalition strategy in the complex conflict of Afghanistan through the 
strategic behaviour of three NATO-states, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Norway from 2003 to 2008. The study argues that the use of alliances and coalitions is 
and will remain one of the most important features of contemporary strategy. Given 
the size and character of contemporary coalitions and alliances, an essential part of any 
coalition’s strategy both in development and execution will reside with a coalition’s 
lesser members. Understanding how these lesser coalition members develop and 
implement strategy will be of great importance to the effectiveness of contemporary 
and future coalitions.  
 
The three states analysed in this study are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Norway, three states who faced similar challenges in Afghanistan. The strategic 
behaviour of these cases is analysed through the lens of strategic theory from which the 
framework of analysis was developed.  
 
The study found that the three states’ interpretations of ISAF’s aims were remarkably 
different and that this impacted their strategies significantly. The study also found that 
as the lesser coalition partners’ purpose behind joining the coalition was only indirectly 
linked to the complex conflict of Afghanistan itself, the lesser members struggled to 
generate the political involvement that is crucial to the development of a clear and 
relevant strategy. Further, the study also found that this lack of political involvement 
had its main source in the lack of proper strategic institutions and procedures in each 
state’s civil-military relations structure, but was also clearly impacted by the states’ 
strategic thinking. The study challenges certain elements of traditional and 
contemporary theory on strategy and civil-military relations with respect to the lack of 
realism in strategic theory and an over-emphasis on structures in current civil-military 
relations theory. 
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Note on abbreviations, language and references: 
 
This dissertation is written in the field of strategic studies, a field riddled with 
abbreviations and acronyms. For reasons of fluidity, I have chosen to introduce the full 
term initially and then subsequently provide only the acronym or abbreviation. A list of 
the abbreviations used is provided in the introduction. 
The study involved the use of primary sources in four languages. For the sake of 
clarity and uniformity, as particularly Norwegian is a little known language, I have 
endeavoured to use English versions where more than one version of a text was 
available and I have provided English translations where necessary instead of using the 
original language. All translations from Norwegian, Dutch and German sources are 
done by me, except as otherwise stated. 
I have followed the reference guide when it comes to the footnotes and 
bibliography, but given the nature of some sources I have made some additions. For 
the sake of reliability, I have provided the titles as they were published although this 
was sometimes contrary to the accepted British style. The British and Dutch 
parliamentary hearings have two sets of page numbers, one for the committee’s own 
conclusion and one set for the actual evidence hearings. In the references, the pages 
referred to in the evidence hearings will be referred to as prefix ‘ev.p’ or ‘ev.pp.’.  
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Abbreviations: 
ADZ:  Afghan Development Zone (ISAF and local Afghan) 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP:  Afghan National Police 
AOR:  Area of Operations 
ASF Afghan Security Forces 
ASF: Afghan Security Forces (ANA, ANP and NDS) 
BDD  British Defence Doctrine 
CDS United Kingdom: Chief of Defence Staff 
The Netherlands: Commander Netherlands’ Armed Forces 
(Commandant der Strijdkrachten) also referred to as the Chief of the 
Defence Staff, or Chief of Defence. 
CGS Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom) 
CHOD Chief of Defence 
CIMIC Civil Military Co-Operation 
CMR Civil-Military Relations 
CO Cabinet Office (United Kingdom) 
COIN Counter Insurgency 
DDR: De-Armament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency 
DFID The Department for International Development 
EBA Effects Based Approach (United Kingdom) 
EBO Effects Based Operations 
FCO United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FFOD The Norwegian Joint Operations Doctrine (Forsvarets Fellesoperative 
Doktrine) 
HEG United Kingdom Helmand Executive Group 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
KMNB: (ISAF) Kabul Multinational Brigade 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCW  Network Centric Warfare 
NDD The Netherlands’ National Defence Doctrine 
NDS (Afghan) National Directorate of Security 
NEC Network Enabling Capability (United Kingdom) 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
NSID United Kingdom Cabinet Committee for National Security, 
International Relations and Development 
NSS National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom (2008) 
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom 
OMF Opposing Military Forces (Taliban, Al Qaeda, Lashgar e Taiba, 
HIG, and local armed opposition) 
PM Prime Minister 
POLAD Political Advisor 
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PRT: ISAF and OEF Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSO Peace support operations  
QIP Quick Impact Projects 
PUS United Kingdom MoD Permanent Under Secretary 
RC  ISAF Regional Command 
RNlA Royal Netherlands Army 
SDR Strategic Defence Review, United Kingdom 1997 
SMO The Netherlands’ Steering Group for Military Operations (Stuurgroep 
Militaire Operaties) 
SVW The Netherlands’ Steering Group for Security Co-operation and 
Reconstruction  (Stuurgroep Veiligheidssamenwerking en Development) 
TFU: Task Force Uruzgan (the Netherlands) 
UK The United Kingdom 
US The United States of America  
USAF United States Air Force 
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Chapter I:  
Introduction  
By late 2008 and early 2009 it was evident that the strategies employed by NATO 
in Afghanistan had failed. The means, however skilfully employed by the alliance, had 
not produced the desired political outcome. The NATO alliance entered the 
Afghanistan theatre in August 2003 and took over responsibility for the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From its initial and limited deployment in Kabul and 
through its subsequent ambitious expansion, the NATO alliance’s stated political 
purpose was to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a lair of international 
terrorism and extremism.1 Its political aims were to establish a central government 
unimpeded by radical Islam, and capable of providing credible security and basic 
services to the Afghan people. A comparison of the stated purpose and aims to the 
actual situation on the ground by the end of 2008 and early 2009 demonstrated the 
failure of NATO’s Afghanistan strategy. In fact, by the end of 2008 both NATO and 
United Nations reports argued that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had 
deteriorated to a level where large parts of Afghanistan had slipped from the hands of 
the central government.2 The number of security incidents in Afghanistan had 
increased six-fold since 2003, there were serious problems with establishing proper 
governance in large parts of the country, and 40% of Afghanistan was deemed 
inaccessible to humanitarian or civilian aid.3 NATO members publicly expressed 
concerns at the level of corruption that permeated all levels of government.4 Even the 
Afghan government’s hold on Kabul province and the capital itself appeared to be in 
doubt. By early 2009 the means and methods employed by NATO did not realise the 
stated political purpose and aims.  
 
                                                 
1
 COMISAF, "Commander's Initial Assessment,"(ISAF HQ/US Forces Afghanistan, 2009), p. 1-1. 
2
 UNSC, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1833," ed. United Nations Security 
Council(New York2008); COMISAF, "Commander's Initial Assessment," p. 1-1. 
3
 UNSC, "Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 21 to 28 November 2008,"(New 
York: United Nations Security Council, 2008). p. 3 
4
 Secretary of State MoD Barth Eide, Espen, "Why Is Norway in Afghanistan? How Can We Best 
Complete Our Mission? [" in Opening address 42nd Leangkollen Conference(Oslo: Norwegian 
Atlantic Committee, 2007); Rt Hon John Hutton, "Speech to the IISS 11 November 2008," in 
Remembrance Day Conference at IISS, ed. IISS(London: IISS, 2008). 
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The failure of NATO’s strategies in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 also 
becomes evident when analysing the behaviour of the members of the NATO-alliance 
by early 2009. The alliance was divided in its understanding of the situation in 
Afghanistan, both with respect to what means and methods were necessary to achieve 
the stated political aims, as well as how to use force in Afghanistan. The result was a 
conglomerate of diverging objectives, approaches, and a rift between members willing 
to commit troops to the troubled RC South and those unwilling to do so.5 By late 2008, 
politicians in leading NATO-countries would publicly admit their concerns and worries 
about the strategies pursued thus far, and further describe the situation as a ‘stalemate’.6 
Although NATO-officials maintained that there were elements of the strategies that 
were successful, the public and many academics questioned whether the NATO-
countries had a coherent strategy at all in Afghanistan.7 In some cases, security analysts 
called for a total re-evaluation of the operations in Afghanistan and went so far as to 
claim that ‘[t]he clammy odour of defeat is in the air.’8 
 
The end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 marked a turning point for the 
Afghanistan campaign as ISAF and many of its members began a series of national 
reappraisals of their strategies in Afghanistan, admitting the serious shortcomings of 
the previous strategies. The United States (US), the leading nation in NATO and in 
Afghanistan, embarked on a re-evaluation of its Afghanistan policy and its strategy 
following the inauguration of the Obama administration in January 2009.9 The result of 
this overhaul was six months later to try ‘….a fundamentally new approach….’ with 
respect to the manner in which the US used force in Afghanistan.10 The United 
Kingdom (UK) similarly re-evaluated its Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy in early 
2009, and its armed forces came to the conclusion during 2008 that it stood at a 
                                                 
5
 Robert Gates, "Afghan Q and A," Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): p. 81; Rory Stewart in House of 
Commons Defence Committee, UK Operations in Afghanistan: The Thirteenth Report of Session 
2006-2007, 2007, evidence pages (ev.pp). 33-34. 
6
 "Afghan Q and A," p. 82. Michael Evans, "David Miliband: Nato Troops Stuck in an Afghanistan 
'Stalemate," Timesonline 2009. 
7
 Hew Strachan, "Strategy and the Limitation of War," Survival 50, no. 1 (2008); Antonio Giustozzi, 
Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan(London: Hurst & 
Company, 2007), p. 206; Corey Flintoff, "Troops May Head to Afghanistan Lacking Strategy," 
National Public Radio, 28 January 2009. 
8
 Julian Lindley-French, "The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views," Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): 
p. 91. 
9
 Mary Louise Kelly, "With New Boss, Gates Shifts Focus to Afghanistan," National Public Radio, 
January 27 2009. 
10
 COMISAF, "Commander's Initial Assessment," p. 2-1. 
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crossroads concerning its outlook and composition in Afghanistan.11 Even smaller 
nations such as the Netherlands and Norway re-evaluated their strategy in 2009 
emphasising that their previous strategy had been flawed, or withdrew their 
commitments altogether.12 
 
Therefore, by early 2009 it was apparent that the strategies employed by the 
NATO alliance and its constituents states had failed. This study will explore the 
strategic behaviour leading up to this failure by focusing on the strategic behaviour of 
three of the alliance members, namely the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, utilising 
the lens of strategic theory. The failure of the alliance and the individual states in 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 may be examined in the narrow light of the 
peculiarities of the neo-Taliban insurgency after 2001, making it a unique event. 
However, it is the premise of this study that the predicament of the NATO partners in 
Afghanistan highlights a more general challenge of contemporary strategy that is, 
making strategy within an alliance or coalition in the midst of complex conflicts.13 It is 
with these perspectives I will explore the strategic behaviour of the aforementioned 
NATO-states in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008.  
 
The Study: 
Overall structure 
Firstly, the research design of this study will be explained. Thereafter, I explore 
the theory underpinning the research question and design, and how the four factors of 
the study were developed. Lastly, the strategic behaviour displayed by the three cases I 
have selected will be analysed based on the research design and the four factors. 
                                                 
11
 HMGovernment, "UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward," ed. The Cabinet 
Office(London: The Stationary Office, 2009). General Sir Richard Dannatt, "Soldier First - 
Developing the Force," in RUSI Land Warfare Conference(London 23 June2009). 
12
 Norwegian Government, "A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian  Efforts in Faryab Province in 
Afghanistan, March 2009  (Strategi for Helhetlig Norsk Innsats I Faryab-Provinsen I Afghanistan, 
Mars 2009)," ed. Norwegian Government(Oslo: Norwegian Government, 2009). 
13
 John Mackinlay, Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, vol. Whitehall 
Paper no 64, Whitehall Papers (London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies, 2005), p. 20. 
 11 
 
 
The research question 
The situation in Afghanistan by the end of 2008 and the challenges of developing 
strategy in the context of coalitions and the complex conflict of Afghanistan create the 
foundation for this study’s research question: What characterised the strategic 
behaviour of the lesser coalition states, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 
Norway, in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008? 
 
As explored below this thesis defines strategy as: The process of utilising force or 
the threat of force for the purpose of political ends. Strategic behaviour is consequently 
defined as: ‘….the behaviour relevant to the threat or actual use of force.’14 These 
definitions have implications for the framework of analysis that will be explored below. 
The term ‘lesser states’ will be used to denote any country in a coalition that is 
not the lead state, in the meaning of a state carrying significantly more influence than 
other coalition states, and provides a political, military or logistical framework for the 
use of the rest of the coalition as well as providing a significantly larger contribution in 
troops and resources than the other coalition states. The UK has been classified a lesser 
state as its contribution was more comparable to other NATO-states, as compared to 
the contribution of the US.  
Research design and choice of cases: 
The study has explored the research question through an exploratory, multiple 
and holistic case study involving three cases: the UK, the Netherlands and Norway.15 
The context of the case study is the three states’ involvement in the operations in 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. The unit of study is the strategic decision-making 
organisation in the three states, whereas the three states’ strategic behaviour constitutes 
the variable explored. The time frame chosen for this study were the years 2003 to 
2008. The start date is thus defined by the time that NATO accepted responsibility for 
the International Security Assistance Force on August 9th 2003. The end date is marked 
                                                 
14
 CS Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History(London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), p. 6. 
15
 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Fourth ed., vol. 5, Applied Social 
Research Methods Series (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), p. 46. 
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by the re-evaluation of the strategies in Afghanistan by the US, following the 
presidential elections of that year, re-evaluations that also occurred in the UK and 
Norway. 
 
The three cases were selected because they shared similar strategic and 
operational challenges from 2003 to 2008, and accepted responsibilities that made it 
reasonable to expect them to develop independent strategies in addition to the overall 
ISAF-strategy. The three states all deployed forces to Afghanistan prior to NATO’s 
involvement and were involved as lesser partners in NATO’s accession of 
responsibility in Afghanistan from 2003. The three states took an active part in all 
stages of NATO’s and ISAF’s operations, from the initial focus on Kabul through the 
four stages of ISAF’s expansion which was completed in 2006.16 The UK, the 
Netherlands, and Norway all had sole operational responsibility for their respective 
PRTs in the Helmand, Uruzgan, and Faryab provinces. Their areas of responsibility 
(AOR) all contained elements of Pashtu population affected by the Taliban insurgency, 
even though the areas were not affected to the same degree. All three countries had to 
develop their Afghanistan strategies in competition with other commitments, and their 
commitments in Afghanistan strained the three nations’ armed forces, in particularly 
their land components, to the point that the Afghanistan deployment was said to have 
adversely affected other commitments and the general readiness of the armed forces.17 
In addition, the expansion of ISAF’s responsibility between 2004 and 2006 and the 
ensuing increase in military and civilian casualties, led the public opinion in all three 
states to become more critical of the Afghanistan operations, and it appeared that 
public opinion in all three countries was split down the middle by 2008 on the question 
of whether they supported the commitment in Afghanistan. 18 The three countries thus 
faced similar strategic challenges in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 and had the 
opportunity and the scope through their missions to develop independent or additional 
strategies in their respective areas.  
 
                                                 
16
 ISAF, "ISAF Troops in Numbers,"(International Security Assistance Force, 2007). 
17
 James Fergusson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan(London: 
Bantam, 2008), pp. 136, 214, 32 and 64. 
18
  See: Nina Berglund, "Majority Supports Troops in Afghanistan," Aftenposten (English edition), 5 
February 2008; Angus Reid Global Monitor, "Dutch Still Divided on Afghanistan Mission," Angus 
Reid Global Monitor, http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/30510/dutch_still_divided_on_afghanistan_mission/. 
 13 
The three cases were also selected because the UK and the Netherlands are two 
of Norway’s’ closest allies and viewed as key partners in defence and security issues. 
This close connection in the field of security and military matters has made it possible 
for me, a Norwegian officer, to access the material relevant and necessary to study and 
compare their strategic behaviour between 2003 and 2008. The similarities between the 
strategic experiences and the strategic organisation of the three cases were not 
coincidental. The three countries have a long history of defence co-operation, 
manifested in logistics and procurement co-operation, the establishment of permanent 
joint units, and the a high degree of operational co-operation. The British and Dutch 
influence on the Norwegian defence sector was and still is widespread.  In the armed 
forces, but particularly in the Norwegian MoD, the UK is a source of inspiration in the 
fields of organisation and operational practices.19  From the Norwegian perspective, the 
Netherlands and the UK were during the period in question described as two of its 
‘….close allies….’ with whom they have ‘….shared values….’.20 This led to the 
development of the so called ‘North Sea Strategy’ where the three countries established 
co-operation in the fields of defence and procurement. In turn, this led to the 
operational co-operation between the Netherlands and Norway in the shape of a joint 
fighter squadron deployed to ISAF, and also in the permanent exchange of liaison 
officers to the respective centres of doctrine in the two countries. The Netherlands and 
the UK have the history of the joint UK-NL amphibious brigade, whereas Norway’s 
mechanised rapid reaction forces have been integrated in the permanent GE-NL 
Corps. The operational co-operation is equally close as Norway has traditionally sought 
to be a part of the British operational organisation as evident in Kosovo, Iraq and stage 
2 of the ISAF enlargement in RC North in 2005. The Dutch and British contingents 
have similarly been part of RC South since 2006. The close connection between the 
three countries made a study of them easier in terms of access to the relevant actors 
                                                 
19
 J Børresen, G Gjeseth, and R Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie: Allianseforsvar I Endring, Bind 5 
[Norwegian Defence History: Alliance Defence in Change, Vol. 5], 5 vols., vol. Bind 5, Norsk 
Forsvarshistorie Bind 1-5 (Bergen, Norway: Eide forlag, 2004), p. 289 (caption) and 310;  For an 
example of British influence on Dutch organisation see: Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, "Can the 
Eu Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities,"(London: European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2009), p. 47. 
20
MoD, "Stortingsproposisjon Nr 48 2007-2008 (Norwegian Government White Paper)," ed. 
Ministry of Defence, (Oslo2008), p. 31.('Nære allierte'); Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 
"Norwegian Government White Paper No 1, 2005-2006 ", ed. Norwegian MoD(Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence,, 2006), para. 2-11 (verdifellesskap);  Norwegian MoD, "Strength and 
Relevance", (Oslo: Norwegian Department of Defence, 2004), p. 12.  
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and documents in the strategic processes, and accessibility to personnel with 
operational experience on the ground.  
 
In addition to the strategic challenges and access to the relevant actors, the three 
countries share similar constitutional platforms. They are all parliamentary democracies, 
where the legislature creates both the basis of the political executive and at the same 
time provides a check to it. The UK, the Netherlands, and Norway are all stable 
democracies in which the principle of civilian supremacy over the armed forces is well 
established in the process of making strategy. As will be demonstrated in the analysis, 
the formal structures of strategy making in the three states were also similar from the 
outset, with an integrated MoD as the pivotal force in strategic planning and decision-
making in order to make strategic decision-making more effective and cost effective.21 
The foundations of the strategy making in the Netherlands, Norway and the UK were 
consequently built along similar lines and created a platform from which their strategies 
could be explored. 
 
Lastly, the three cases were selected because the three countries’ potentially 
offered different approaches to strategic behaviour in Afghanistan between 2003 and 
2008. Although the three states had similar formal structures on which to develop their 
strategies, in that their societal, political and military platforms resembled each other, 
their way of approaching the problems of complex conflicts as Afghanistan was 
different. The history of the three countries’ involvement in international crisis 
management and insurgency in many ways represented three different levels of 
experience and three different approaches to the challenges of Afghanistan. Prior to 
Afghanistan, the UK had been more involved in counterinsurgency operations (COIN) 
than international crisis management. Its participation in international crisis 
management and traditional peacekeeping was intermittent prior to 1992, whereas the 
country’s decolonisation experience and the troubles in Northern Ireland forced it to 
engage in COIN for the better part of the twentieth century. The UK was subsequently 
                                                 
21
 See: "Norwegian Government White Paper No 45: 00/01 (Stortingsproposisjon Nr. 45, 2000-2001 
) 'the Reorganisation of the Armed Forces in the Period 2002-2005'," ed. MoD (Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence (Forsvarsdepartementet), 2001)., 
www.defensie.nl/organisatie/defensie/militaire_leiding, and 
www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation 
 15 
willing to define the conflict of Afghanistan in terms of an insurgency early on and 
debate whether its counterinsurgency experience was relevant to Afghanistan.22  
 
In contrast, Norway had throughout the twentieth century nurtured the role of a 
small state in terms of hard power issues such as strategy and use of force. Its 
experience prior to Afghanistan was limited to international crisis management in the 
shape of PSO and peacemaking, where it had been one of the main contributors since 
1956. It consequently attempted to define its efforts in Afghanistan in these terms 
rather than COIN.23 Norwegian strategic concepts differed from the British in its 
understanding of the conflict as well as in its perception on the use of force. Norwegian 
perception emphasised civilian rather than military resources, and employed UN 
concepts such as integrated mission and PSO rather than the perspective of 
counterinsurgency.24 This tendency was exemplified by the fact that Norway by the end 
of 2008 had not developed any specific doctrines for COIN but relied on sundry high 
intensity and PSO manuals.25  
 
The Netherlands occupied a third position in its experience in dealing with 
international crisis management and insurgency. It had been involved in colonial 
counterinsurgency from late 1870s to 1949 in Indonesia and then in PSO from 1956.26 
The Netherlands used the terms of insurgency and counterinsurgency from an early 
stage, but argued for a different interpretation of the terms and a different emphasis.27 
The Dutch interpretation, or ‘the Dutch Approach’, to COIN emphasised the co-
ordination and the synergy of civilian and military resources, and attempted to combine 
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restrictive use of force with cultural sensitivity.28 To what extent this actually 
represented a unique approach to COIN was debated and will be discussed below.29 
 
The three countries of the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway were selected on 
the basis of their similar strategic challenges in Afghanistan, their close relationship 
which provided access to relevant material, their strategic organisation, and their 
different approaches to the strategic challenges. The three countries thus provide a 
useful framework for the examination of the strategic behaviour among the lesser 
coalition members in Afghanistan conflict between 2003 and 2008. 
 
Limitations  
Although the relationship between the three countries was close, Norway as the 
smallest nation placed more emphasis on the relationship than did the Netherlands and 
the UK. The Norwegian desire to emulate the other states was not necessarily 
reciprocated, as the UK naturally would find more influence from the US than from 
other countries. Indeed, the post World War II history of Anglo-Norwegian relations in 
the field of security, defence, and strategy was characterised by a former Norwegian 
diplomat as a story of ‘….unreciprocated love…’.30 Another obvious limitation in 
comparing these cases was the size of the strategic means available to the three states. 
Although the conflicts after the Cold War have not been of an industrial or total nature, 
the Western response to the conflicts have been lengthy, and of an expeditionary and 
technologically advanced nature. Consequently, the size of the military and civilian 
means matter and will enable and constrict the development of strategy in each 
country. The three countries were not lead members of the coalition in Afghanistan 
2003 to 2008, as their efforts were continuously dwarfed by that of the US; however, 
the difference in size between the lesser countries of the ISAF-coalition was 
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considerable. The UK’s military means were roughly ten times the size of the 
equivalent Norwegian means in its defence budget, manpower, and troops in 
Afghanistan during the period, whereas similar figures for the Netherlands was 
approximately one third that of the British.31  
 
Validity and reliability 
The three cases were examined using a qualitative methodology. The four factors 
deemed relevant to strategic behaviour during the period was explored through studies 
of relevant official documents and available literature on the subject.  
Validity of the study was sought through the use of multiple sources of evidence 
by studying the strategic discourse, national strategy documents, doctrines, and 
operational practices at the same levels in each of the three countries. Further validity 
was sought through a comparison of the data and alternative explanations across the 
three cases. However, given my methodological standpoint, the three cases were not 
used to construct general theories on the strategic behaviour of lesser coalition 
partners. Reliability in the study was established through the use of public and 
published sources, but the selection were limited to sources where the purpose was to 
explain strategic reasoning to an audience involved in the strategic decision-making or 
expected to understand the use of force. Sources aimed at a broader audience were only 
included as far as they explained the strategic reasoning in detail.  
Methodological challenges 
The methodological challenges of my approach concerned the use and the study 
of the central terms of the study, as well as the use of theory to establish my analytical 
framework to explore the characteristics of the strategic behaviour in the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Norway. 
 
The general problem was how to study and approach the subject of strategy. This 
study uses as its core that the research question is addressing political and strategic 
behaviour, and therefore a study of human behaviour in the context of political 
conflict. How this behaviour is best studied depends on how one perceives the nature 
of political conflict. This study adopted the view that the nature of political conflict is 
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best analysed through an approach first described by the German military theorist Carl 
von Clausewitz. The starting point of this view is that war and conflict should be seen 
as a violent social interaction between human adversaries.32 As a result severe 
limitations may be inferred on how to measure and predict outcomes when studying 
events involving human behaviour.33 This means that this study approached the 
research questions qualitatively and understood the subject of strategy as something 
that cannot be measured in absolute and objective terms, but rather should be 
interpreted in a human and subjective context.34  
 
The analytical framework for analysing the characteristics will be developed 
through a study of existing strategic theory, with an emphasis on the challenges of 
developing strategy in the context of a coalition, faced with the challenges of complex 
conflicts. Utilising this theory, a definition of strategy and four main factors for 
characterising the strategic behaviour of the three states will be deduced. 
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework  
This project poses the question of what characterised the strategic behaviour of 
three lesser NATO-states involved in the Afghanistan operations between 2003 and 
2008. The question is part of the broad, multidisciplinary field of strategic studies. 
Within the field of strategic studies there are no universally accepted definitions of 
either strategy, strategic behaviour or what factors are relevant to analyse this research 
question. Whilst there is no agreement as to what factors are relevant to the study of 
strategy, certain themes and problems recur in the literature, and it is through a 
discussion of what I believe are the most important themes that I will explore and 
establish the terms of strategy and strategic behaviour. 
 
Having established a definition of the terms strategy and strategic behaviour, I 
will explore the impact of coalition and alliance warfare on contemporary strategy and 
the role and influence of lesser coalition states. Thereafter, I will explore the impact of 
complex conflicts on contemporary strategy. I will then revisit the general theories on 
strategy and strategic behaviour, and use these three theoretical perspectives to deduce 
the relevant factors for an analysis of what characterised the strategic behaviour of the 
three NATO-states in Afghanistan. Having deduced what factors are relevant to 
explore and analyse the problem; I will explain how each factor will be used and 
operationalised. 
Strategy – a definition 
The term strategy, and its derivative strategic behaviour, has become a term with 
wide usage. In the words of Michael Howard, strategy is ‘….used to describe the use of 
available resources to gain any objective, from winning at bridge to selling soap,….’.35 
From having a narrow military definition, the term strategy has become widely used in 
colloquial language, and in the fields of business studies and political science. The term 
strategy has become so broadly used and so widely defined that some authors argue 
that it has lost its meaning and if not carefully defined strategy is a term more likely to 
confuse than clarify.36  
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The definition of strategy employed in my analysis is that strategy is the process 
of utilising force or the threat of force for the purpose of political ends.37 This 
definition and the reasoning behind it will be further explored in each of the four 
factors. Strategic behaviour is defined as ‘….the behaviour relevant to the threat or 
actual use of force.’38 Strategic behaviour is understood as the decisions and actions 
taken by the three countries concerning the use of force, but does not include an 
analysis of whether or not the strategies themselves were effective. These decisions and 
actions are influenced and shaped by the factors, but also influencing the factors 
themselves, creating a dynamic and complex relationship between strategic behaviour 
and the factors of analysis.39 This definition necessarily draws upon the contentious 
debate about strategic culture and its relationship to strategic behaviour and whether 
behaviour can be separated from culture, which will be further analysed under the 
factor strategic outlook below.40  
Strategy, Coalitions and Alliances  
An analysis of contemporary strategic behaviour would be incomplete without 
including the impact of alliances and coalitions. The reliance of coalitions and alliances 
has been one of the most significant features of strategy and the use of force in the 
Western world throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The world’s 
greatest military power, the US, has not launched a major military operation since the 
Second World without attempting to establish a working coalition or an alliance before 
using force and the need for coalitions is now fully embedded in its national and 
military strategies.41 To smaller and medium sized powers coalition operations are no 
longer described in terms of options, but rather as a prerequisite for the use of force. A 
significant military power like the UK argues that it would be difficult to imagine 
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British land operations without a working coalition.42 For even smaller Western states, 
operations beyond its immediate survival are unimaginable outside the framework of an 
alliance or a coalition.  
 
This reliance among Western nations on coalitions is due to the increased 
importance of international institutions and the reliance on those institutions and 
organisations to establish security both inside and outside the Western World after 
1945, particularly after 1989.43 Following this logic, coalitions becomes vehicles through 
which the states can wield influence in institutions or organisations and gain ‘….a seat 
at the table.’44 The internationalisation of security has led to a view where unilateral use 
of force is less acceptable and the use of international coalitions legitimise the use of 
force; a large coalition being an expression of international unity and legitimacy for the 
use of force. There are also more mundane and practical reasons for the extensive use 
of alliances. Particularly since 1989 the Western states have significantly reduced the 
size of its military forces and what forces remain are expensive and not readily risked.45 
For all these reasons, coalitions have become essential to the use of force in the 
Western world, and analysing Western strategy in the early twenty-first century without 
including the impact of coalitions would provide an incomplete and inadequate picture 
of contemporary strategy. 
 
The use of coalitions in contemporary operations brings with it an aspect of 
sharing political and military risk, cost, capabilities and casualties, but the reliance on 
coalitions also presents strategic thinkers with a paradox. 46 In order to be able to use 
force internationally Western states need coalitions, but coalitions are not the most 
effective way of employing force in a limited strategic or military sense. From a 
strategic point of view what makes coalitions politically desirable, the participation of 
many states, is the factor that makes them unwieldy and ineffective as instruments of 
force in contemporary conflicts.  
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The paradox of the need for coalitions and alliances on the one side and the 
strategic ineffectiveness inherent in them is in itself not revolutionary, but the 
international situation and the character of contemporary conflict presents the dilemma 
in a new setting. The traditional theories on strategy and coalitions do not adequately 
describe the challenges of coalition warfare in contemporary conflicts and are 
consistently written from the perspective of the lead nation and downplay the role of 
the lesser nations. Thus they do not sufficiently explain the challenges of NATO’s 
coalition strategies in Afghanistan. It is important to revisit the strategic theory on 
coalition and alliance warfare and see it the light of the challenges of contemporary 
conflict in Afghanistan. In order to do so I will briefly discuss how strategic theory has 
traditionally balanced the dilemma of coalition and alliance effectiveness, what remedies 
have been employed to increase effectiveness, and then explain how these remedies are 
less applicable in contemporary conflicts such as Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. I 
will then illustrate how the theories’ traditional focus on lead nations is less relevant to 
understand the question of coalition effectiveness in contemporary conflicts such as 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. An examination of strategic behaviour in 
Afghanistan and contemporary conflicts would be incomplete without examining it in 
the light of coalition strategy and including the strategies of the lesser members of 
contemporary coalitions. 
 
Definitions: 
Alliances and coalitions are as old as organised warfare itself, and created out of a 
desire to strengthen two or more states’ position, in general or vis-a-vis a common 
adversary.47 An alliance or coalition may further states’ interests as it offers increased 
legitimacy or moral standing, as well as increased military and civilian resources in the 
deterrence of an adversary or in pursuit of an actual conflict. Most contemporary 
writers and official doctrines distinguish between two forms of collaborative warfare: 
coalitions and alliances. Alliances are described by the official US doctrines as a long-
term security relationship emanating from ‘….a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between 
two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests 
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of the members.’48 Alliances normally have formal and agreed procedures of decision-
making and an organisation or bureaucracy, as well as often having common policies, 
doctrines, training, and to some extent streamlined military forces. Alliances are 
established between states that share common perspectives and values, and their long-
term and deterrent aspects are emphasised.49 Coalitions on the other hand are normally 
described as ‘….an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common 
action.’50 Coalitions are formed to deal with an immediate crisis or conflict and to deal 
with specific issues rather than creating long-term bonds between states.  
 
The benefits of alliances and coalitions  
Any examination of the dilemma of alliances and coalitions and their 
effectiveness commences with the question of states’ interests. Alliances and coalitions 
are formed by states who find it in their interest to join forces. These interests do not 
necessarily overlap, and the degree to which they do, determines whether the states 
form a coalition or an alliance. Interests within an alliance or coalition will often diverge 
outside the purpose of the formation of the alliance or coalition, and alliances and 
coalitions do not have to be based on friendships between the states.51 Large coalitions 
or alliances have different degrees of common interests, sometimes creating different 
tiers or levels of unity within the same alliance.52 Interests are not static factors, 
however, but may change through the participation in alliances, making alliances and 
coalitions instruments for influencing the participants, not merely vehicles for the 
realisation of their interests.  
 
The clearest benefits to joining alliances and coalitions are the increased 
resources and the sharing of the burdens. As pointed out by Henri de Jomini, a state’s 
interests may be significantly enhanced by the addition of allies, either through the 
additional troops that can be provided or the additional distraction it provides to the 
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common adversary.53 Jomini’s focus on the benefits of alliances and coalitions came 
after extensive service both against and with coalitions during the Revolutionary Wars 
and represents a positive view in strategic theory of the use of alliances and coalitions. 
To a small state, the advantages of additional resources will often be the most 
important reason to join an alliance or coalition as it enables a state to advance its 
interests through actions that would otherwise be impossible. To a larger state, 
additional partners may enhance an alliance or a coalition’s capacity in the form of 
numbers or their capabilities to carry out certain operations either through their 
additional training, experience or equipment.54 The resources may not always take the 
form of military forces or capability, but also by financial and logistical support 
provided to ease the burden of other nations. Forming an alliance or coalition also 
provides easier access to many areas of interest that states within a coalition or alliance 
may have. Rather than having the challenge of a forcible entry into an area, a coalition 
may provide peaceful access and facilities enabling operations.55 
 
The actual resources may however not be the most important part of Western 
coalitions. The more recent literature, published in the wake of the Gulf War coalitions 
and NATO’s operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan emphasises the legal and moral 
benefits of establishing alliances and coalitions.56 Historically many coalitions welcome 
partners with either limited financial or military capacity.57 As noted by Thucydides an 
important aspect of alliances and coalitions is the enhanced legitimacy and moral 
standing the joining together of many states bring with it. A large coalition or alliance 
provides legitimacy in the eyes of international opinion and freedom of action that 
unilateral action seldom has.58 Within a coalition or alliance a large number of members 
also help to share the intangible burdens of political and military risks: the pressures of 
domestic public opinion as well as the actual casualties in the operations.  
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Alliance and coalition ineffectiveness 
The benefits of coalition or alliance are offset against their perceived 
ineffectiveness and weaknesses in action. Many strategic theorists have approached the 
subject of alliance and coalition warfare with a sense of scepticism and mistrust. 
Whereas Jomini adopted a practical view and emphasised the benefits of alliances and 
coalitions, Carl von Clausewitz recognised the need for coalitions but emphasised their 
weaknesses rather than exploring their strengths.59 Ever the political realist and the 
strategic idealist, Clausewitz viewed the interests of the individual states in the coalition 
as the source of its strength or weakness. A coalition’s effectiveness depended on the 
degree to which the coalition partners pursued their ‘….independent interest….’ or 
subordinated their own interests to that of the whole coalition.60 The degree to which 
the narrow interests of a country were subordinated to the wider objectives was 
contingent on the degree of friendship existing between the coalition partners, and 
Clausewitz was not overly optimistic of this occurring. Clausewitz’s writings reflect the 
scepticism of later strategic theorists and set the parametres of the military debate, as 
opposed to the political debate, on alliance and coalition warfare. To the extent that 
coalitions were discussed explicitly in Clausewitz’s works he underscored their 
weaknesses and the opportunities they offered a cunning enemy able to exploit 
divisions. This critical view of alliances and coalitions has been maintained by many 
scholars today. Colin Spencer Gray in his Modern Strategy reiterated the Clausewitzian 
view. While discussing alliances and coalitions he afforded the greater part of his 
analysis to the weaknesses and inherent military ineffectiveness inherent in them, rather 
than their strengths. Although he acknowledged the strategic significance of alliances 
and coalitions, he adopted the Clausewitzian perspective of their vulnerability to a 
cunning adversary. To Gray, conflicts of the twentieth century illustrate that ‘….the 
garnering of allies need not augment strength overall’ and that allies are ‘….both a curse 
and a blessing.’61 
 
Both Clausewitz’s and Gray’s views on coalition and alliance warfare are perhaps 
best interpreted as illustrating the struggle between strategy as an ideal and strategy in 
practice. Although Clausewitz was most interested in how to divide enemy coalitions, 
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he also clearly recognised the need for coalitions in practice. In fact, when trying to 
illustrate his strategic and operational thoughts in practice, Clausewitz used a fictitious 
coalition against France as the basis of his plan.62 Clausewitz was also overly pessimistic 
about the resilience of coalitions even in his own day. France was defeated by coalitions 
in both 1813-1814 and in 1815, and states were able to see past their own narrow 
interests although Clausewitz did not highlight it. He himself praised the Russian Tsar 
for subordinating his troops to other coalition members, and his own mentor 
Gneisenau risked his army in the Waterloo campaign by advancing towards Wellington 
rather than retreat after initial defeats.63 Gray arrives at his conclusion about the 
weaknesses of alliance and coalition warfare after focusing on the challenges of the 
Axis powers during World War II and the opportunities they provided their 
adversaries, rather than the ultimately successful set of coalitions and alliances of the 
Western allies.64 To both authors alliances and coalitions are necessary evils, and the 
practical challenges of keeping them together are at odds with the ideal conduct of war 
and strategy.  
 
The explanation for Clausewitz’s and Gray’s instinctive scepticism is obvious. 
The necessities of alliance and coalition warfare go against all established and ideal 
principles of war and strategy.65 Most lists of principles start with the need for 
establishing clear and unambiguous political and strategic aims and the maintaining of 
these aims throughout the war. Given that alliances and coalitions are formed by 
independent states, this principle is rarely achievable. Each state has its own 
understanding of what the purpose and the aims should be, and although the states 
may agree on the overall purpose of an alignment, the more immediate aims and 
particularly the methods employed to reach the goals may historically cause 
differences.66 The final strategic purpose and aims may be less ambitious or clear than 
ideally desired and the organisation of the use of force may differ from what a narrow 
military perspective of strategy may view as desirable.67 Connected to the principle of 
clear aims is the principle of unity of command. The conduct of war and strategy 
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should be directed from one source, with decisions emanating from one body.  In 
relation to alliance and coalition warfare this creates serious challenges as states are 
reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over vital instruments such as the use of force and 
its military forces.68 This reluctance may be symbolic, but also due to the prospect of 
losing control over the actual use of force and its consequences.69  Historically, unity of 
command is rarely achieved in coalitions, and unity of effort is only possible at the 
highest levels.70 Instead constant negotiations and compromise between alliance or 
coalition members becomes the order of the day.71 
 
Measured against the principles of war, alliances and coalitions traditionally suffer 
from ineffectiveness due to the problems of interoperability between military forces. 
Alliance and coalition operations are difficult to reconcile with the principles of 
economy of force and simplicity of plans, as well as flexibility and mobility. Alliance 
and coalition warfare entail streamlining forces from different states with different 
equipment, doctrines, and ways of operating. Add to this the challenges of combined 
logistics, different languages, culture and mindsets, and it is not difficult to understand 
the operational challenges of alliance and coalition warfare, and why alliances and 
coalitions are viewed as cumbersome, costly, and ineffective by many strategic theorists 
and military professionals.  
 
Remedies against coalition and alliance ineffectiveness 
The dilemma between the need for coalitions and their inherent ineffectiveness 
has been remedied in various ways. Because alliances and coalitions are formed in the 
common interests of the states augmenting their own resources and standing, the first 
remedy discussed is thorough negotiations on purpose and aims in advance of actual 
operations and a ‘harmonization’ of the states’ divergent political and military aims.72 
This harmonisation requires a unique leadership from all parties involved. Although the 
larger states naturally carry more weight, smaller states may contribute vital features to 
coalitions such as international standing, geographical access, or key resources, which 
may provide them more relative influence. The leadership of successful alliances and 
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coalitions is characterised by persuasion and negotiations at both political and military 
levels, rather than traditional force and might.73 The outcome of such negotiations and 
harmonisation is often a compromise concerning aims and methods such as in Kosovo 
1999, or in the formal command structure such as in Kuwait 1990-91.  
 
More practical remedies aim to enhance the interoperability between forces. The 
experiences of Kuwait in 1990-91 and Kosovo 1999 illustrated that a proper 
understanding of each nation’s strengths and limitations made it possible to mesh the 
requirements of each nation with the overall coalition operational design.74 This 
included assigning suitable tasks to individual nations in accordance with their wishes 
rather than insisting on a one size fits all approach to operational design. Common 
force training and integration of doctrines may in theory be carried out prior to actual 
operations, such as NATO has attempted for 60 years in peacetime, or as the US 
carried out in theatre during the Korean War.75 The inherent operational weaknesses of 
alliances and coalitions has been improved by the deployment of large national units, 
integrated ideally at operational level, but traditionally not lower than brigade level, in 
order to lessen the amount of friction that tactical integration carries with it and to 
reduce the number of areas vulnerable to multinational differences.76  
 
The character of the threat facing an alliance or coalition also seems to influence 
whether the dilemma between the need for alliances and coalitions and their inherent 
weaknesses emerges. Historically, alliances and coalitions met with success when faced 
with either a threat against the states’ survival, or threats that do not require coalitions 
to operate over a length of time. Threats against the survival of the state, such as that 
facing the United Nations (UN) during World War II and its Western successor 
NATO, bind the states closer together and make issues of sovereignty less contentious. 
An exception from this was the challenges of the Entente during World War I where 
coalition unity was a contentious issue until the very end. If a threat is more limited, 
such as Kuwait in 1990-91, Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq 2003 the strains within the 
coalitions emerges quickly and the most important remedy is a swift conclusion of the 
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conflict. The most important way to ameliorate the dilemma between the need for 
alliances and coalitions and their ineffectiveness is a proper understanding of the 
exceptional nature of alliance and coalition strategy. Eliot Cohen argues persuasively 
that Winston Churchill’s true greatness as a strategist lay in his ability to balance 
firmness with sympathy in his relationship with his alliance partners, and the needs of 
the whole alliance against the needs of the individual states, and thus understanding 
that alliance and coalition warfare is ‘…the art[…] of persuasion and negotiation….’.77 
  
Coalition and alliance warfare in contemporary conflicts 
Striking a balance between the need for coalitions and managing their strategic 
weaknesses is in many respects more precarious in contemporary conflicts than 
previously. The need for alliances and coalitions is greater due to the character of the 
international system and the sizes of the military forces available. Simultaneously, the 
weaknesses of alliance and coalition strategy are more prevalent because many of the 
traditional remedies against coalition weaknesses are less available and employable. 
 
With the brief exception of Iraq in April 2003, Western states have since 1999 
been involved in limited, low intensity conflicts involving non-state actors, rendering 
many of the remedies against alliance and coalition ineffectiveness inapplicable. The 
character of the Afghanistan conflict since NATO’s intervention in 2003 has been that 
of a stabilisation or counterinsurgency operation, presenting the alliance members with 
an indirect or limited threat, and denying the alliance the benefit of forging an alliance 
against an existential threat. The contemporary operations in Afghanistan have also 
required the alliance to operate in a hostile environment for a lengthy period of time. 
This renders the experiences from the brief alliance and coalition warfare of the 1990s 
less relevant, as long-term limited wars increase the potential for diverging interests and 
sovereignty issues to emerge.78 The stabilisation or counterinsurgency character of the 
conflict also involves more non-state actors in the form of GOs and NGOs, making 
the alliance and coalition theory developed around Kuwait and Kosovo less relevant, 
whereas the actual intensity of the operations create challenges that render the 
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experiences from the PSO carried out by the United Nations and NATO less 
applicable.  
 
The methods used to reduce alliance and coalition inoperability are also less 
applicable than in previous alliances and coalitions. Although NATO as an alliance has 
for sixty years attempted to streamline its decision-making procedures and chains of 
command, its doctrines and training, these efforts concerned high intensity missions of 
defending Europe or stabilising the Balkans through PSO. Between 2003 and 2008 the 
alliance did not have a common approach to counterinsurgency, and hence no 
common doctrines or training directly relevant to the mission in Afghanistan. 79 The 
size of the contributions made available to ISAF between 2003 and 2008 as well as the 
dispersed design of the operations made the organisation along large national 
contingents more difficult. The actual troop contributions, except in the cases of the 
US and the UK after 2006, were at company group and battalion group levels.80 The 
NATO units have consequently been forced to integrate their operations at the lowest 
tactical level without common training and doctrines. 
 
Although the NATO alliance enjoyed certain benefits of an alliance such as an 
integrated command structure, alliance operations between 2003 and 2008 have had to 
be carried out without many of the instruments that successful alliances and coalitions 
have used to reduce the inherent ineffectiveness in alliance and coalition warfare, and 
these limitations of traditional strategic theory are likely to continue in future alliances 
and coalitions. 
 
The influence of smaller states: 
An analysis of NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan would be deficient without 
focusing on the inherent dilemma in coalition and alliance strategy. This in turn may be 
analysed through the study of the NATO-alliance itself or the strategy of the lead 
nation of the alliance, the US. Whilst the lead nation and institution perspectives merit 
consideration in the understanding of contemporary strategy, another significant 
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feature concerning NATO’s strategy between 2003 and 2008 was the influence of the 
lesser alliance partners in the actual conduct of strategy. 
 
As significant as the institutions and the coalitions themselves are to 
understanding contemporary strategy in an international context, the most critical 
aspects of the use of force still pertain to the individual states constituting the alliance.81 
Decisions about establishing, training, equipping and deploying military forces and 
other sources of power are still the prerogatives of individual states. Historically, lesser 
nations have had limited influence on alliance and coalition strategy because they did 
not always constitute a significant or relevant contribution. The lead nation would be 
able to dominate both the decision-making as well as the conduct of strategy. In 
contemporary alliance and coalition warfare, this is not always the case as the lesser 
nations in sum constitute larger and more important contributions. Afghanistan 
between 2003 and 2008 is a case in point. By mid- 2008 the ISAF operation in 
Afghanistan had contributions from forty-two states. The largest contingent was from 
the US, but ISAF’s concept of operations relied on the use of smaller and medium 
states to take a significant share of the operational burden in Afghanistan. Out of 
ISAF’s twenty six Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the US was only fully 
responsible for twelve, and jointly responsible for two. The remaining twelve PRTs 
were operated by smaller and medium sized NATO countries.82 Furthermore, out of 
the 61 000 troops under ISAF command in July 2008, the US provided less than half, 
26 000 troops, the remainder was provided by NATO allies. NATO in Afghanistan 
relied on the smaller and medium sized members of the coalition to play a significant 
and important part of both NATO’s operations and policies in Afghanistan, providing 
the lesser members of the alliance with a greater degree of influence on alliance strategy 
than previous historical coalitions.  
 
The lesser states of the alliance influenced the strategy at the political level and 
through the formal decision-making process of the NATO-summits, the force 
generating process and through their permanent representation in NATO’s political 
and military councils. Furthermore, they had influence through their seconding of 
officials and officers to the Alliance’s chain of command. Utilising these channels the 
lesser states would wield general influence depending on their size and position as one 
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of 26 other NATO states. More importantly, the lesser states influenced NATO 
strategy beyond the actual formal structures, through the character of their actual 
contributions. The nature of NATO’s operations between 2003 and 2008 was that of 
decentralised stabilisation and counterinsurgency efforts, making a division of the areas 
of responsibility (AOR) along national lines necessary. The size of the contributions 
deployed into these AORs depended largely on the individual state’s resources and will. 
The individual states could also influence the modus operandi to a large degree. Equally 
important, alliance troops were not assigned to the NATO commanders without 
restrictions, as all nations retain control over their armed forces even while operating 
under alliance command. All nations, large and small, deployed a parallel national 
command structure to represent the state vis-a-vis NATO and to support the national 
troops by reporting directly to national headquarters. If orders from NATO chain of 
command appeared questionable to a specific contingent, the national chain of 
command could intervene.  
 
The troops assigned to NATO could also be detached with national caveats or 
restrictions as to their actual use. 83 Although the use of national caveats was reduced 
after the Riga Summit of 2006, the individual states still retained control through other 
means, most through command and transfer of authority arrangements.84 As noted, 
troops are never detached to an alliance or coalition unconditionally; instead ISAF-
troops were detached through limited command arrangements where the alliance 
commanders had different degrees of control over the respective national contingents. 
The lesser states could vary whether they transferred their troops with operational 
command or control and to what NATO-level they provide command authority, for 
instance by providing operational command or control to the Regional Commands 
(RCs) rather than ISAF HQ, hence limiting the use of their troops outside the specific 
RCs.85 The lesser states could also influence the actual operations by what kind of 
troops they chose to send, the level of civilian resources made available, and the 
doctrine by which they operated.86 NATO did not have a common counterinsurgency 
doctrine between 2003 and 2008, and directions from NATO chain of command 
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would have limited influence on the manner in which operations were to be carried out. 
Many nations had by 2008 developed their own strategies within their AORs, in line 
with NATO’s overall directives but still with a distinctive national flavour. 
 
The influence of the lesser states can be illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The lesser states exercised considerable autonomy in political, strategic and 
operational matters in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008, and thereby influenced 
alliance strategy.87 NATO’s strategy was in practice as much an aggregate of the 
strategies pursued by its individual members as an alliance strategy. An analysis of 
NATO’s failure in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 would be lacking without the 
study of the strategic behaviour of the individual states participating in the operation. 
Understanding what characterised the strategy of the individual states would aid in the 
examination of NATO’s challenges in Afghanistan up to 2008, as well improve our 
understanding of how coalitions operate and affect contemporary strategy.  
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Strategy in Complex Conflicts 
The second challenge facing the individual NATO-countries was that they were 
developing their strategies in Afghanistan while confronting a conflict and a strategic 
context which was new and unfamiliar to them. The individual NATO countries were 
developing their strategies in an international context where the threats to their national 
security were either indirect or viewed as tied in with the broader goals of a regional or 
international community. The aim of the operations for most NATO-countries was 
international crisis management rather than an outright military victory.88 
 
The conflict in Afghanistan represented a type of conflict that gradually emerged 
through the 1990s and the early 2000s. There is no academic agreement as to the 
character of the type conflicts that Afghanistan represents, but most authors emphasise 
its complexity and composite character, as well as its dissimilarity from the earlier 
interstate conflicts and conventional warfare that most NATO countries were prepared 
to fight.89 Other authors emphasise the ideological struggle as well as the irregular 
tactics employed, and understood the conflict in Afghanistan as well as other similar 
conflicts in terms of a violent insurgency with the population as its main objective.90 
Furthermore, many authors have emphasised the almost dichotomous character of 
Afghanistan and other complex conflicts and note that the conflicts combine modern 
and primitive features simultaneously.91 This is seen as a result of two trends; the 
adversary adapting to the conventional superiority of the Western forces as well as the 
accessibility of modern technology and ideas through globalisation. The conflicts are 
described as composite threats, where regular and irregular modes of war blend 
together and are used deliberately by opponents to offset any conventional 
advantages.92 The conflicts defied traditional strategic thinking in terms of the 
conventional inter-state war that most Western states were prepared for and designed 
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its forces for, as well as their previous peace support experience.93 Their strategies also 
had to take into account the context of international crisis management in which 
international and local non-state actors operate independently or in conjunction with 
international organisations. The NATO-states were thus forced to develop strategies to 
cope with conflicts that were simultaneously pre-modern and hyper modern, 
simultaneously primitive and high tech, and had both intra-state and transnational roots 
and implications.  
 
Not only were the states involved in making strategy in a conceptual void, but 
academics and professionals were also unable to agree on the sources and the nature of 
the actual conflict in Afghanistan. The literature on the Afghan conflict was and is 
diverging, and there is little agreement as to who the actors in the conflict really are, 
their reasons and motives to fight, and naturally disagreement on how to successfully 
develop a counter-strategy in Afghanistan. At the overall level, the conflict has been 
described as a part of a global Islamic insurgency and as part of a regional power 
struggle over Central and South Asia.94 Inside Afghanistan authors have found the 
sources of the instability or insurgency in the Afghan government’s inability to establish 
effective governance at central and local levels and ensuing popular grievances.95 The 
lack of government control is a basic truth in any insurgency, but the main differences 
in the academic literature lie in the conclusions drawn from this basic proposition. One 
argument was that the conflict has its roots in the Afghan government’s inability to 
provide basic security, law and order, and credible local governance. Another common 
argument derived from the grievance argument was the widespread belief that there 
was a link between the lack of development and the ensuing instability and 
insurgency.96 This link has been countered by authors such as Antonio Giustozzi who 
argued that although the Afghan government’s corruption and nepotism was a 
contributing cause to the conflict there was no direct link between the unrest and the 
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lack of development.97 Giustozzi argues that the insurgents and their supporters never 
wanted foreign aid or development, but that the sources of the unrest was to be found 
in the inability of the traditional tribal societies to absorb the turbulent changes that 
Afghanistan and the region have experienced the last thirty years.98 Giustozzi also lent 
credibility to another perspective on the roots of the instability and unrest which sees 
the uprising as rooted in the conflict line between central and local power in 
Afghanistan.99 This argument was offered in parallel to the argument that the conflict 
could be explained by the xenophobic and traditional attitudes of Eastern and Southern 
Afghanistan, and in the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan and the exclusion on the 
Southern Pashtu population from the central government.100 Finally, an important 
explanation for the uprising was to be found in the ideological and religious 
motivations of the Taliban and their representation of Islam and Afghan history.101 
 
Given the multitude of conflict lines it is not surprising that academics or 
professionals have not been able to agree on the character of the main adversary, the 
Taliban. Gilles Dorronsoro argues that the Taliban is a cohesive and centrally directed 
organisation that skilfully exploits the multitude of conflict lines explored in the 
previous paragraph.102 This is contrary to the official British belief held by Secretary of 
State Des Browne and General Houghton who argued that the Taliban was divided 
between local and central tiers, a division that could be exploited.103 This view is 
supported by Giustozzi who argues that the Taliban consists of at least three tiers, each 
with their own motivation and agenda.104  
 
Consequently, the individual states involved in the Afghanistan conflict between 
2003 and 2008 had to develop their strategies in a conceptual void, within a conflict 
where the causes and the actors were unclear. These challenges occurred at a time when 
the lesser NATO countries had few political, strategic or operational concepts with 
which to deal with complex conflicts. The result was a conceptual confusion as to how 
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to respond to the challenges and consequently how to use force.105 Apart from the 
theoretical approach to industrial war during the Cold War era, the NATO members 
shared few common concepts or doctrines on how to deal with complex conflicts, and 
they naturally developed their strategies based on their own experiences. The response 
to the Afghanistan conflict, has been seen as the meeting of three different schools of 
strategic and operational thought, represented by three different types forces: ‘….the 
traditional peacekeepers, the continental war fighters and, at a national level, the 
counter-insurgency forces.’106 Given their impact, the question becomes how the lesser 
states approached the question of strategy in Afghanistan. 
 
Consequences 
NATO’s strategic challenges in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 should not 
only be studied in relation to the specific challenges of the Taliban uprising or limited 
to the strategy of the coalition itself, but also through an examination of the individual 
states constituting the coalition and their efforts to develop strategy in an unfamiliar 
conflict.  
 
In Afghanistan as in most other Western operations since 1989, large parts of the 
responsibility of developing strategy in practice rested with the lesser alliance and 
coalition states. These nations have thus far faced the challenge of making strategy in a 
situation where on the one hand they have limited influence on the most important 
decisions being made by the alliance and the U.S., but on the other hand they had a 
large degree of control over the actual use of force in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the 
nations have been developing their strategies in a conflict and in a context that is 
unfamiliar to them. The examination of how individual NATO countries have 
developed their strategies in the light of the challenges of coalition warfare and 
complex conflicts merits closer investigation.  
 
Examining the strategies of the three states would improve our knowledge of the 
role of the smaller and medium sized states in coalition operations, operations that are 
likely to remain the mainstay of international crisis management for the foreseeable 
future. A study of the strategies of the three lesser NATO- partners in the ISAF-
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operation would advance our understanding of how these states perceive and use force, 
and may enhance our understanding as to how to best use these nations within a 
coalition. An improved appreciation and use of lesser coalition partners within a 
coalition may create more cohesive alliances and ideally improve strategic and 
operational effectiveness.107  This is important because although each contribution by 
the three states was limited, their total contribution have consistently outweighed the 
contribution in numbers of the lead nation in Afghanistan, namely the US. The lesser 
states have spared the US troops and resources, as well as added new perspectives and 
competencies. A proper analysis of how the lesser nations use force to realise political 
aims may save lead nations troops and resources in Afghanistan as well as in future 
coalition operations.  
 
Lastly, an analysis and comparison of the strategies of the lesser nations of a 
coalition may improve the strategic thought in the states themselves and aid these states 
to see their own strategies in the context of other states confronting similar challenges 
in contemporary conflicts. In many European states the word strategy is not uttered in 
relation to international crisis management as it is seen as infringing on the domain of 
the coalition itself. Strategy is most often reserved for the case of national survival, and 
not for the contributions in international crisis management. The study of some of the 
lesser nations involved in the NATO operations up to 2008 will shed light on the de-
facto strategic thinking in these countries and their use force, and will contribute to the 
strategic debate in these countries as well as in the broader field of strategic studies.  
 
 
The Factors of the Study: 
From the definitions of strategy and strategic behaviour, and the exploration of 
coalition warfare and complex conflicts, four factors were deduced as relevant for the 
study of the characteristics of strategic behaviour in the three cases. The factors are the 
three states’ political purposes and aims, how the purposes and aims were adapted to 
the nature of war, how the three states organised the process of strategy, and their 
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strategic outlook. These four factors were then operationalised by more detailed 
questions based on the analysis of the strategic literature: 
 
Factors Questions: 
The political purpose 
and aims 
- What were the political purposes and political aims behind the 
three states’ use of force in Afghanistan? 
Adaptability Were the political purpose and aims adapted to: 
- The nature of war and conflict? 
- The character of the complex conflict in Afghanistan? 
- The dynamics of coalition and alliance warfare? 
The organisation of 
the strategic process 
- How was the process of star organised in the three states? 
- What was the level and form of integration in the strategic 
process? 
The use of force and 
the strategic outlook 
- How did the three states understand strategy and force? 
- With what doctrines did the three states employ force? 
 
 
Analysing what characterises the three countries’ strategic behaviour requires an 
analytical framework, and a disaggregation of strategy itself. This is a challenging task as 
the making of strategy is a complex social and human process with many institutions 
and individuals coming together and operating in a dynamic and changing context with 
limited and unreliable information.108 Establishing causal relationships in strategy 
amongst the many factors actually influencing strategic decisions is difficult. Strategy 
can be analysed in factors, but the factors are difficult to isolate from each other 
thematically as they influence each other constantly, and there is a dynamic human 
factor permeating all factors. Strategy and strategic behaviour must be studied as a 
whole even though it necessarily must be analysed through factors. Consequently, my 
four factors cannot be understood in isolation but rather as interacting with each other, 
creating a whole. 
 
Although strategy should be analysed as a whole, my focus on the three countries 
and their involvement in coalition operations in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 
limited the scope of what factors were relevant to my analysis. Although unlimited and 
industrial wars are rare occurrences in history, much of the extant analysis of strategic 
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literature was developed with the context of these wars in mind, rather than 
expeditionary and limited warfare. Certain factors often discussed in the strategic 
literature, such as the access to natural resources, technological innovations, or the 
three countries’ strategic geography may be excluded from my analysis, whereas other 
factors such as the way force is perceived and used in the post-modern Western world 
are more important today than in industrial wars waged for survival of the state. In the 
following I will explain how I arrived at my factors through an analysis of the strategic 
literature. This will be completed by initially explaining the choice of each factor of 
analysis before proceeding to the questions emanating from each factor in relation to 
the three cases. 
 
Factor 1: The political purpose and aims 
Strategic literature 
The definition of strategy employed by this study is that strategy is understood as 
the process of utilising force or the threat of force for the purpose of political ends. 
From this follows that strategy is an instrument of political purpose. One of the 
fundamental aspects of strategic theory emphasises the instrumentality of strategy; and 
that strategy serves as a means to an end. Strategy is a means to direct and control a 
state’s use of force in war and conflict, and the ends to be attained by this direction is 
found in a state’s political purpose and political aims.109 From this initial definition also 
follows that although usually strategy is connected with the actual use of force, the 
process of strategy also includes the consideration of the use of force to realise political 
objectives although force is never actually used. This follows from the definition’s 
inclusion of the threat of force, but it also follows from the adoption of a Clausewitzian 
perspective of force where the possible or contemplated use of force is also to be 
included in an analysis of strategy as far as it influences one of the sides.110 This means 
that my definition includes the actual use of force, the threat of use of force but also 
cases where force was contemplated but not actually used.  
 
The most influential proponent of this manner of understanding strategy was 
Carl von Clausewitz, who defined strategy as ‘….the utilisation of engagements for the 
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purpose of the war.’ 111 To Clausewitz war and strategy could not have a purpose in 
itself, but found its purpose in the rational political objectives of a conflict. Strategy was 
a part of a hierarchical system of purpose, ends and means, and strategy found its 
means in successful military engagements and its purpose and ends in the political aims 
of the war. 112 Although Clausewitz was not the first to establish the relationship 
between strategy and politics, he was the most influential.113 Most influential strategic 
thinkers of the last two centuries have adopted or discussed Clausewitz’s instrumental 
view of strategy as their departure point for their discussion of war and strategy, 
including Julian Corbett, Basil Liddell Hart, Bernard Brodie, Michael Howard, Colin 
Gray, and Hew Strachan. 
 
The consequence of adopting Clausewitz’s instrumental view of war and strategy 
is that there can be no separate logic or measure when it comes to examining strategy. 
Strategy is neither the ends nor the means of a conflict, but rather as the strategist CS 
Gray argues, the ‘….the bridge that relates military power to political purpose.…’.114 
Strategic logic is a combination of the logic from its political purpose and the logic that 
follows from the use of forceful means. Strategy is ultimately measured in political 
terms, and the question of success is relative to the political ambitions that spawned the 
strategy. Discussing strategy in isolation from politics would not make sense, because 
‘….the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature, and their 
political character increases the more the plan encompasses the entire war and the 
entire state.’115 Following the instrumental view logically entails that it is impossible to 
discuss strategy without first understanding what political purpose and what political 
ends the concrete strategy is meant to realise. Strategy is thus the utilisation of force in 
order to realise a political purpose, and any analysis of what characterises strategy, 
including in Afghanistan, the focus of this study, would be incomplete without the 
inclusion of the political purpose as a factor. The first factor in order to analyse the 
strategic behaviour of the three states is to examine with what political purpose and 
with what political aims the three countries engaged in the coalition operation in 
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Afghanistan. 
 
Operationalising the factor   
The factor of political purpose is an obvious starting point for any analysis of 
strategy, whether the purpose is to analyse the nature of strategy, as is the ambition of 
C.S. Gray, the making of strategy, as explored by Murray and Grimsley, or to temper 
the enthusiasm for the technological aspect of military force as Michael Howard.116 Any 
analysis of actual strategy must commence by grappling with what decision makers 
intended with their use of force, and hence this will be the first question of the factor. 
 
The factor of political purpose will focus on the stated purpose and political 
objectives of the three NATO-states. This will be done by including all publically 
available papers which had as its intent to communicate political purpose in relation to 
strategic behaviour. General communication to the public has normally not been 
included, unless it explicitly deals with strategic rationale. The purpose should provide 
the scope of the strategy and how it was characterised. The Netherlands, the UK, and 
Norway all published specific policy and strategy documents on their commitments to 
Afghanistan late in the period, the Netherlands in 2006, and the other two in early 
2009. 117 However, not all aspects of the three countries’ strategies were explicitly stated, 
either because they were understandably unwilling to make all aspects of their strategies 
public, because the commitment initially did not seem to warrant the publication of 
specific strategies, and because all aspects of the states’ commitments were not seen as 
a whole. Particularly smaller countries like Norway do not use the term strategy in 
relation to their commitments to international crisis management. The countries 
perceive their commitments in relation to their general foreign policy, overall national 
security strategies and coalition policies. This does not necessarily indicate a lack of a 
strategy, merely a lack of an articulated strategy and a different understanding of 
strategy.118 Just as any thesis has a theoretical basis whether the author is explicit on his 
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theory or not, the actual commitment of forceful means as in the cases of the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Norway, follows a certain rationale. The strategies of all countries 
may not be ideally designed, but the commitment of force was decided upon with some 
outcome in mind. Particularly in the case of Norway, which did not have a specific and 
published strategy for its military commitment in Afghanistan until late 2008, the study 
of strategic behaviour became a question of interpreting the political purpose behind 
the use of force from general security and policy documents. 
 
Factor 2: Adaptability 
The instrumental view of strategy analysed through the factor of political purpose 
fits well with the prevalent view of politics and strategy in the Western world. The view 
emphasises rationality in war and strategy, and offers a degree of control over the use 
of force. It also fits the current prevailing view among strategic authors of the 
dominance of civilian politics over the military profession, and the possibility for a 
close co-ordination of all political resources available to the state.119  
Strategy is the realisation of political intent by the use of force. Strategy that 
strives towards any sort of rationality cannot find its purpose or direction in itself; it is 
merely an instrument of the political intent. In a strategic context the most important 
aspect of the political intent is to what extent it provides clear direction and guidance as 
to what the use of force is to achieve.120 Strategy is about transforming abstract political 
intent into practical forceful action and is an inherently practical process.121 This means 
that the political guidance must be clear, and that there is a discernable logic in what the 
use of force was to achieve. Furthermore, where there are multiple political aims, the 
relationship between the aims and their internal priorities must be clear for strategy to 
become the instrument of policy that it is intended to be, and for strategy to be able to 
realise the political ambitions. 
 
Adopting the instrumental view of Clausewitz and his followers, however, entails 
certain modifications and limitations.122 The chosen definition implies that strategy is an 
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instrument to politics and the political objectives, but this one-sided relationship may 
be altered by the realities of armed conflict.123 The initial rational and instrumental 
relationship between purpose, ends, and means in war and strategy, can be transformed 
when it encounters the complex and unpredictable nature of war. Two of Clausewitz’s 
persistent features of war involve human unpredictability; that our strategy is always 
directed against a live and reacting adversary whose objectives and actions will 
necessarily run counter to ours, and that our strategy must be realised by human 
beings.124  The uncertainty and unpredictability that follows from these two elements of 
human interaction make the realisation of strategy impossible to predict. The political 
purpose and aims must be realised in the harsh and practical environment of human 
conflict, where the use of force often creates its own dynamic due to human emotions 
and chance, and may not be controlled by rationality. This means that the relationship 
between the political purpose and aims on the one side, and strategy on the other, is 
not a relationship that works only one way. Although strategy and the use of force are 
the instruments of the political purpose, the use of force and the events on the ground 
may instead influence and change the political objectives. In practice, the relationship 
between ends and means in strategy, between the political purpose and the use of force 
in conflict, can best be characterised as reciprocal, and the reciprocity and the potential 
limits to instrumentality must in turn influence strategic decision makers and civil-
military relations. The initial instrumental and top-down approach must be adjusted 
and replaced by a holistic view, where strategy is ideally directed by its political purpose, 
but opens up for the reality that chance, friction and enemy action will influence and 
change the strategy and the political purpose in practice.125 This means that in order to 
realise its political ambitions in the face of an actual conflict, a government could be 
forced to alter its political aims to better adapt to the actual situation. This could 
involve changing what it intends to achieve, the ways in which it wants to achieve it, or 
indeed, in a coalition setting, alter its involvement in the conflict itself. 
 
The view that the instrumental element of strategy must be modified in practice 
by the realities on the ground was of course pertinent in the conflict and the period of 
this study. As pointed out above, this study understood the conflict of Afghanistan as 
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exhibiting many of the characteristics of complex and hybrid wars where the varying 
degrees of intensity, the number of possible partners and actors in the field made 
unpredictability, chance and change the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, 
the strategy of the three cases took part within a coalition consisting of a lead country, a 
host nation and forty odd other countries, each with their interests and purposes to be 
adapted to the overall aims of the coalition. This emphasises that an analysis of 
individual strategies within a coalition such as NATO’s ISAF force cannot be limited to 
a straightforward instrumental approach, but must also include the question of how the 
three states related to the challenges of developing strategy within a dynamic coalition 
and in support of a host nation.  
The factor of adaptability will thus analyse whether the political purposes and 
aims in the three cases were clear and logical so as to provide direction for strategy to 
be an instrument for the political intent. The next question will be whether the political 
purposes, aims and objectives were adapted to the nature of war in general, and 
whether they represented a reciprocal view of strategy. In addition the question will 
analyse whether the government’ political intent took into account the complex 
character of the Afghanistan conflict and the complexities of making and conducting 
strategy in a coalition, and adapted or changed its political intent or the nature of its 
participation in the conflict.126 
 
Factor 3: The organisation of the strategic process  
Strategic literature 
Strategy is the process of utilising force for political ends. The initial feature of 
strategy deduced from the definition was the instrumental relationship between politics 
and strategy, whereas the second feature related political intent to the realities of 
conflict. The third feature to emerge from the definition relates to another practical 
aspect of strategy; that strategy is the practical process of transforming abstract political 
purpose into a concrete plan that directs and controls the use of force.127 The third 
factor in the analysis of the strategic behaviour of the three states will thus focus on 
how this process of making strategy was organised in the three states. 
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Transforming an abstract political purpose into a practical and feasible plan of 
action illustrates the challenges of strategic decision-making.128 In the process of 
making strategy political intentions are to be wedded to practical considerations 
involving the means of force, and then realised in a highly volatile and changing 
environment against a resistant opponent who will do his utmost to thwart the plan. 
The challenges and pitfalls of the process of transforming the political purpose and 
aims into practical action are the reasons many strategic theorists have focused on this 
aspect of strategy making when analysing actual strategies. The transformation of the 
political purpose and aim into a plan for the use of force involves the meeting of at 
least two different categories of state officials and the establishing of a dialogue and 
working civil-military relations between them.129 The political purpose and aims are in 
principal developed at the political level, whereas the use of force is entrusted to the 
military profession. The meeting of these two categories of state officials entails both 
personal and institutional challenges with direct implications on the outcome of the 
actual strategy chosen.  
 
By accepting that the transformation of the political purpose in strategy has both 
theoretical and practical aspects and that it involves at least two professional groups in 
the state, it also becomes clear why strategy is often regarded as a process rather than a 
single act.130 Developing strategy is an iterative process where the political purpose 
must be negotiated in a changing political world, it then has to be transformed into a 
practical strategic plan which in turn must be adjusted to the unpredictable realities of 
the conflict itself. Strategy is developed in an uncertain and complex environment 
where human errors and reacting adversaries influence outcomes, and sometimes pure 
chance may change the circumstances and render the best political objectives irrelevant. 
The political objectives must be adjusted to the new situation and so must the strategy. 
Faced with the uncertainties of friction and living adversaries, in reality the 
development and conduct of strategy becomes an iterative process where political 
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purpose and aims are transformed and adjusted continuously between the politicians in 
charge and those who are to carry out the plan.131  
 
How the process of strategy is organised, or more precisely, which government 
institutions are used, what personnel are involved in the process, and what relationship 
exists between them, has received significant attention in the strategic literature.  
In their analysis of the strategy making, Murray and Grimsley argue that ‘[t]he 
structure of government and military institutions plays a crucial role in the formulation 
of strategy and its adaptability to the actual conditions.’ 132 They argue for a direct 
correlation between the organisation of the strategic process and the effectiveness of 
the actual strategy. These two authors do not distinguish between the role of 
institutions on the one side and the relationship between groups and individuals on the 
other; instead they integrate the individual side and the institutional side of the process 
into one factor of organisation of government and military institutions. The need to 
examine the organisational aspects is further reinforced by MacGregor Knox in his 
analysis of the driving forces in the transformation of strategy making. Similarly to 
Murray and Grimsley, Knox chooses to use the institutions and the individuals 
manning them as one of his main driving forces in strategic change. 133    
 
In his recent criticism of the lack of British and Western strategy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Hew Strachan argued that a dysfunctional organisation and the wrong 
institutions in charge of the strategic process were important reasons for the lack of 
strategic effectiveness in the UK.134 To Strachan, the development of proper strategic 
institutions was crucial if any improvement was to be made. He argued that proper 
strategic institutions are a ‘….default mechanism….’ which the making of strategy may 
fall back on if there is a lack of genius or unproductive personal relationships to 
prevent the constructive interaction between the politicians and the military.135 The 
structure of the institutions and their organisation was critical to Strachan. Strachan did 
not deny the impact of personalities and personal relationships, but argued that basing 
the process of strategy on the premise that certain personalities always will emerge or 
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that good personal relationships always will develop is a dangerous course. Strachan 
draws on support from the civil servant Ewan Broadbent’s analysis of the changes in 
the British Ministry of Defence, where he concludes that ‘[o]rganisation is often 
regarded as mundane, even tedious. Policies and personalities are what count. But in 
the field of defence this is not the case’.136  
 
In his analysis of the nature of strategy C.S. Gray also includes organisation as 
one of his seventeen dimensions. His treatment of the factors itself is limited to the 
actual government structures, whereas the impact of individuals and the relationship 
between them is treated under different topics. Furthermore, elements of what Murray, 
Strachan and Broadbent discuss are also included in another of Gray’s dimensions such 
as military administration as well as strategic theory and doctrine.137 More importantly, 
although Gray’s organisational dimension only constitutes one of seventeen 
dimensions, the challenges of the process of making strategy features prominently in 
his work. This is evident in his discussion of his dimensions, where the process of 
transforming political purpose, the establishment of proper institutions, and the 
challenges of the dialogue between the two professions involved in the making of 
strategy, are important and essential parts of all Gray’s works.138 
 
Organising the process of strategy is a question that involves civil-military 
relations. The questions of how to understand and transform the political purpose into 
forceful action and the relationship between the two groups of professionals involved 
in the strategic process are questions that strategic studies share with those studying 
civil-military relations, or the actual relationship  ‘….between soldiers and 
statesmen….’.139 According to E.A. Cohen, the question of how the strategic process is 
organised and how politicians and military interact ‘….lies at the heart of what strategy 
is all about.’140 It is clear that an analysis and comparison of what characterises actual 
strategies in NATO-countries would be lacking without studying the organisation of 
the process of strategy in three different countries. 
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The emphasis on the organisation of the strategic process is not unanimous in 
strategic literature. Carl von Clausewitz’s main work Vom Kriege engages only briefly 
with the question of structure and then only as a consequence of the political nature of 
war.141 Indeed, when Clausewitz tried to analyse the causes and conditions of the use of 
engagements in strategy he did not identify the structure of strategy making as an 
important element, but rather ‘….the moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and 
statistical elements.’142 Michael Howard in his works on the conduct of strategy did not 
identify an organisational dimension in addition to his four dimensions of strategy, the 
operational, the logistical, the social, and the technological.143  
 
This lack of attention may indicate that the organisation of the strategic process 
is a less relevant factor. On the other hand, Clausewitz never fully revised and 
completed his work to include a proper analysis of strategy on par with his analysis of 
war in general.144 Furthermore, Michael Howard’s purpose with his strategic 
dimensions was to not analyse the characteristics of actual strategies but rather to 
provide a general historical view of strategic thought before criticising the American 
propensity to apply technological solutions to any strategic problem.145 Both Howard 
and Clausewitz clearly emphasised the relationship between politicians and the military 
in their work.146 This means that although they do not emphasise the structures as 
much as Strachan, Murray and Gray, they still acknowledged the importance of the 
process of transforming the political purpose into a practical plan.  
 
The two views of what are important features in the process also bring to 
attention the relationship between the structures and the individuals involved in the 
process of strategy, and their impact on the end result. Although the government 
structures are important, the structures themselves do not produce strategy; the 
individual politicians, civil servants and military officers do.147 However, as Strachan 
points out, not focusing on the structures and expecting genius and good relations 
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between politicians, civil servants and military officers is equivalent to performing 
without a safety net.148 Organisation must be seen as including both the personnel and 
the structures involved in the process of making and conducting strategy.  
 
Having the right organisation with the right structures and the right people does 
not produce good strategy in itself. The organisation of structures and personnel must 
be combined with relevant ideas, and as such the organisation of the process of strategy 
may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the analysis of a strategic outcome. 
Similarly, when analysing what characterises actual strategies, the organisation of the 
process is but one of the necessary factors. The impact of the organisation of the 
process of strategy is perhaps best described by former Prime Minister MacMillan, who 
argued that although organisations do not solve defence problems and priorities in 
themselves, ‘….bad organisation can do much harm and this is truer in defence than in 
many other spheres.’149 If strategy as C.S. Gray argues is ‘….the bridge that relates 
military power to political purpose….’, then the organisation of the strategic process 
may be seen as the framework of that bridge.150 
 
Operationalising the factor   
This factor will initially analyse how the process of transforming the political 
purpose and aims into a plan was structured and what institutions were used in each 
case. Furthermore, it will examine who was involved in this process and what the 
relationship was between them. In practice this means examining the institutions of the 
ministries of defence, inter-departmental committees and the top level of the military 
organisations, as well as the examining the relationship between the politicians, civil 
servants and military who were involved in the process of transforming political 
purpose into strategic and operational plans.  
 
The next question is the manner in which to analyse the structures and the 
relationships involved in the strategy making process. The prevailing view is that if 
politics influences strategy this should be reflected in the structures and the 
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relationships of strategy.151Given the instrumental relationship between politics and 
strategy, and the reiterative nature of strategy, the current tendency is to advocate for 
integrated structures.152 This is the thought behind the integrated structures of the 
ministries of defence in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, who have all embraced 
this idea.153 Given the close relationship between politics, strategy and operations it 
makes sense to have the structures reflect this, most often in the shape of a unified or 
integrated ministry of defence, as well as joint operational structures. Increased 
structural integration between the political and military elements is accepted as an 
important way of improving the strategic process and is ‘….imperative for increased 
effectiveness’.154 This is also the case for the military organisation where the 
establishing of joint military headquarters and units, as well as the ability to operate in 
joint forces is a major contributor to strategic effectiveness.155 The idea of integration 
also enters into the relationships between the groups involved in the transformation of 
political purpose into practical plans. The political nature of strategy and seeing strategy 
as a process means that it is neither possible, nor desirable to separate the groups 
involved in the strategic process. This is because if the boundaries between politics and 
the military are permeable, there will be no clear distinction between pure political and 
military professional areas of responsibility, and little room for a separate military 
sphere. 
 
The alternative to the integrated view of the strategic process is to be found in 
elements of the traditional literature on strategic studies and civil-military relations, but 
also in more recent criticism. The traditional view, or as E.A.Cohen argues the normal 
view, of civil-military relations and the making of strategy is that politics and the 
practical application of force should be distinguished as two separate spheres with 
some autonomy for the military sector. The classic example of this is Samuel P. 
Huntington’s thesis of objective military control.156 Huntington argued for an 
equilibrium where the political control was maintained and accepted by the military in 
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exchange for an autonomous military professional sphere. Although Huntington’s main 
idea seems to have lost its impact, some of his underlying themes still provide useful 
points of discussion for the organisation of the strategic process. 
 
The first underlying theme is one of political influence versus strategic 
effectiveness. Although the political purpose provides meaning to strategy, the strategic 
process must be a reciprocal one with emphasis on all levels of the making of strategy, 
not only the political level.157 The criticism of the integration argument is that if the 
integration of the strategic process is carried out with political motives such as 
strengthening civilian control, cutting budgets, or improving bureaucratic efficiency, 
integration may not necessarily improve strategy or indeed be harmful to it.158 As 
Strachan points out in his criticism of civil-military relations in the UK, the purpose of 
the Clausewitzian thought of seeing the political and the military process as one ‘….was 
the integration of civil and military authorities, not the subordination of the military to 
political control.’159 As an example, the rationale behind Norway’s introduction of its 
integrated ministry of defence appeared to be as much about cost effectiveness and 
civilian control as about strategic effectiveness.160 The analysis of the level of 
integration will thus not be limited to the level of integration in the states’ strategic 
process, but also to what extent the integration is done with strategic issues in mind. 
 
A second theme concerns the relationship between the political decision makers 
and their military partners and advisors. Although all aspects of force may have a 
political dimension, there is still a need for a military profession to wield it.161 Being that 
politicians need military professionals as advisors it becomes a question of how relevant 
the advice is and how well prepared the military advisors are in providing it in the 
complex setting of Afghanistan and similarly complex conflicts. A further problem of 
providing military advice may be if the strategic process becomes too integrated, the 
military advice can be throttled by being too closely connected to the political side. 162 
This means that there may be such a thing as too much integration in the strategic 
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process seen from the perspective of strategic effectiveness. A good strategic process 
depends on the frank exchange of views between the civilian and military side, but 
authors argue that integrated structures stifle the debate on strategic issues by limiting 
the debate to the closed rooms of the MoDs, and the military organisation anticipating 
political viewpoints rather than developing independent professional views. In both the 
UK and in Norway this argument has been put forward.163 Currently, the intensity of 
this debate seems to vary between the three countries with the British structure of 
powerful service chiefs, combined with a stronger military culture, providing a platform 
for more open debate and a stronger military viewpoint than in Norway and the 
Netherlands. Consequently, it becomes necessary to analyse how the political and 
military considerations are developed and how they are included in the actual process. 
 
In the analysis of what characterises the strategic behaviour of these three 
countries there is a need for a factor analysing the organisation of the process of 
strategy. This factor of organisation will include both the aspects of what institutions 
were used and what personnel were involved as well as the relationship between the 
different groups of state officials. This factor will further analyse what organisational 
model was chosen, whether an integrated or a more separate model, the reasoning 
behind this choice and finally how professional advice was included in the process. 
 
Factor 4: The use of force and the strategic outlook 
Strategy is the utilisation of force in order to realise a political purpose. The 
fourth aspect deduced from the strategic theory is the question of how the UK, the 
Netherlands and Norway understood and employed force. The fourth factor will 
examine the strategic outlook with which the three countries developed their strategies.  
 
Political purpose and aims are realised and carried out by numerous actions of 
international bodies and governments. States realise a vast number of policy objectives 
and aims every day, but if all these actions are to be considered strategy, the term 
becomes too wide to be analysed properly. Strategy cannot include all actions employed 
to realise any political purpose. Hence, this factor will merit exploration of the links 
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between the use of force and strategy. This will be accomplished by first explaining the 
factor and its relationship to strategic culture, before I analyse the relationship between 
the use of force and strategy. Lastly, I will analyse the different theories of how to 
understand force and what experiences, assumptions, ideas, theories, and doctrines lay 
behind the employment of force in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway.  
 
The factor of strategic outlook includes elements of the contentious topic of 
strategic culture, as it tries to study the manner in which the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Norway understood force, and the discourse, the ideas, and assumptions behind the 
employment of force. Given my outlook on strategy and strategic culture, strategic 
outlook will be understood as the ‘….shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of 
behavior….’ among the strategic elites in the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway that 
shape the understanding of the use of force and how force should best be applied. 164  
 
Strategic culture is a highly contested concept within political, strategic, and 
military studies, but in this study it will be limited to the exploration of how the three 
states understood their strategic problems, thought about strategy, and attempted to 
employ force in pursuit of their political aims. 165 The question posed in this study 
explores how the three country perceived military force, what force is, its utility, and its 
proper use.166 The factor of strategic outlook will consequently address how the UK, 
the Netherlands, and Norway understood force and strategy, and how the three 
countries thought force should be employed in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008.   
 
Strategic literature 
What distinguishes war from other international activity and strategy from other 
government activities is the use of or the threat of force.167 This emphasis on the use of 
forceful means to realise strategy is partly the result of the theories of Carl von 
Clausewitz. Clausewitz argued that ‘[w]ar in its real meaning is fighting,….’ and the 
‘outmost use of violent force’. 168 Given his view of strategy as the realisation of 
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political ends through the use of engagements, there is no doubt that Clausewitz’s view 
of strategy emphasised the use of force, and in particular military force. To Clausewitz 
the only means available in war was fighting. 169 The element that set war and strategy 
apart from other human interaction and government activity was the impact of violent 
force. Indeed, the use of force and violence was what rendered war and strategy 
suitable for study in its own right.170 The use of force was consequently a central 
element to Clausewitz’s ideas on strategy. 
 
The view that the use of force is an essential element of strategy is also furthered 
by Michael Howard, who argues that the use of force is what sets the ‘…..strategic 
approach to international relations…..’ aside from other approaches.171 The use of 
force or coercion is inextricably linked to strategy and to disregard the use of force 
would necessitate a fundamental change to the anarchical tendencies of the 
international system.172 The fact that the use of force is one of the defining 
characteristics of strategy is also supported by Strachan and Gray whom both define 
and discuss strategy as the use of force to attain political aims.173 
 
The concept of force is thus inextricably linked to strategy, and must underpin 
any further analysis of the strategies of the NATO-countries. There is less consensus, 
however, in strategic theory on the method to analyse the use of force in a strategic 
context, and different views on how to employ and utilise force. My third factor will 
focus on the premise that the use of force is indispensable to strategy, and explore the 
different views governing the use of force in the three NATO countries in Afghanistan.  
 
Operationalising the factor   
The factor will examine the strategic outlook of each of the countries, that is to 
say, the prevailing beliefs, assumptions, and theories governing the use of force for 
political purpose in each country. The factor will emphasise the way in which strategy 
and the use of force was understood and accordingly how the countries applied force 
to realise their political purpose in the context of Afghanistan from 2003-2008. In 
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practice the understanding of strategy and force will be deduced from the three 
countries’ national policies and strategy documents, and their views on how to use 
force will be deduced from their strategic and operational doctrines as well as their 
actual operations.  
 
The understanding of strategy and its relation to the use of force in 
contemporary conflicts may be summarised in two opposing views, the Clausewitzian 
or limited view, and the grand strategic, or broader view. At face value, this is a 
discussion of what means should be considered in strategy, however, the discussion 
also reflects differences in the understanding of what strategy is and what the use of 
force entails. 
 
The Clausewitzian view linked strategy to the use of military force and defined 
strategy through the use of violence. His main work Vom Kriege dealt with war, strategy 
and force in relation to what could be achieved through the use of military force only. 
Clausewitz’s limited view of strategy was of course a result of the scope of his work; his 
magnum opus was on war, not diplomacy or state building, and also a result of his 
perception of force as limited to violent force. The Clausewitzian view of strategy is 
somewhat limited compared to the grand strategic view coined by the British thinkers 
JFC Fuller and BH Liddell Hart, who distinguished military strategy from the broader 
concept of grand strategy. To Liddell Hart, Clausewitz’s definition was similar to his 
own definition of military strategy except that Liddell Hart argued that military strategy 
dealt with ‘….the art of distributing military means to fulfil the ends of policy.’174 This meant that 
the ends and means logic of Clausewitz vis-a-vis politics was retained, but it removed the 
concept of military strategy from its connection with force and fighting, and the 
Clausewitzian idea of the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, making strategy a 
more palatable concept to grapple with during the war weary interwar period.175 Liddell 
Hart’s definition of military strategy also moved the concept away from the practical 
sphere of choosing where and when to engage an enemy towards a more general 
allocation of military resources. Perhaps more importantly, Liddell Hart expanded the 
view of what strategy was as he distinguished between military strategy and the overall 
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strategy of a state, its ‘Grand Strategy’. To Liddell Hart war and strategy was not only 
conducted through the use of military means, but through the co-ordination and 
direction of all available means, the diplomatic, economic, military, financial and moral 
resources of a political entity ‘….towards the attainment of the political object of the 
war….’.176 In this concept the more limited Clausewitzian view of strategy is relegated 
to the term military strategy, subordinate to the larger entity of grand strategy. The 
concept of grand strategy was spawned by the ideas of industrial and total war, 
influenced by the need to control and direct all national resources in wars of national 
survival, and direct multiple campaigns of millions of men on multiple continents. The 
grand strategic view provides the great advantage of being able to see a conflict in a 
wider perspective than a mere military one, and brings more resources and perspectives 
to bear in a conflict. This is evident in the three countries’ overall strategy documents 
on Afghanistan where an important question in all three was the interaction between 
the military and civilian resources.177  Grand strategy also brings the perspective of 
looking ‘….beyond the war to the subsequent peace’, and attempts to bring to the 
forefront the long-term consequences of the force employed.178 Both these perspectives 
are valuable in any conflict, but are indispensible in a complex conflict such as 
Afghanistan, where there was little force on force fighting in a Clausewitzian sense, and 
in which the political aims include rebuilding parts of Afghan society. The grand 
strategy view has also been influential in the emerging ideas in international crisis 
management, where ideas such as multifunctional operations, integrated missions and 
comprehensive approach have gained influence since the latter part of the 1990s.179 
 
The concept of grand strategy has its apparent limitations, however, as some 
authors have argued it employs too broad a view of strategy and that it dilutes the 
understanding and development of strategy, and consequently its applicability in 
complex limited warfare is limited.180 The first problem is that the grand strategic view 
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might create confusion between policy and strategy. Hew Strachan argues that the 
grand strategy outlook may result in ‘….the conflation of strategy and policy.’181 This 
means that the grand strategic view may lose the focus on strategy as the bridge 
between operations and politics, as grand strategy becomes policy. This criticism is 
somewhat unfair as Liddell Hart made it clear that grand strategy and strategy are 
different yet interlinked entities, and he was under no illusion that policy and grand 
strategy were ‘….practically synonymous.’182 What is a fairer criticism is Strachan’s 
argument that the focus on grand strategy and policy, as well as and the co-ordination 
of all available state resources may reduce the focus on strategy as a practical activity. 
Adopting the grand strategy view of force may lead to an under-appreciation of the 
manner in which force is employed in a conflict and that the purpose of strategy is to 
transform political purpose into a practical plan.183  
 
On a more fundamental note the view of grand strategy also uses a different 
understanding of force. The Clausewitzian view focuses on ‘….purposive and 
functional violence….’,184 whereas Liddell Hart used the word ‘power’ rather than 
force, again indicating a broader view of what actually constitutes strategy.185 The use of 
the grand strategy view may thus create ambiguity as to what is strategy as opposed to 
other forms of international and government action, but also make it unclear whose 
responsibility the actual development of strategy is. The Clausewitzian or limited view 
emphasises the importance of the use of violent force and gives the military an 
initiating role in developing strategy, whereas the grand strategy view with its use of 
power rather than force places the responsibility at the political level.186 A further 
criticism of the view of grand strategy is that it does not fit in with the realities of 
contemporary conflicts. Grand strategy was a child of the vast industrial wars of the 
twentieth century with its total aims, and its hierarchical and all-encompassing structure 
is ill-suited to the small expeditionary wars and the crisis management of the last twenty 
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years.187 In other words, the dilemma is whether we need four command and staff 
levels between Whitehall and Sangin to direct an infantry battalion or PRT in 
Afghanistan? 
 
The two views of strategy and strategic behaviour are both fraught with 
shortcomings in the face of contemporary conflicts where small resources must be 
applied in co-ordination with many different actors. The first question within the factor 
of strategic outlook will explore how the three states understood strategy and use of 
force, whether they understood strategy in a limited or grand strategic sense, and 
consequently explore who had the main responsibility for the development of the 
strategy for Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. Having examined the strategic 
outlook of the three NATO states as far as their strategic theory is concerned; the next 
step will be to examine how the strategic theory was translated into strategic and 
operational concepts. The actual use of force will be studied through examining the 
strategy documents available and an examination of the main framework of the actual 
operations of the three countries between 2003 and 2008. 
 
The manner in which force was applied in Afghanistan was a result of the actual 
political purpose and aims directing the operations, but also a result of how the 
countries understood strategy, the conflict, and what concepts and doctrines were 
developed to guide the use of force in complex conflicts.188 As pointed out by John 
Mackinlay, the Western response to Afghanistan became a meeting ground of different 
strategic and operational approaches, as different strategic traditions met to deal with 
the new type of conflict that Afghanistan represented.189 Within the three countries 
there were different perceptions as to how to interpret the conflict, and consequently, 
the countries’ approaches to the use of force differed. These differences were 
manifested in the different choices of doctrines. Doctrine must not be confused with 
strategy, as the former explains how an army prepares organisationally and mentally in 
general or in relation to specific type of conflict, whereas the latter is the practical 
choice of how to apply force to realise the political aim in a concrete situation.190 
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Strategy and doctrine can best be seen as existing in a reciprocal relationship. Doctrine 
may influence the range of strategic options seen as available when deciding an actual 
strategy and a choice of strategy may influence the doctrinal direction, but as far as this 
study is concerned doctrine in itself is not seen as the only determining factor in the 
choice of strategy only an influencing one.    
 
This relationship between strategy and doctrine is illustrated by the relationship 
between the doctrinal approaches and the overall strategic concepts employed by the 
three states. The three states differed in their conceptual or doctrinal approaches to the 
conflict by calling their response either wars, PSO or counterinsurgencies. 191 
Examining and understanding the differences and to some degree aligning them is 
important to the effect of coalition operations in complex conflicts.192 The Norwegian 
forces operated the entire period without a counterinsurgency doctrine, or an updated 
tactical and operational PSO-doctrine. The Dutch on the other hand, relied on a mix of 
its PSO and counter-insurgency doctrines to strike a balance between forceful and 
conciliatory measures.193 The British approach was initially a counter-insurgency based 
one, but its approach gradually became based on principles from conventional warfare, 
partly because of the circumstances but also partially by choice.194 These doctrinal 
differences represented practical differences in the use of force in terms of operational 
issues such as defining security tasks within the mandate, how to relate to the Afghan 
administration and security forces, how to see the other international actors, and 
crucially, how to deal with or engage the Taliban insurgency.195  
 
In order to characterise the strategic behaviour of the three countries it is 
consequently important to examine the factor of strategic outlook; and explore what 
assumptions, beliefs, and perceptions guided the use of force and strategy in the states 
of Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. 
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Chapter III: Norway 
“Happy is the land that need no military strategists”.196  
 
The study of strategy and strategic behaviour revolves around the transformation of 
political aims through the use of military and other forceful means. The point of departure 
into the three states’ strategic behaviour was their political intentions and how these 
intentions were developed into more concrete political aims that gave direction to the use 
of military force. This logic is straightforward enough in theory, but less obvious in real 
life. All three states operated with a multitude of various purposes, objectives and aims at 
different stages of the period, and rarely were they put in a logical relationship to one 
another. In order to discern a logic that explains and orders the aims in relation to one 
another, I operate from the premise that a political purpose or intent must describe the 
reasons for the state’s involvement, or the highest order of what the states tried to achieve 
by using force in Afghanistan. The political aims and objectives will then support this 
intent, but cannot logically give meaning without seeing them in relation to the purpose. 
The political aims and objectives then in turn give meaning to the methods chosen and the 
means employed. I have not assumed that the state can only have one purpose behind its 
involvement. In the complex conflicts involving coalitions of liberal democracies all states 
will necessarily have to make strategy while balancing own interests, coalition interests, and 
public opinion. That the states then operate with various aims and purposes must be seen 
as a normal state of affairs, and not as an anomaly void of strategic logic.  
  
Another challenge with studying the purpose and aims of the three states between 
2003 and 2008 is that our perception of the complex conflict that was Afghanistan has 
changed immensely from the earliest stages until today. The conflict in Afghanistan 
changed radically between 2003 and 2008. There is a risk of understanding the period by 
looking at the situation in Afghanistan post 2008, or by emphasising the latter stages of the 
period, and therefore not understanding the context behind the changes during the period. 
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1. The Political Purposes and Aims of Norway: 
The Norwegian involvement in the Afghanistan conflict preceded NATO’s 
decision to take over the ISAF operations in August 2003. From late 2001 to 2005 
Norwegian troops participated in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom with 
combat engineers, special forces and air assets such as fighter-, surveillance-, and 
transport aircraft, whereas combat engineers and CIMIC teams were deployed to the 
pre-NATO ISAF contingents.197 The Norwegian practice of contributing both to ISAF 
as well as Operation Enduring Freedom continued until the Norwegian Centre-Right 
government was replaced by the Labour-led coalition in 2005, when all contributions to 
the American led operations in Iraq and in Operation Enduring Freedom were 
discontinued.198 Despite the changing forms of contributions, Norwegian participation 
in the ISAF-operations in Afghanistan was communicated as the main priority of 
Norwegian forces throughout the period of 2003 to 2008.199 
 
Political purpose: 
The two Norwegian governments provided a plethora of aims and reasons for its 
use of force in Afghanistan. The various aims were rarely connected in a strategic logic 
that explained how the various purposes and aims related to one another or gave 
distinct direction to the use of force. On the other hand, it is possible to discern a twin 
set of overall purposes behind the use of Norwegian force in Afghanistan, and these 
purposes appeared to be consistent throughout the period of 2003 to 2008. 
International peace and security: 
The purpose that was presented consistently by the two governments, and that 
was at the top of the hierarchy of Norwegian strategic logic during the period, was 
Norway’s commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security.200 The 
purpose was provided as the political and strategic logic by the centre-conservative 
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coalition when the Norwegian government provided troops for NATO’s involvement 
in the ISAF operation in the autumn of 2003 and was maintained throughout the 
period.  The purpose of maintenance of international peace and security was closely 
tied one of the central tenets in Norwegian foreign and security policy; the support of 
the UN and to enable the organisation to “….manage international crises and 
conflicts….”.201 To the Norwegian government its political purpose was tied to the 
UN’s resolutions enabling NATO’s operations, and the fact that the UN declared that 
the situation in Afghanistan was a threat to international peace and security. The main 
rationale behind the Norwegian strategy, that of contributing to the UN and through 
the UN support the maintenance of international peace and security, was initially used 
by the centre-conservative government as the rationale behind the Norwegian support 
to both the directly mandated ISAF operation as well as the more indirectly mandated 
Operation Enduring Freedom.202 After the 2005 elections, where the Labour-led 
coalition came to power, the political purpose was maintained as far as the NATO-led 
ISAF operation was concerned, but the support to the Operation Enduring Freedom 
was withdrawn.203 The government did this as part of its policy of strengthening its 
participation in UN-mandated operations rather than the post hoc mandates issued by 
the UN on Iraq and for Operation Enduring Freedom.204 As was made clear in the new 
government’s accession speech, as far as the contribution of Norwegian forces to 
NATO was concerned, there were no significant changes; the political purpose 
remained that of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security 
through supporting the UN’s resolutions on Afghanistan.205 Indeed, if anything, the 
emphasis on the original political purpose was strengthened through statements by the 
government towards the end of the period. In 2007 and 2008 the Prime Minister, as 
well as his Minister of Defence and State Secretary in the Defence Department 
reemphasised the political purpose in the face of mounting domestic criticism as 
Norwegian forces in the Faryab province were facing a mounting Taliban uprising and 
became involved in heavy fighting. The state secretary argued that: ‘We see our 
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presence [in Afghanistan] as part of our support of a UN-led world order.’206 The Prime 
Minister argued that NATO’s new plans in 2008 corresponded ‘….well with our 
established strategy based on the UN mandate”, while the Minister of Defence argued 
that Norway was in Afghanistan because Norway was ‘….invited by the World 
Community through the UN.’ 207  
 
NATO obligations 
The Norwegian support to the maintenance of international peace and security 
was an overarching political purpose during the period. The purpose itself was of a 
nature that naturally subordinated other aims and objectives and it was closely tied to 
the central tenets of Norwegian foreign and security policy. Another tenet of 
Norwegian foreign and security policy and overarching purpose in relation to 
Afghanistan was the obligation to the NATO alliance. NATO had been the 
cornerstone of Norwegian security policy since 1949 but the Norwegian relationship 
with NATO underwent significant changes after NATO lost some of its interest in the 
potential security problems posed by Russia in particular, and in the Norwegian and 
Barents seas in general. By 2003, successive Norwegian governments had gradually 
transformed its relationship with NATO from that of a recipient of alliance security to 
that of a contributor to NATO’s security operations outside the Trans Atlantic area. 
The contributions to NATO’s operations, and the subsequent influence that such 
contributions could generate within the alliance, would in turn generate support for 
Norwegian interests. By 2003 it was thus: ‘….a superior goal to contribute to making 
NATO’s operations successful and credible.’208  
 
When Norway deployed its first small battalion group to Kabul in 2003 the 
purpose behind the deployment was not only described as maintaining international 
peace and security, but also to support NATO in its ‘….difficult and demanding 
task.’209 The purpose of supporting NATO and honouring Norway’s alliance 
obligations was kept by the centre-conservative coalition throughout its existence, and 
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was continued by the Labour-led coalition that took office in autumn 2005.210 Just as in 
2003, at the outset of NATO’s campaign, the State Secretary for Defence argued in 
2007 that ‘….as a NATO member we have a shared responsibility in living up to our 
joint promise of assisting the Afghan government ….’, and the Minister of Defence 
would argue in 2008 that: ‘We are in Afghanistan in solidarity with our NATO allies.’211 
The purpose was described in terms of a general obligation, using NATO’s decision to 
take on its ISAF obligation as an argument in itself, and did not explore the differences 
of opinion within NATO.  The Norwegian obligation to NATO was on a general level, 
ensuring the success of the organisation so that NATO would remain a relevant 
security instrument to Norwegian interests closer to home, and particularly in the 
Barents and Norwegian Seas.212 
 
The two overall purposes of contributing to the maintenance of international 
peace and security and supporting NATO, were mostly presented as twin purposes and 
they were rarely discussed separately from one another. The possible incompatibility 
between the two purposes was rarely discussed, despite the fact that the role of the UN 
was a lot less defined than that of NATO, and the fact that the purpose of supporting a 
UN led world order was difficult to realise in Afghanistan given the limited role of the 
UN’s UNAMA operations. Similarly, it was rarely discussed what Norway’s solidarity to 
the NATO organisation actually entailed. As is argued below, the NATO solidarity that 
Norway presented as its political purpose was thus limited to a general support of 
NATO’s operations.  
 
Political aims and objectives: 
The two political purposes behind the Norwegian use of force in Afghanistan 
were consistently communicated through the period of 2003 to 2008, although they 
were not necessarily precisely and clearly defined. The lack of precision became evident 
in peculiar situation of UN’s involvement in Afghanistan and when NATO needed to 
reinforce its operations in the South. This also meant that the two purposes presented 
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were to some degree fraught with mutual inconsistencies in Afghanistan. One way that 
the Norwegian governments apparently sought to bridge the inconsistencies at the 
overall level, was through its peculiar emphasis on other aims and objectives. Most of 
the additional aims and objectives presented by the Norwegian government were 
mostly in line with the overall ISAF objectives, but given Norway’s particular point of 
departure through its two political purposes, the aims and objectives were given a 
unique Norwegian interpretation. This Norwegian point of view emerged from a 
stronger emphasis of the international institutions involved, and created the backdrop 
from which the Norwegian political aims and strategy were developed. 
 
Assisting the Afghan government 
Given that the overall purposes of the Norwegian government were general 
rather than Afghanistan specific in nature, the aim of assisting the Afghan state did not 
follow logically from the purposes. There was no independent strategic logic following 
from the initial purposes to that of establishing and supporting an Afghan state. The 
aim of assisting an Afghan state only became logical when it was derived from the 
ambitions of the UN and NATO. When the two institutions’ ambitions were 
incompatible, as was evident through much of the period, the Norwegian purposes 
suffered from the same incompatibility.  
 
The political aim of assisting the Afghan authorities was throughout the period 
the main political aim of the Norwegian use of force in Afghanistan. The aim was 
closely tied to the subordinate aims of security and stability, improved governance, and 
reconstruction.213 The aim itself and possible options were rarely discussed; the 
question of what kind of state the aim entailed was for the most part treated as given. 
 
Security 
The first objective tied to the political aim of assisting the Afghan authorities was 
that of providing security and stability. The Norwegian government initially thought to 
realise this aim through the deployment of a battalion group and support forces as part 
of ISAF’s KMNB brigade between 2003 and 2005. The Norwegian forces initially 
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provided security to the Loya Jirga conference in 2003, and then contributed to general 
area security in Kabul and training to the Kabul City Police force. During stage 2 of the 
NATO enlargement, Norwegian security operations shifted its focus to relieving one of 
the two British PRTs in Northern Afghanistan as well as providing a reaction force to 
the RC North. The Norwegian security efforts were focused on the province of Faryab, 
with the aim of securing the reconstruction and government efforts of the PRT. The 
objective of providing security was not well defined or discussed in itself. Security was 
presented as a necessary condition for other processes to take place, ‘….a much needed 
foundation for development efforts,’ and described more in the sense of what not to 
do rather than how Norwegian force was to achieve security.214 This is also borne out 
of the evidence of the absence of any major Norwegian military operations between 
2005 and 2007. The small forces available to provide security, the Norwegian 
contingent rarely exceeded 400 troops between 2005 and 2008, could of course provide 
an explanation for the lack of discussion, but substantial discussion of how Norwegian 
force was to attain the objective of security was conspicuously absent from official 
documents before 2007.  
 
In late 2007, the security situation in Western and Northern Afghanistan 
deteriorated and Norwegian forces launched operations with the aim of ‘….preventing 
the Taliban from gaining a foothold….’ in Western Faryab.215 In conjunction with these 
operations late in 2007, the Norwegian Prime Minister explained the use of force in 
Faryab as necessary to prevent ‘….the Taliban and criminal factions from gaining a 
stronger foothold….’ in Faryab.216 The PM argued that the operations were necessary 
in order for the situation not to deteriorate in the future, but the objective of providing 
security was only discussed in four lines out of a two-page letter. Furthermore, the PM 
did not explain or discuss the Norwegian view on security operations in general, nor 
did he discuss future security measures as a result of the altered situation.217 Similar 
operations were launched throughout 2007 and 2008, but these operations did not 
result in any clarification as to how the objective of providing security was to be 
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realised. In 2008, the Norwegian Minister of Defence discussed the question of 
Norwegian strategy in Afghanistan without describing the objective of creating security 
in any detail. The emphasis was on reconstruction, Afghanisation, and co-ordination 
between civilian and military resources. Thus, how Norwegian military forces were to 
actively provide security within its AOR was not outlined between 2003 and 2008.  
 
This lack of detail when it came to providing security was reinforced by the 
publication of Norway’s first and only strategy paper on Afghanistan, which was 
published in early 2009. In this strategy paper, the use of armed forces was only 
described as leading to the transfer of responsibility to ASF, but there was no 
description of how the armed forces should create security in the first place or what 
guidance the Norwegian forces were to provide in its support to the ASF.218 Although 
the Norwegian governments did not appear to have a clear idea about how the 
Norwegian armed forces were to achieve its security objective directly, both Norwegian 
governments heavily emphasised the concept of Afghanisation throughout the period of 
2003 and 2008. Despite the fact that Norwegian troops did not become involved in the 
training of the ANA until 2005, but were involved in minor training of the Kabul 
police, the governments’ rhetoric always emphasised that security operations were to 
enable the ASF in its increased responsibilities.219 This emphasis on Afghanisation 
became more pronounced and more clarified after the Norwegian forces took over the 
responsibility in the Faryab province, and ISAF in general took on the responsibility of 
training the ASF. By 2008 the Norwegian Defence Minister did not state any direct 
security tasks for the Norwegian armed forces in Faryab, but tied all security activity to 
the ‘….creation of a credible and potent Afghan Army, under democratic control.’220 
Whereas the British government between 2005 and 2007 saw the armed forces’ tasks as 
defending its PRT and securing the central triangle in Helmand, while training the ASF, 
the Norwegian government never seemed to discuss or clarify whether Norwegian 
troops were to actively take on the security responsibility in its AOR prior to handing it 
over to the ASF. Furthermore, the Norwegian government never moved beyond the 
idea of mentoring when it described the concept of Afghanisation. Where the British 
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government in 2008 and 2009 saw the mentoring of ASF as insufficient, and attempted 
to integrate British and Afghan security operations, no similar measures were described 
by Norwegian authorities.221  
Governance 
Whereas the objective of security and how it was to be achieved was not subject 
to a thorough discussion, the two other objectives seen as underpinning the aim of 
assisting the Afghan authorities were subject to much more attention. The objectives of 
improving governance and assisting the reconstruction of Afghan society went to the 
heart of the matter of the Norwegian discussion of what it wanted to achieve in 
Afghanistan. Throughout the period between 2003 and 2008, the objective of 
improving the security through improved governance rather than direct security 
operations was emphasised. Both Norwegian governments were fully committed to 
NATO’s concept of improving governance through the use of PRTs. Late in 2003, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister committed Norway to the idea of supporting the British 
PRTs in Faryab and Mazar-e-Sharif.222 To the Centre-Conservative government, this 
was the best way of providing stability and at the same time ‘….increasing the influence 
of the central government.’223 The model of the PRT was also supported by the 
Labour-led coalition after 2005 who supported the PRT concept, but further 
emphasised the PRT’s role as a facilitator of civil-military co-operation and 
development efforts.224 Despite the wholehearted support and the emphasis of the 
model, the Norwegian objective of improving governance was not described in any 
great detail.  
 
The PRT concept came with an inherent problem of balancing military security 
operations and improvement of civilian institutions, and this dilemma was not 
addressed publicly in any great detail by the Norwegian government. In 2003 the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister saw the role of the PRTs as having a direct role 
‘….making the area safe….’ and thereby creating a stable environment for economic 
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redevelopment. In the same speech to the Norwegian Parliament, he nevertheless set as 
a condition for the Norwegian participation that the PRT would be provided with 
‘….the necessary security support functions.’225 The speech did not clarify the 
relationship between the governance objective, carried out by the PRT, and the 
creation of security in the province, and left it uncertain whether the Norwegian PRT 
should actively engage in security operations or not. This unclear relationship was 
continued after the new government came into power and the Norwegian PRT took on 
the responsibility for the Faryab province. The Norwegian PRT was in 2007 ‘….to 
facilitate and protect development activities, humanitarian aid, and to support the 
establishment of Governmental control over the entire territory.[sic]’226 Given the status 
of the ASF during 2007 and the level of insurgent activity in Faryab, the establishment 
of government control had to entail active security operations, but the political 
objectives did not seem to take heed of this. In contrast to the British and Dutch cases 
in 2006 and 2007 there were no discussions of the relationship between the PRT and 
the security forces, despite the fact that the insurgency activity had increased in general, 
and the unruly district of Ghowrmach was transferred to Norwegian control.227  
 
The lack of discussion of the relationship between the objectives of governance 
and security as well as the general aim of assisting the Afghan government was also 
evident when it came to the use of Norwegian police personnel. Improving governance 
was explicitly tied to the enhancement of the ASF, including the ANP.228 In response to 
the task of training the ANP, the Norwegian government dispatched police trainers and 
by 2005 18 police advisers were deployed to support local police training. The police 
advisers were independent from the Norwegian PRT, although the PRT commander 
had input on the security aspects of the police operations, and the police trainers 
operated under a different judicial framework than the military security forces and even 
the PRT.229 This in turn led to disagreements between Norwegian police forces and the 
Norwegian military PRT commander on issues such as participation of Norwegian 
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police in planned security operations and liaison with the ANP.230 Although the 
objective of improving governance was subject to more attention from the Norwegian 
governments, the means with which to achieve this objective and its relationship with 
other parallel objectives were not clarified and discussed. 
 
When it came to the question of what kind of governance the Norwegian 
government wanted to support through its objective of governance, there was less 
ambiguity. Both Norwegian governments were clear that they wanted to strengthen the 
central authorities.231 On the other hand, the regional aspect of governance was not 
clarified to the same degree. Compared to the Dutch and British governments, both of 
whom were directly involved in the appointments of provincial government, the 
Norwegian governments rarely involved itself directly in regional governance. Although 
the regional level was mentioned, the objective was discussed with the central 
government as a point of departure. It was only towards the end of the period that the 
Norwegian strategy specifically addressed the provincial and district levels.232  
 
The objective of governance was thus given more attention than the objective of 
security, but the challenging aspects of the objective of governance such as its 
relationship to the objective of security and the inherent dilemma of dealing with local 
or central governance were not solved.  
Reconstruction and development 
Out of the trio of objectives that came out of the aim of assisting the Afghan 
state, the objective of reconstruction was given most attention and emphasis. The 
objective of reconstructing Afghan society could indeed be seen as more important 
than the other objectives and aims, as the objective was discussed in contexts that 
indicated that it was seen as a partial purpose behind the use of Norwegian force in 
Afghanistan. The Norwegian emphasis on reconstruction and development was a result 
of a logic where security and governance was seen as laying the foundation for 
development, but the Norwegian emphasis on development and reconstruction was 
also generated by own policy interests. During the initial NATO deployment, the 
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challenges of reconstructing and developing Afghan society was presented alongside 
the two other purposes of UN and NATO contribution to Afghan security.233 During 
the period this strategic logic was not continued consistently, although throughout the 
period the various political aims were discussed with the need for development and 
reconstruction as a backdrop and in many cases any progress made in Afghanistan was 
measured by progress in reconstruction and development, rather than through progress 
made by security and improved governance.234 The reason why I nevertheless have 
chosen to treat Norwegian political ambitions in the fields of reconstruction and 
development as a subordinate objective rather than a purpose or aim was the lack of 
consistency and the tendency of both Norwegian governments to focus on the loyalty 
to the international institutions of NATO and the UN, whenever a comprehensive 
strategic logic was communicated. 
 
The Norwegian governments’ approach to the objective of reconstruction and 
development was somewhat different than that of the two other cases. Within the 
framework of assisting the Afghan state, the objective of reconstruction and 
development was from the outset kept at an arms length from the objectives of security 
and improving governance. The Norwegian governments provided approximately 
£350 000 in developmental aid to Afghanistan during the period and about 80% of this 
money was provided as aid to the central government in Kabul.235 The remaining 20% 
was allocated through different international organisations and Norwegian NGOs with 
an emphasis on the Norwegian efforts in Faryab. The Norwegian development funds 
were from 2005 divided in three main strands: humanitarian aid, improved governance, 
and long-term development.236  
 
What was significant about the Norwegian objective of development and 
reconstruction was the way the Norwegian government sought to carry out this 
objective. The Norwegian strategy was to make the two elements of reconstruction, the 
humanitarian and the developmental, separate from the military activity on the ground 
through the use of civilian institutions, governmental and non-governmental. During 
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the whole period in question, it was the policy of the Norwegian government to rely 
heavily on civilian agencies to carry out Norway’s ambitions in the field of development 
and reconstruction.237 Utilising the capacities of NGOs was not unique for Norway, but 
in many ways, the consequences this created for Norwegian armed forces were. The 
humanitarian aid was seen as the prerogative of the NGOs, and on the few occasions 
that the Norwegian military forces attempted to engage it, the military was robustly 
rebuffed. On one occasion the Norwegian military PRT commander used an 
emergency fund to address what he perceived as a dire humanitarian situation in his 
immediate surroundings by financing the handing out of warm blankets and food by 
the local Afghan government. He was immediately corrected by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instructed that this was not within the scope of his 
mission, and that the use of military resources in humanitarian aid and development 
would harm the work of the non-governmental organizations operating in the area.238  
 
The development strand was likewise the prerogative of the civilian institutions. 
The Norwegian development efforts were from the outset set apart from the military 
operations. This was partly due to the nature of the efforts; the Norwegian government 
laid emphasis on development of human rights, educational development, particularly 
female education, rural development and anti corruption efforts, efforts not easily 
carried out by military forces.239 However, the separation of the development objective 
from the objectives involving military forces was a deliberate element of Norwegian 
strategic behaviour. Many of the Norwegian efforts in Faryab between 2005 and 2008 
were not easily separated into development or improved governance, the latter being 
the defining function of the military-led PRT in Faryab.240 Between 2005 and 2008, the 
Norwegian government wanted to implement reforms in the police and justice sector, 
in local governance, and improve local infrastructure such as providing basic health 
care, building roads and wells, as well as mine clearing. All these efforts were within the 
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scope of the Norwegian military forces’ capabilities, indeed, the NGO with the greatest 
capacity for mine clearing was for many years dependent on military personnel for its 
training. Nevertheless, the Norwegian strategy was throughout the period to limit the 
use of military personnel to ASF training and direct security operations where 
needed.241 From the outset the Norwegian government argued for a separation rather 
than co-operation between its military and civilian efforts. The military forces thus had 
no direct funds available, and were not intended to take an active part the achievement 
of the objective of reconstruction and development. Initially this concept was not 
codified, but particularly after the deployment of the Norwegian PRT to the Faryab 
province the concept of separating the military effort not only from that of NGOs, but 
also from other government actors such as police and the Foreign Service, became 
more evident. By the end of 2008 the Norwegian political direction had created a 
strategy whereby the military and civilian efforts were separated both in time and space. 
The first Norwegian public strategy from late 2008 and early 2009 worked on the tenet 
that ‘[t]he respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and military actors shall be clearly 
distinguished,…’.242 
 
The political objective of reconstruction and development had a significant place 
in the Norwegian strategy in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. The two 
governments’ intentions were more consistent and their intentions were made clearer 
about this objective than the other objectives and aims. However, although the 
objective of reconstruction and development was more clearly articulated than the 
other aims and objectives, the objective suffered from some practical confusion on the 
ground particularly in relation to the military’s participation in development and 
reconstruction, as well as its relationship to the objectives of security and improved 
governance. 
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Other political aims: Improved civil-military co-ordination and The 
Norwegian Model 
The Norwegian Model 
The way the political objective of reconstruction and development was 
interpreted illustrated an independent political aim pursued by Norway in Afghanistan 
during the period. The Norwegian government not only practiced, but also promoted a 
distinct model of civil-military co-operation, based on clear separation between military 
and civilian actors, called the Norwegian Model.243 The approach was gradually 
developed throughout the period and was laid out in detail towards the end of the 
period in the two strategy documents published early in 2009 and in June the same 
year, where it was described as ‘….the main thrust of our efforts in Faryab…’.244 
 
The approach had the twin aims of improving the co-ordination of civilian and 
military efforts, while at the same time distinguishing clearly between the sectors. The 
approach was fronted as an alternative to ISAF’s comprehensive approach, and to the 
more COIN-based approach introduced by ISAF in 2008.245 The Norwegian model 
was tied to the overall Norwegian purpose of strengthening the UN in Afghanistan and 
utilising the UN as the hub of the civil-military integration.246 This tendency was 
prevalent prior to the change of government in 2005, but the new Labour-led coalition 
made the fronting of the Norwegian model to a political aim directing Norwegian 
strategy, as well as making it the preferred model in all of ISAF’s operations.247 Norway 
was one of the advocates of NATO adopting the concept of comprehensive approach 
in Afghanistan248, but in practice it’s own preferred model was heavily influenced by the 
ideas developed in the 2005 UN report on Integrated Missions, written by the later 
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state secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.249 The Norwegian government 
made the aim of introducing the Norwegian model to a cornerstone of its Afghanistan 
policy in 2007, and reinforced it through 2008, before the principle was clearly stated in 
early 2009. It was argued that the Norwegian model was not in contradiction to the 
other models of NATO and ISAF, but was instead a third way that would involve the 
UN in the strengthening of the Afghan state.  
 
The strengthening of the co-ordination between ISAF and the UN was not 
necessarily controversial. The Norwegian model and the new ISAF strategy emphasised 
the importance of tight co-ordination between NATO forces and the UN.250 However, 
whereas ISAF throughout the period saw this co-ordination as a way to bring the UN 
and NATO closer together in the field, the Norwegian government’s approach was to 
separate the civilian components from the military components and using the civilian 
components to strengthen a more independent UNAMA operation.251 This was a 
departure from the overall strategy of ISAF who throughout the period appeared to 
integrate the civilian and military components, and attempted to include the UNAMA 
in this.252 Whereas ISAF through the period gradually developed political objectives 
conducive to a classic population centric COIN-strategy, where civilian and military 
objectives were fused, the Norwegian government developed a political objective based 
on separation between its military and civilian components. Civilian components such 
as foreign affairs representatives, development experts, and police advisers, as well as 
government funded NGOs were to co-ordinate and co-operate with Norwegian 
military forces in advance of major operations, but there was to be ‘daylight’ between 
the two components during operations in the field.253  
 
The reasons for this departure from the more COIN-based model of ISAF could 
be explained through the different political purposes behind the Norwegian use of 
force in Afghanistan, in particular the purpose of supporting the UN. Support to the 
UN and its operations was an important part of Norwegian security policy to both 
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governments, but the UN line was strengthened as the Labour led coalition came to 
power on a promise of working for ‘….a substantially strengthened United Nations.’254 
The connection to the UN was strong in both governments as government officials in 
both governments sought positions within the UN, and took part in the development 
of UN operational doctrines such as Integrated Missions.255 The emphasis given to the 
role of civilian actors in development, reconstruction and improving governance during 
the period can also be explained by the dominant role of NGOs and other parts of civil 
society in Norwegian foreign policy. The Norwegian NGOs and in particular the 
Norwegian Red Cross had strong ties with both Norwegian governments, exemplified 
by the number of political actors with ties to NGOs before and after their time in 
office.256 Norwegian governments had traditionally taken pride in using NGOs as the 
operational instrument of Norwegian development and humanitarian missions, and the 
separation of civilian and military efforts in many ways fitted the traditional way of 
defining political aims in the sectors of development and humanitarian aid.257 
Furthermore, the Norwegian model and the emphasis of this particular political 
objective could also be traced back to the Norwegian Armed Forces’ lack of experience 
in complex conflicts and counter-insurgency.258 The Norwegian Armed Forces did not 
have a specific approach to these types of conflict, and although they attempted to deal 
with the challenges of civil-military co-operation, their timid response to the criticism 
of their involvement in the objectives of governance, reconstruction, and development, 
proved their relative weakness vis-a-vis its civilian counterpart. 
 
The aim of developing a Norwegian model and promoting it in Afghanistan 
illustrated an independent aspect of Norwegian political purposes and aims in 
Afghanistan during the period. The aim had substantial impact on Norwegian strategic 
behaviour as evidenced through the emphasis it was given. This in turn meant that 
compared to the two other cases, the debate on strategy took a different turn. Whereas 
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the UK and the Netherlands strove towards integrating its military security operations 
with that of the military and civilian PRT operations, Norway strove towards 
separation. Whereas the UK demanded that civilian political efforts such as the MFA 
and DIFD should adapt to and work alongside British military forces, and the 
Netherlands made its civilian PRT the focal point of integration, the Norwegian MFA 
gradually pulled out its lead representatives from the Norwegian PRT, and let NGOs 
operate independently.   
 
2. Were the Political Purposes and Aims Adapted to the 
Nature of War, the Character of Complex Conflicts and 
Coalition Warfare? 
The discussion of Norwegian political purposes, aims and objectives have 
provided an understanding of what the Norwegian governments involved in 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 wanted to achieve with their use of force. The 
next step in the analysis of the strategic behaviour of Norway, is to analyse the 
relationship between these political ambitions and the actual use of force. This part of 
the chapter will analyse how the Norwegian political intent was adapted to the nature 
of war and conflict in general, and how in particular it was adapted to complex conflicts 
and coalition warfare. 
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The Norwegian political purposes and aims may be illustrated in the following 
matrix: 
 
 
Adapted to the nature of war: instrumentality? 
Although the two Norwegian governments operated with multiple purposes and 
aims throughout the period of 2003 and 2008, the purposes behind the deployment of 
Norwegian forces were remarkably consistent throughout the period. Whereas the UK 
appeared to disregard its original purpose behind its use of force in Afghanistan 
between 2003 and 2005 and develop new aims, the Norwegian governments, like the 
Dutch, stuck to its dual purposes of supporting its main security institutions the UN 
and NATO. This consistency was also evident in relation to other aims and objectives. 
Apart from minor developments in the objectives of security, most notably the change 
from relying on own security operations to that of mentoring Afghan security forces, 
the aims and objectives were almost static between 2003 and 2008. The only major 
Overall 
Norwegian 
purpose: 
Contributing to the 
maintenance of a UN 
World Order. 
Solidarity with NATO as a 
security organisation 
Ad hoc:   
Reconstruction 
and 
development as 
a purpose 
 Coalition aims and 
objectives 
Independent Norwegian 
aims and objectives  
 
Political 
aims of a 
higher order 
Assisting the Afghan 
government 
Norwegian model:  
Improved civil-military co-
ordination 
 
Political 
objectives of 
a lower order 
Security   
 Improved governance   
 Reconstruction   
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development evident in political aims was the development of the aim of proposing a 
distinct Norwegian approach to reconstruction, development and governance that was 
accelerated by the Labour-led government after 2005.  
 
Although the Norwegian political aims were consistent, the strategic logic was 
not always clear as several of the various purposes and aims were fraught with mutual 
inconsistencies that were not properly discussed. The Norwegian strategic logic was 
founded on the premise of the UN and NATO agreeing on its policies and methods. 
During the period in question this was not necessarily the case, and the Norwegian twin 
aims of supporting the UN and NATO were difficult to uphold without inconsistencies 
becoming evident. The incompatibility between the UN and NATO policies was visible 
from the outset of NATO’s operations, and was in many ways inherent in the mandate 
of ISAF’s and NATO’s operations when the presence and operational responsibilities 
of the UN was limited and ill defined, particularly regarding the UN’s relationship to 
the military forces. The differences in opinion between the UN and NATO became 
even more visible towards the end of the period when NATO started to rely on 
counterinsurgency doctrines with integrated civilian and military command structures, 
whereas the UN wanted to keep the two more separate in practice. To the Norwegian 
forces, this pursuance of the twin purposes, both supporting the UN and NATO, 
became problematic as the command structure and other alliance partners started to 
implement NATO’s new strategy late in 2008. The Norwegian forces were instructed 
to operate in ways incompatible with NATO strategy.259 The Norwegian government 
thus never appeared do resolve the dilemma between adhering to the NATO PRT 
model and promoting its own preferred model, as the Norwegian PRT lost control 
over most of the civilian Norwegian resources after 2007 just as ISAF tried to improve 
its civilian-military integration through the use of the PRT.  
 
Another problem was the interpretation of what the Norwegian support of 
NATO and ISAF actually entailed and how far the support should extend. After the 
challenges of ISAF’s expansion through stages 3 and 4 became evident early in 2007, 
the question of Norwegian support and reinforcement to Southern Afghanistan came 
up. This question created tension within the government, leading the coalition 
government to decline the use of Norwegian troops outside RCs North and Central. 
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The political purpose of supporting NATO thus did not extend to sending Norwegian 
forces to RC South at a time when NATO struggled to generate enough forces there. 
This interpretation was not necessarily evident in the initial purposes stated, where the 
message was that Norway was in Afghanistan as part of a ‘….shared responsibility in 
living up to our joint promise of assisting the Afghan government in extending its 
authority across the country.’260 
  
The Norwegian governments’ political intent was thus fraught with 
inconsistencies and incompatibilities stemming from the original purposes behind the 
Norwegian use of force in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Norwegian public 
intentions were remarkably consistent during the period, particularly given the fact that 
the period included a change of government in 2005. However, consistency was not the 
same as clarity, for strategy to be an instrument of politics and specific policies, the 
political direction must be clear, and also relevant for the use force. Given the nature of 
the two main purposes behind Norway’s use of force in Afghanistan, one could argue 
that the ambition behind Norway’s use of force in Afghanistan was simply to pledge 
support for the UN and NATO and that there was sufficient clarity in the political 
intent for this. This is not a tenable position as Norway de-facto did more than maintain 
presence on behalf of the two institutions. Firstly, the purposes were to make both 
institutions relevant in Afghanistan, which indicates an understanding that active 
measures were needed for neither institution to fail. Secondly, Norway maintained 
operational control of its forces to a larger degree than what was strictly necessary. 
Thirdly, Norway was not content with letting either institution dictate its operational 
concept in Afghanistan, but actively promoted its own model of development and 
reconstruction based on its own interests. Finally, Norway developed its own strategy 
late in the period that illustrated the above-mentioned ambitions, and Norwegian 
armed forces carried out a series of offensive operations in the Faryab province 
initiated by Norwegian forces. The Norwegian governments clearly had ambitions with 
its use of force beyond mere presence and tacit support to the UN and NATO. 
 
Thus, to what extent did the political purposes and aims provide clear direction 
for the use of force and were they relevant to the development of a strategy? The 
Norwegian purposes and aims during the period appeared to be of a very general 
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nature. There were very few attempts to connect the overall purposes to time and 
space, thereby creating foundations for a strategy. The overall aim of supporting the 
Afghan state was never explained through areas of emphasis, and the subordinate 
objectives were not explained through the priorities of certain areas or functions that 
could provide a foundation for a comprehensive strategy. The objective of security was 
to be achieved through a general security presence, but not elaborated as far as to 
describe what areas should be prioritised. The lack of priorities and directions as to 
where and when force should be used, was also evident when it came to the objectives 
of improving governance and reconstruction, where the objectives only described 
general functions that were to be developed, but again, not when and where they were 
to be achieved. Compared to the British and Dutch political aims for Afghanistan, the 
Norwegian aims were a lot less concrete. The three states faced similar challenges in the 
taking on responsibility of a province, but where the British aims and objectives dealt 
with time and space issues in the central Helmand triangle and the Netherlands 
maintained its focus on the two main cities, there was no similar direction or detail in 
the Norwegian political aims. The Norwegian political objectives were never detailed 
enough to enable a choice between securing Maymaneh or the unruly district of 
Gowrmach.261 
 
This meant that in many respects the Norwegian purposes and aims for 
Afghanistan were never developed beyond general Norwegian security policy. Both 
main purposes were lifted out of the general long-term security policies of both 
governments, and the Norwegian aims and objectives were not elaborated in any 
further detail with regards to developing a strategy that explained how the purposes and 
aims were to be realised through the use of force.262 Of course, a counterargument 
could be that the Norwegian governments did develop its aims and objectives in more 
detail, but that they were developed on the ground in Afghanistan and not made 
available to the public. However, as late as in 2008 the Norwegian armed forces 
operated with the general purposes as its operational objectives, frequently complained 
that the different PRT contingents were allowed to develop its own priorities, and that 
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priorities vis-a-vis other government agencies were unclear.263 That the Norwegian 
political aims and objectives were not developed with the direction of the use of force 
in mind was further illustrated towards the end of the period when the Norwegian 
government developed its only publicised strategy for its commitment in Afghanistan. 
The strategy reiterated the Norwegian purposes and aims, but did not set out any 
priorities for the use of Norwegian force apart from establishing the need to develop 
the Norwegian model of civil-military co-operation and for the continued Afghanisation-
effort.264 There was no direction as far the armed forces were concerned; the 
Norwegian armed forces were to participate in general security operations and continue 
the development of ANSF capabilities.265 The void of clear direction with respect to the 
use of force was illustrated by the way the strategy described the situation in the 
Gowrmach district (the only district singled out) as ‘…..characterized by conflict and 
weak governance’ and that the ‘…security challenges in the district may result in 
difficulties in finding partners for the development of the district.’266 The situation in 
the district obviously constituted a problem, but when the role of the armed forces was 
discussion in the next paragraph, the district was not mentioned and the problems 
described in the district were not addressed in relation to the Norwegian armed forces. 
The criticism of the Norwegian strategy of 2008 and 2009 as not being good strategy is 
to some extent unfair, as it the document did not deal with strategy in the sense that 
strategic theory would define it. The Norwegian strategy was to a large extent a policy 
document rather than a strategy, but it illustrates the lack of direction and clarity in 
Norwegian political aims and objectives when it came to prioritising efforts in time and 
space. The Norwegian political purposes and aims were developed with general security 
policy in mind, but did not to provide direction or rationale for the use of force in 
Afghanistan. 
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Adapted to the nature of war: Unpredictability and reciprocity in 
strategy? 
In strategic theory, the political intent sets the direction for strategy and provides 
the rationale and logic for the use of force, in the words of Carl von Clausewitz: ‘How 
could anything else be conceivable?’267 However, the question of instrumental direction 
has to be combined with the next aspect of strategy; that the political intent is to be 
realised through the use of force in the realm of conflict and war. This means that the 
political intent must be suited to the unpredictability and uncertainty of war and 
conflict, and that it must be stand the test of reality and the volatility of the actual 
conflict, and if necessary be adapted or changed if it is to be realised. There must be 
reciprocity between the ends and the means in strategy, between the political intent and 
the actual use of force. The question is thus whether the Norwegian political purposes 
and aims were adapted to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the actual conflict and 
whether the Norwegian strategic behaviour was characterised by reciprocity between its 
ends and means. 
 
The main source of unpredictability and change in strategy stems from the fact 
that the political intent is to be realised by force against a living adversary or enemy. 
The enemy has a will of his own and will react to and counteract the force used against 
or in relation to him. The Norwegian political purposes and aims were not initially 
designed to deal with a specific enemy, instead Norwegian force was used in relation to 
a general security context where the adversaries were a broad array of ‘….armed groups 
associated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda….’ as well as local warlords, clan leaders and 
regional power brokers.268 This broad definition of the adversaries was in line with the 
way ISAF described its opponents; all adversaries were lumped into a category of 
opposing military forces without an in-depth discussion of the opponents’ diverging 
aims. This lack of a specific enemy was understandable during the years between 2003 
and 2005 of the NATO operation when the focus of ISAF was directed towards the 
relatively secure area of Kabul, and its operations were limited to this benign area.  
 
The Norwegian aims and objectives did not change significantly in relation to 
describing an active adversary after Norway took charge of the province of Faryab in 
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2005, nor did it change significantly after the Taliban uprising reached the Pashto areas 
and started to pose a threat to the outlying districts in Faryab in late 2007.269 In 2005, 
during the deployment of the Norwegian PRT and the Norwegian take-over in Faryab, 
no enemy or adversary was discussed in relation to the Norwegian forces or the 
political aims they were there to achieve; the only reference to adversaries was a brief 
description of the Taliban and Al Qaeda still operating in the South of Afghanistan.270 
The initial Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was difficult for ISAF and the force 
contributing countries to detect, but from late 2006 and during 2007 it became evident 
that the Taliban was a powerful force in the South and East, but also that it was 
operating in force in Southern Faryab.271 Despite this, the Norwegian political aims and 
objectives were not discussed in relation to this threat. Even as Norwegian forces 
engaged the Taliban forces repeatedly in 2007 and 2008, the political intent showed no 
sign of dealing with the signs of an active enemy. The Norwegian State Secretary of 
Defence argued in 2007 that the operational environment in Northern Afghanistan was 
‘….largely permissive….’, in contrast to the more conflict ridden Southern provinces.272 
The Taliban resurgence and the importance of the Pashto population was understood 
by the Norwegian government in 2007, but this did not generate any discussion as to 
how this would affect the Norwegian aims or how the Norwegian government was to 
deal with the enemy that was operating in the Norwegian forces’ area.273 The only 
exception was the Prime Minister’s article in late 2007 where he explained that the 
Norwegian forces were engaging the Taliban in order ‘….to prevent the Taliban and 
criminal groups from gaining a stronger foothold.’274 However, this acknowledgement 
of an adversary did not appear to influence the objectives of the Norwegian 
government or lead to a greater clarification of how Norwegian forces were to create 
the security that was needed in relation to other objectives.  
 
A year later, the Norwegian Minister of Defence gave a speech to a military 
audience on the Norwegian strategy in Afghanistan without addressing the Taliban in 
Faryab, its aims, operations or capacities, or how it affected Norwegian strategy. The 
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Taliban was only mentioned in relation to its pre-2001 rule.275 The interesting aspect of 
this speech was that it explicitly set out to discuss Norwegian strategy, and it went into 
great detail on the importance of strategy, arguing that ‘….tactics without strategy is the 
sound of defeat.’276 The speech did not lack details on other issues and went into detail 
on how the ANA’s 209th Corps was being developed, and in making the case for the 
Norwegian model of civil-military co-operation.277 This indicates that the Norwegian 
government did not see its political aims and objectives, or indeed strategy, as affected 
by or relating to an enemy or adversary despite its own armed forces being actively 
engaged in combat operations at the time.278 This perspective is also supported by the 
fact that the only published Norwegian strategy did not mention an enemy, nor did it 
mention the Taliban or any other forces opposing the Norwegian armed forces in the 
Faryab province.279 The strategy, developed in late 2008 and early 2009, did not 
describe any force(s) working counter to Norwegian political ambitions in the Faryab 
province. The only mentioning of any uncertainty in the province pertained to one of 
the border districts, where the situation was ‘….characterized by conflict and weak 
governance.’280 The strategy did not address questions such as who generated the 
conflict, possible reasons for it, or what the conflict was about, and thus did not 
describe how the political aims should be realised in the face of any opposition. In 
many ways the situation that the political purposes, aims, and objectives were to be 
realised in was not described differently from that of a natural disaster, as the political 
aims were described without relating to a live adversary.  
 
The Norwegian political aims and objectives did not change significantly at any 
stage as a result of any development within the province between 2005 and 2008. This 
period saw a resurgence of the Taliban movement within the province, a marked 
increase in the number of attacks on Norwegian and ISAF forces, and the Norwegian 
forces engaged in active combat against this resurgence. The Norwegian political 
purposes, aims, and objectives were not adapted to the nature of war as far as the 
challenges of changing environment and the adversaries were concerned. This lack of 
adaptation and change even when the situation in Faryab seemed to call for it, leads to 
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the conclusion that the Norwegian political aims were not developed within a 
framework of a reciprocal understanding of strategy. The Norwegian political purposes 
and aims were designed and developed in a way that only allowed for the political logic 
to influence the strategic process and did not allow the logic of the nature of war to 
influence the political intent. It would appear that it was not adjusted to the practical 
realities of the conflict. Thus, the Norwegian political aims and objectives did not seem 
to have been adapted to the nature of war. 
 
Adapted to complex conflicts? 
The Norwegian political aims and objectives were not adapted to all aspects of 
the nature of war when analysed through the lens of strategic theory. The political 
purposes and aims, although thoroughly based on Norwegian security policy and 
consistent through the period, did not create a solid platform on which to build a 
strategy. The next question is to analyse to what extent the Norwegian political intent 
was adapted to the complex conflict that Afghanistan represented and further, to what 
extent the Norwegian government adapted its political aims and participation in the 
coalition to the situation of Afghanistan.   
 
The first aspect characterising complex conflicts is the dichotomous character of 
the conflict where, from a Western perspective, aspects of primitiveness and modernity 
is displayed simultaneously and side by side. This is notable when it comes to the 
threats that the armed forces and other state actors are facing, which range from high 
to low intensity within the same area of operations. The same forces might thus have to 
deal with an enemy launching company size attacks, conducting terrorism, criminal 
activity, as well as political subversion and challenges to its legitimacy simultaneously.281 
The challenges posed by such composite, or hybrid, threats require a flexible response 
with a strategy able to combine the full range of kinetic and non-kinetic force.282  
 
The Norwegian political purposes and aims between 2003 and 2005 indicated 
that the Norwegian forces were deployed without a proper understanding of the 
intensity level present in the Afghanistan conflict. The Norwegian purposes and aims 
described a situation in Afghanistan that was complicated and unstable, but the conflict 
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was described in terms of a multifunctional peacekeeping operation similar to that of 
Kosovo. The task of the Norwegian and NATO forces were described in terms such as 
‘….securing conditions….’ and ‘…creating stability….’, without any mentioning of an 
active opposition.283 This of course reflected the intensity of the conflict prior to 
NATO’s expansion outside Kabul, which was in many ways quite calm. On the other 
hand, less than six months into its Kabul mission, Norwegian troops experienced the 
full range of threats, from IEDs and rocket attacks via criminal attacks and ambushes 
with ATK-weapons. Despite this, the political aims and objectives did not change in 
any significant way. In 2005, the Norwegian Defence Minister outlined Norway’s new 
role as lead nation in the Faryab province without discussing the threats facing the 
mission, other than that describing the political and social challenges faced by opium 
production.284 
 
The resurgence of the Taliban uprising reached the Faryab province in late 2006 
and early 2007, and during the ensuing two years the situation in the province went 
from a cold to a hot insurgency with the Taliban actively holding ground and targeting 
Norwegian and Afghan forces. As noted earlier, this did not result in any significant 
change in the Norwegian political aims or objectives, but the changed situation did 
produce statements from the government relating to the intensity of the conflict. In 
2007 both the state secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, as well as the 
Norwegian CHOD, gave their views on Norwegian strategy and the state of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan. State secretary Barth Eide argued that it was 
clear that the Afghanistan conflict demanded high intensity use of force combined with 
operations facilitating governance and development. Barth Eide argued that ‘….more 
force must be applied in order to support the […] reconstruction effort….’, and that 
‘….we must not shy away from robust action when such action is called for.’285 His 
statement illustrated that the government realised that the conflict in Afghanistan had 
the varying level of intensity characteristic of complex conflicts. The problem was that 
his analysis related to Afghanistan in general and particularly the challenges of the 
NATO expansion in Southern Afghanistan. Nowhere did the state secretary make the 
connection between this understanding and the ends and means relationship in the 
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Norwegian-led province, and neither did his comment involve Norwegian troops, who 
were under his command. The Norwegian CHOD’s statement after one of the 
Norwegian operations in November 2007 similarly illustrated an understanding of the 
varying intensity of the conflict. General Diesen described the details of the operation 
and saw the combat as a result of ‘….deliberate offensive operations against a well 
organised opponent.’286 General Diesen went on by describing the operation as a 
reminder of the fact that coin-operations in general were not won through decisive 
battles. He then went on to describe the benefits of the technological advantage that 
Norwegian troops had vis-a-vis their Taliban opponents. General Diesen did not 
elaborate on how varying levels of intensity created challenges for the Norwegian 
troops or how this influenced policy or strategy, or even operations. Instead, he 
focused the brunt of his speech (delivered to an audience of active and retired officers) 
on the importance of technological superiority and firepower. The General thus 
illustrated an understanding of the high intensity level of the conflict, but did not 
discuss the challenges of operating against a multiple set of threats engaging 
simultaneously. Just as Barth Eide’s statement was a general security policy analysis, 
General Diesen’s speech focused on the general aspects of military theory and 
technology. Nowhere in the General’s speech was there any attempt to discuss how the 
use of force and the situation in Faryab related to Norwegian political aims and 
objectives.  
 
The two speeches and statements of 2007 were the only public examples of the 
Norwegian government discussing the intensity level as part of an analysis of the 
conflict during the period of 2003 and 2008. The statements and analyses of 2008, 
including the published strategy, did not discuss the conflict in the light of multiple 
threats or varying intensity. Indeed, the public strategy did not deal with the question of 
an enemy or his ways of thwarting Norwegian ambitions at all. Norwegian government 
and military leadership thus appeared to see the conflict as posing the challenges of 
complex or hybrid warfare, but only in general terms. The analyses were not related to 
the Norwegian use of force in Faryab and it did not influence the political aims and 
objectives. The Norwegian political aims were thus not adapted to the challenges of 
complex conflicts as far multiple threats were concerned, and the changing nature of 
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the conflict during the period in question did not change the nature of Norwegian 
participation and its use of force. 
 
The second aspect of the question of whether the Norwegian aims were adapted 
to the challenges of making strategy in the context of a complex conflict was the 
question of longevity. A significant characteristic of complex conflicts is the fact that 
modern conflicts tend to be drawn out affairs without a conclusive ending.287 The 
Norwegian purposes, aims and objectives appeared to take this aspect of complex 
conflicts into account. During the entire period in question the publicly stated aims 
stressed the fact that the conflict in Afghanistan was a conflict that required a long-
term perspective, and even that the end of the conflict would not be an all out victory. 
The long-term perspective was evident from the beginning of Norway’s contribution to 
NATO’s responsibilities in Afghanistan as the Norwegian centre-conservative 
government understood that ‘….NATO and Norway as a member of the alliance will 
have to stay in Afghanistan for a long time.’288 This view was continued by the 
succeeding government and communicated by various members of the administration. 
The Norwegian State Secretary for Defence argued that Norway had a ‘….long-term 
perspective….’ on its commitment in Afghanistan, whereas the Minister of Defence a 
year later argued that ‘….we will remain in Afghanistan – also in the long run.’289 
Paradoxically, the public strategy did not mention the long-term aspect of the conflict 
as it did not deal with time and space. The Norwegian political aims thus displayed that 
they were developed with the drawn out nature of complex conflicts in mind. The 
government also saw its commitment ending in an unclear fashion and not in an 
outright victory. The Norwegian CHOD argued that the ‘Taliban will still be present 
the day we and NATO withdraw…’ and saw the conflict in the timeless fashion that 
for instance Rupert Smith described.290 The Norwegian political aims and objectives 
were hence fairly well adapted to the out drawn nature of complex conflicts. 
 
The third aspect highlighted in the discussion of complex conflicts and 
Afghanistan is the question of how the Norwegian political intent and the use of force 
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related to the plethora of different actors and different tasks present in complex 
conflicts; or whether the political aims was adapted to the multifunctional and 
multinational requirements of the Afghanistan conflict. One of the political aims of the 
Norwegian government after 2005 was the improvement of the co-operation between 
civilian and military actors in Afghanistan. The aim was to strengthen the coordination 
by enabling the UNAMA and other civilian coordination instruments to take on the 
‘….lead role…’ at central and provincial levels.291 The problem in Afghanistan was that 
in many ways UNAMA was not given the mandate, authority, or the resources to take 
the lead. The Norwegian emphasis on the UN thus appeared to be based on the hope 
that UNAMA would suddenly be able to co-ordinate civilian and military efforts, when 
the situation in reality was very different. 
 
The Norwegian political aims and objectives were attuned to the challenges of 
multi-functionality and the challenges of making strategy in conflicts where multiple 
actors with different mandates and tasks operated. The challenge was that they were 
not in line with the other states of the coalition, or indeed the coalition’s official policy. 
Whereas ISAF, spearheaded by the US and the UK, was trying to integrate the different 
actors along the lines of traditional COIN-practices, the Norwegian approach was to 
work for a clear separation between the different actors, in particular the military and 
the civilian actors. In many ways, this separation made it conceptually easier to engage 
with the challenges in Faryab as the military forces could focus on its normal task of 
fighting the enemy, whereas the other actors could carry out their tasks of 
reconstruction and development.292 Apart from the fact that this approach differed 
from rest of the coalition, other problems arose during the period. Firstly, the 
Norwegian model tried to avoid the problem of the military dabbling in the art of 
reconstruction and development, and consequently prevented the military from 
engaging in quick impact projects (QIP) that could be detrimental to long-term Afghan 
socio-economic development. Examples of the failure of QIPs from other operations 
and sectors in Afghanistan are abundant, as the very nature of QIPs prevents the 
thorough long-term cross sector analysis necessary to create sustained development. In 
the Helmand province the British military initially got engaged in projects such as 
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donating advanced equipment to hospitals without ensuring that proper funding, wiring 
or training was in place, and without realising that the introduction of machines led to 
less work for labourers.293 Although the Norwegian model in theory left the difficult 
work to the more competent NGOs, the problem of separating the development actors 
from direct co-operation with those providing security became evident towards the end 
of the period as the security situation in Faryab deteriorated. The challenge was that the 
development was most needed in the Pashto areas in Southern Faryab, where the 
security situation was most dire. As the NGOs did not want to risk their projects, the 
development projects were concentrated in the Uzbek areas, where the situation was 
more benign.294 As the insurgency developed there were fewer areas where 
development projects could be implemented and less incentive particularly for the 
Pashto population to support the government. In practice, the model went counter to 
the very idea of ISAF’s COIN-project, which saw the need to increase the support of 
the elected government particularly in disputed areas. The Norwegian model was thus a 
good model in a benign setting, but when confronted with the challenges of multi-
functionality and multi-agency in a complex conflict, the model seemed less adequate. 
 
Secondly, although the actors were to operate separately, there was still a need to 
coordinate in advance and for the long-term. Whereas the British and Dutch 
coordination and planning brought the different actors together in a joint planning 
process prior to deployment and during their operations, the Norwegian approach did 
not allow for a similar process.295 The Norwegian government had no joint planning 
process below the ministry level to bring the various actors together. In the field, the 
civilian coordinators; MFA officials; police; and military forces were only co-located, 
but no command structure was established and all actors were under the command of 
different organisations and answered to different authorities.296 The idea of 
coordinating the various actors was there, but as the military answered to its chain of 
command emanating in the Ministry of Defence, the MFA officials took orders from 
the MFA, the police officers from the Ministry of Justice, and NGOs could only be 
loosely controlled through incentives by the MFA and Ministry of Development. 
Hence, co-ordination was difficult to achieve in practice. The practical problems of co-
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ordinating the various actors were a source of great controversy between particularly 
the NGOs and the military forces who regularly criticised each other for either 
encroachment, absence or rigidity.297 Furthermore, the idea of improved coordination 
was further made problematic by the fact that all actors operated under different 
legislation and mandates making actual co-ordination in the field difficult and the 
question of co-operation nearly impossible.298 The co-operation between the various 
Norwegian actors was made difficult by the political aims of the Norwegian 
government which prevented any such activity, and the lack of any mechanisms to 
coordinate below government level exacerbated the problem of carrying out any 
operation with more than one actor. 
 
When it came to other international actors, the Norwegian aims and objectives 
ran into difficulties when trying to co-operate with the host government and its security 
forces. Where the British aims and objectives were difficult to reconcile with the 
province governor’s need for a power base, a similar problem with the elected regional 
government occurred in the more multiethnic province of Faryab. The power in Faryab 
was held by the Uzbek majority which tended to make its own population its priority 
rather than the Pashto population.299 As the insurgency had its origin in the Pashto 
areas the Norwegian government wanted a fair distribution of resources in order to 
build trust in the government in these areas. In the eyes of the Norwegian forces the 
insurgency was partly driven by the distrust of the Pashto population, but from 2005 to 
2008 the Norwegian government did not manage to convince the regional government 
to make the Pashto areas more of a priority.300 This inability ran counter to the 
Norwegian ideas of unbiased development and reconstruction and counter to its ideas 
of good governance. 
 
The purposes, aims and objectives of the Norwegian government were deeply 
tied to the idea of international law and human rights. From the first deployment of 
Norwegian troops it became apparent that other nations’ troops and in particular the 
ASF either interpreted the rules of armed conflict differently than the Norwegians 
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intended or they lacked the resources or the training to carry them out. A precursor to 
this problem became evident when Norwegian Special Forces were committed to the 
Operation Enduring Freedom operation Anaconda in early 2002. As the operation 
progressed it became evident that any prisoners or detainees taken would be handed 
over to either American troops or the newly inaugurated Afghan government. In both 
cases, the risk was that the detainees could be given the status of illegal combatants and 
end up in Guantanamo Bay. As the Norwegian government did not recognise this 
interpretation of international armed conflict the Norwegian political line became that 
“[…] Norwegian troops has only in a limited way apprehended prisoners”, a line that 
that could certainly be interpreted in the wrong way.301 The problem of co-operating 
with local security forces persisted also after 2003 with the deployment of Norwegian 
troops under NATO authority. In 2004 Norwegian troops, as part of its joint 
operations with local police, detained and handed over suspects to the ASF. Again, this 
created the problem of how these detainees were treated, and once again whether the 
local authorities would hand them over to US detention facilities. The problem was 
solved through a series of memorandums of understanding (MoU) between the 
Norwegian (and other states) and the Afghan authorities in 2006 inspect the local 
facilities and follow up on the detainees. This was by far not an exclusively Norwegian 
problem, but as the problem persisted, Norwegian troops were left in the confusing 
situation of not knowing how to deal with suspected insurgents and other criminals 
because the Norwegian government was more concerned than other governments even 
after the MoUs were in place, and as late as 2008 the actual conduct of Norwegian 
troops was not clarified. 
 
The Norwegian political purposes, aims and objectives were developed with the 
challenges of multi-functionality and multi-agency in mind, but as the aims prescribed a 
rigid separation of the various actors on the ground without developing proper 
mechanisms of coordination on the ground, the result was a confusing situation 
whereby the various actors in reality did not work towards common goals. 
Furthermore, the Norwegian political aims were not adapted to the realities of making 
strategy in the context of a host nation and other coalition partners operating with a 
different understanding of the actual conflict and its legal ramifications.  
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Adapted to coalition warfare? 
The last factor that the Norwegian political intent will be analysed in relation to is 
the question of how the Norwegian political purposes, aims and objectives were 
adapted to develop strategy in a coalition with other states. One of the original political 
purposes behind the Norwegian involvement in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan was 
the solidarity with NATO as an alliance and with the countries in the alliance;  a 
purpose that was maintained through the period.302 From the outset the Norwegian 
government’s political intent was thus adapted to the fact that the Afghanistan 
operation depended on a coalition. Despite this, the Norwegian governments’ 
relationship to the coalition was not as streamlined as the overall political purpose 
would indicate. The political purpose was not discussed in any detail regarding how far 
the alliance obligations would extend or what it meant in practice on the ground. This 
lack of discussion and clarification appeared to be a source of friction between Norway 
and other alliance members on several occasions, and created serious challenges for 
both Norwegian governments. The first challenge lay in the very reasoning behind the 
participation in the NATO part of the Afghan operations. The participation in 
NATO’s operation in Afghanistan and the emphasis on ISAF operations could partially 
be explained by the Norwegian governments’ ambivalence to the US led Operation 
Enduring Freedom. As this operation was sanctioned by the UN, but not directly 
mandated, it ran contrary to the main tenets of Norwegian security policy, which 
emphasised the UN’s role in sanctioning the use of military force.303 This criterion was 
met in the case of ISAF and the Norwegian choice of deploying its forces under 
NATO auspices was thus preferred. The problem was that ISAF initially was a small 
force that relied heavily on Operation Enduring Freedom resources for its operations, 
and the limited AOR of ISAF meant that many operations on the outskirts of ISAF 
boundaries demanded a close co-operation between ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom forces. This co-operation created challenges for the Norwegian government, 
which tried to limit the co-operation and create a clear distinction between the two 
operations through the use of caveats and through the strengthening of ISAF 
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capacities.304 This became particularly evident when the Norwegian government 
deployed F-16 fighters to ISAF, and publicly stated that the fighters would only 
support the Operation Enduring Freedom in cases of emergency but not on a regular 
basis.305 The problem for Norwegian troops was that other states did not operate with 
the same restrictions and co-operation between Norwegian troops and other ISAF 
coalition partners was sometimes problematic, let alone the co-operation with the 
forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. 
 
The problem of Operation Enduring Freedom co-operation gradually diminished 
as ISAF expanded its area of responsibility into the areas previously under Operation 
Enduring Freedom command. This process was supported by the Norwegian 
government, but in turn created the challenge of defining the extent of Norway’s 
support to ISAF.306 By the autumn of 2005 the Labour-led coalition had taken over 
government and came into power with an uneasy partnership with the socialist left on 
the issues of foreign policy and in particular Afghanistan. The new government found 
itself having to reinterpret the practical extent of its solidarity with NATO, ISAF and 
other coalition partners. This second problem of adapting Norwegian political aims to 
those of coalition and alliance partners emerged in late 2006 and early 2007. The 
NATO-states tasked with establishing control in the South and in the East began in late 
2006 and early 2007 to look for reinforcements from other NATO countries. The 
Norwegian government received several requests from NATO and from individual 
countries such as the Netherlands, but decided in both 2006 and 2007 that a 
Norwegian reinforcement of the more controversial and violent operation in Southern 
Afghanistan was not in the best interest of Norway due to other commitments.307 
Instead, the Norwegian government wanted to focus on Northern Afghanistan and to 
improve the co-operation between civilian and military efforts there. The question of 
solidarity with NATO and the other NATO states was hence brought to a head, and 
although the Norwegian government ‘….in principle….’ did not rule out sending 
Norwegian troops outside the area of RC North, the Norwegian political purpose of 
NATO solidarity was in reality reinterpreted to exclude Norwegian participation in 
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ISAF operations outside RC North and RC Central.308 The Norwegian (and other 
states’) refusal to contribute forces to Southern Afghanistan in a time when the UK and 
the Netherlands felt faced with an undue burden did strain relationships inside the 
broader coalition as well as within the NATO alliance, calling into question whether the 
purpose of supporting alliance partners could be realised.309 
 
The third challenge of adapting Norwegian political intent to the context of 
coalition operation emerged in relation to the independent Norwegian aim of 
improving the civil military co-ordination according to the Norwegian model. The 
model was distinctly different to that of other NATO states such as the US, and to the 
British or the Dutch models because it demanded a clear separation between military 
and civilian, that is both political and non-political, efforts. This model created 
problems within the Norwegian organisation as noted previously, but it also created 
problems vis-a-vis other coalition partners and as well as Norwegian forces on the 
ground. The challenge was first of all a conceptual one; Norway, as a coalition member 
pursued a different approach within its PRT than did its adjacent partners. During 
operations the Norwegian forces could not closely co-operate with civilian actors, 
which led to a series of operations where the focus was in practice, although not in 
theory, purely military in execution.310 On the other hand, initially the conceptual 
problems were limited as every PRT in Afghanistan operated differently and with 
different organisations, and there was limited co-operation with other forces in the 
Faryab province. However, at the end of the period, in 2008, US’ military forces and 
development agencies began operating in Faryab. The conceptual differences became 
visible quite early on as the US forces and agencies brought with them a different 
approach based on more integrated operations between the US Army and USAID. The 
disparity between American and Norwegian resources left the Norwegian troops with 
the dilemma of following its own path without adequate resources to follow through, 
or tow the American line, which was supported by both military and civilian 
resources.311  
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The Norwegian political purposes and aims were seemingly well adapted to the 
challenges of operating in a complex conflict within a coalition framework as the 
Norwegian government from the outset defined coalition solidarity as the very purpose 
of the use of Norwegian force in Afghanistan. The problem was that the coalition and 
alliance solidarity was not thoroughly analysed as far as its practical consequences and 
limitations were concerned. The Norwegian political purposes and aims ran into 
practical problems when they were to be realised by force alongside other states and 
members of the coalition. Although the Norwegian government’s aims did not run into 
problems with the local authorities, as did the British aims, the Norwegian 
government’s problems were those of its own allies. The challenges of adapting 
Norwegian political intent and the use of force to the ongoing Operation Enduring 
Freedom operations, the sudden refusal to support Regional Commands other than the 
North and Central, and the challenges stemmed from the government’s pursuance of a 
different model for civilian and military co-operation. This revealed that the Norwegian 
political intent was not well adapted to the challenges of making strategy in the context 
of a coalition. 
 
 
3. The Organisation of the Strategic Process in Norway 
The structure  
The next step of this study of Norwegian strategic behaviour is to analyse how 
the process of the Norwegian strategy was organised during the years between 2003 
and 2008. The making of strategy is an inherently practical process which involves the 
bringing together of elected politicians, government officials of relevant ministries and 
military officers in order to transform the political intent into a practical plan for the 
use of military force. The way in which this process was organised and what part the 
participants played in developing the Norwegian strategy in Afghanistan was an 
important aspect when describing the Norwegian strategic behaviour during the period. 
What characterised the Norwegian organisation of its strategic process during the 
period was that it was designed to function against either major threats directed 
towards Norwegian home soil or low-level domestic threats. The organisation of the 
strategic process was neither designed nor was it adapted, to deal with violent and 
shifting complex conflicts far from the Norwegian homeland.  
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At the top, the Norwegian political and strategic organisation was led by the 
prime minister in charge of a cabinet constituted by the head of the different ministries. 
The cabinet’s work was co-ordinated by the small administrative office of the Prime 
Minister, which mainly co-ordinated the cabinet meetings and the work of the Prime 
Minister. As compared to the Netherlands and the UK, there was a conspicuous lack of 
sub-ministerial committees to co-ordinate inter-ministerial work. There were no formal 
cabinet committees to deal with security or strategy issues, nor were there any 
permanent inter-ministerial sub-committees. Major security issues such as the decisions 
to deploy forces to Afghanistan and later to Faryab would be presented to the 
Norwegian Select-Committee on Foreign Relations, including representatives of the 
major parties in Stortinget, but these meetings were not public, and were conducted to 
keep the Norwegian Parliament informed, not to open up for discussion on how force 
should be used. 
 
The individual ministries were the main vehicles of carrying out actual policies 
and providing advice to the political leadership within their areas of responsibility. In 
principle, the ministries were not organised in a hierarchy and no ministry had any 
overall co-ordinating powers, such as a ministry of the interior have in other countries. 
Situations that required a joint or a co-ordinated response, would have to be co-
ordinated at cabinet level or directly between the ministries. For foreign crises or 
emergencies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would take the lead, but as the Norwegian 
response to Afghanistan primarily consisted of military personnel, the day-to-day 
efforts in Afghanistan required substantial involvement by the Ministry of Defence. 
Further efforts from Norwegian police forces and development agencies meant that a 
Norwegian strategy in practice would require intimate co-operation between the 
ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, and Development, as well as the 
Ministry of Finance. Until 2007 there were no permanent co-ordinating bodies to co-
ordinate or discuss the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan, but in 2005 an ‘….inter-
ministerial forum….’ was established which involved the state secretaries of relevant 
ministries.312 This forum was not a permanent structure, but allowed for some of the 
co-ordination required by the Stoltenberg-II government’s increased focus on 
comprehensive approach in Faryab.  
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The process of developing a Norwegian strategy for the complex conflict of 
Afghanistan was hence left to the full cabinet if it was deemed important enough, 
however, in practice it was left to the ministries of Foreign Affairs (including the 
Ministry of Development), Defence and Justice, whose resources were involved in the 
conflict. For domestic crises a system of co-ordination between the ministries was set 
up, but participation in these co-ordination mechanisms was dealt with in an ad-hoc 
manner.313 This functional and separate organisation developed out of adherence of to 
the ‘…overall principles…’ of Norwegian ministerial government and crisis 
management.314 The principles guiding the Norwegian government were proximity, 
responsibility and similarity, and entailed that government policy and any response to 
emergencies was handled by the ministry whose functional responsibility it was to 
handle this area normally. The organisation responsible for dealing with a situation was 
to be organised as similarly as possible to its normal organisation, and any emergency 
was to be dealt with as close to the problem as possible. These principles were designed 
and discussed in the context of dealing with domestic emergencies, but the idea of 
separating Norwegian efforts along functional lines was also the primary organising 
principle for operations abroad.315 The three principles were the desired policy of both 
Norwegian governments during the period, and although criticised by a public 
commission in 2000, both governments maintained the principles of separation and 
decentralisation in all public documents during the period of this study.316 Indeed, it 
was only in 2012, after the terrorist attacks of the previous year in which the co-
operation between the police and defence forces were found lacking, that the 
Norwegian government argued for more emphasis on co-ordination and interaction 
between the ministries in response to crises. In its initial report after the terrorist 
attacks the Labour-led coalition introduced a fourth principle of ‘interaction’ between 
ministries as guiding the Norwegian response to governance and crises, but did not link 
this change to Norwegian development of strategy abroad.317 The governments’ 
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organisation along functional and ministerial lines grew out of the old Cold War 
security paradigm, where the main security threat was an existential threat to 
Norwegian territory, where major decisions would be made in the cabinet and the 
ministries would constitute the main players in an overall Norwegian grand strategy.318 
The organisation and the principles guiding it also made sense from the perspective of 
preventing an unnecessary build-up of power in peace time, such as a large body 
charged with the co-ordination of central actors in the government could entail. It also 
allowed for accountability and transparency where political responsibility was firmly 
placed at the head of a politically accountable minister who could be called and 
questioned by the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget).  
 
The problem with the organisation was that it was not well adapted to the 
challenges of long-term, low intensity conflicts such as Afghanistan, which required 
intense planning, co-operation, and co-ordination of multi-agency operations at sub-
cabinet levels. As in all Western democracies, the deliberations on how to develop 
strategy in the ‘Norwegian’ province of Faryab was rarely considered a vital task of the 
nation, and if the question of Afghanistan did become politically noticeable it 
concerned the questions of whether Norway should remain in Afghanistan, casualties 
or concerns about cost or equipment. The subjects of making strategy and the 
implementation of the chosen strategy did not loom large enough to warrant 
consideration at the cabinet levels. The ministries involved in the actual co-ordination 
did not always agree on who was in charge of what in the process. The MoD and the 
MFA kept competing departments that assessed and advised on Norwegian security 
policy. The MFA and the Ministry of Development maintained strong ties with the 
Norwegian NGO community, thus limiting the scope of co-ordination with the MoD 
and the Armed Forces, whereas the Ministry of Justice always maintained that the use 
of Norwegian police was governed by a separate legal framework than the armed forces 
which in turn limited any potential co-operation between the two ministries.319  
 
This meant that the Norwegian strategic organisation and the process of making 
strategy were disjointed and separate from the outset and there were no structures that 
could encourage co-operation between the ministries. The relationships between the 
various ministries smacked of territoriality rather than a desire to co-ordinate and co-
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operate, and this had a significant impact on the choices of strategies that were available 
to the Norwegian government. The Stoltenberg-II government’s policy of developing a 
distinct Norwegian interpretation of the comprehensive approach, whereby military 
efforts were separate both from political and non-political Norwegian efforts, was 
influenced by the principles guiding the overall political and strategic organisation 
which was already separated along functional lines. An interpretation of the concept of 
comprehensive approach along the lines of uniting military and civilian efforts, such as 
advocated by the ISAF, would require a break with the traditional Norwegian views on 
governance. The overall political and strategic organisation in Norway was thus 
designed to operate within a peaceful crisis situation or an absolute war context, and 
was not well adapted to the challenges of a complex conflict such as Afghanistan; 
fought abroad and requiring extensive low level co-operation between the actors 
involved. 
The integration 
The process of making strategy has been described by Eliot Cohen as the 
dialogue between ‘….soldiers and statesmen….’ and that in order to make good 
strategy (and maintain healthy Civil-Military Relations (CMR)) this meeting must take 
the form of an ‘unequal dialogue’ and a ‘dialogue of unequals’.320 The dialogue between 
these soldiers and statesmen is thus characterised by the premise that politicians have 
the final word in strategy, but also that officers have more practical knowledge about 
the use of force and have a duty to bring this knowledge forward in the shape of sound 
military advice. The manner in which this military advice was generated and dealt with 
thus becomes central to the study of the process of developing the Norwegian strategy 
during the period. Contrary to the studies conducted by Cohen, the Norwegian 
strategic process was not characterised by the meeting and exchanges between a 
democratically elected leader and his subordinate generals. In Norway, just as in the 
UK and the Netherlands, the pivotal structure when it came to generating and passing 
on military advice to the political level was the MoD. What characterised the 
Norwegian strategic organisation during the period of this study was a weakening of 
the military advice and a corresponding strengthening of the political and bureaucratic 
voices in the strategic decision-making process.  
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Figure: The organisation of the strategic process in Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Norwegian Defence organisation had since the late 1960s vacillated between 
co-locating its MoD and its Defence Headquarters and keeping them separate. From 
1985 to the late 1990s the two elements had been kept apart, but as a part of an overall 
downsizing and restructuring of the armed forces, the Labour government in 2001 
argued for a merger between the Defence Headquarters and the MoD. This was initially 
voted down by the centre-conservative coalition that superseded it later the same year, 
who instead argued for a co-location of the MoD and a much reduced Defence Staff.321 
In a political compromise in June 2002 the initial proposition of an integrated MoD 
and Defence Headquarters was reintroduced and the so-called ‘…integrated strategic 
leadership….’ was established in 2003.322 The initial reasoning behind the integration of 
the MoD and the Defence Headquarters from 2001 was divided into three main 
elements. The integration of the political and military institutions was seen as a 
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response to the changing operational requirements after the end of the Cold War 
whereby the armed forces were consistently used abroad in international operations. 
This made ‘….a continuous political-military contact…’ necessary as the operations 
both abroad and domestically were seen as more ‘….varied and challenging….’ than 
previously.323 The second and third lines of reasoning for integrating the political and 
military leadership were tied to the frustrations at the political level with the lacklustre 
performance of the Norwegian Armed Forces when it came to the transformation and 
reduction of the armed forces.324 The size of the armed forces’ command structure was 
seen as too large compared to that of the MoD, and both the Defence Headquarters 
and the MoD was seen as ‘….not having succeeded in their efforts to transform the 
armed forces during the 1990s….’, and that this failure ‘….for the most part had 
structural causes.’325 The introduction of the integrated MoD was thus based on a 
desire to improve strategic decision-making at the political and military interface, but 
more importantly, to take control of the process of transforming the armed forces 
from a Cold War to a post-Cold War setting. This view is reinforced by the 2002 
proposition which did not argue for improved political and military interaction but 
instead argued for co-location of the military and political leaderships from a 
perspective of effective resource management and saving administrative support.326 The 
integrated MoD was not a result of a coherent idea of how to improve the strategic 
decision-making process; it was a way to increase the political and bureaucratic control 
over reluctant armed forces that had refused change for most of the previous decade. 
This is further evident in the way the new integrated MoD was structured after August 
2003. The Defence Headquarters comprised of approximately 600 officers in relevant 
positions to the strategic decision-making process, whereas the old MoD had 200 
civilians. The new integrated MoD cut the number of officers to 110 and maintained 
the 200 civilians.327 The CHOD kept an additional 183 officers to form his new 
Defence Staff which was to serve as his staff outside the actual MoD. The overall effect 
was to cut the number of officers in the strategic decision-making organisation by two 
thirds and maintain the level of civilians involved.  
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The integrated MoD established the CHOD as the main military adviser to the 
Minister of Defence on par with the senior civil servant of the MoD. After 1970, the 
Norwegian CHOD was to be in general command over the armed forces but did not 
have direct operational command. The operational command resided at the joint 
operational HQs, and the CHOD’s responsibility was thus not implementing strategy 
but to manage the armed forces and provide advice to the Minister of Defence. 328  The 
problem was that the CHOD’s ability to generate independent military advice was 
much reduced and relied mostly on the small Joint Defence Staff which was located 
outside the MoD. This meant that more of the military advice would be generated 
within the MoD rather than in the armed forces. This tendency was further reinforced 
in 2008, when the Defence Staff was reduced and the service chiefs (Inspector 
Generals) were relocated outside of the capital. This was done in order to ‘….establish 
a robust and transparent level of command in charge of force generation within the 
respective services.’329 The CHOD’s Defence Staff was further reduced and service 
chiefs were thus further removed from the strategic decision-making process against 
the explicit advice of the CHOD who argued that this decision would ‘….significantly 
weaken the day-to-day running of the armed forces….’.330 Towards the end of the 
period, the ability of the CHOD to generate and formulate military advice was further 
reduced as his control over the military communications office was transferred to the 
Minister of Defence, reducing his ability to convey independent advice.331 The 
establishment of an integrated MoD was thus meant to strengthen the political control 
over the armed forces, particularly in relation to the much needed transformation of 
the forces and resource management. The integrated MoD undoubtedly sped up this 
process and enhanced the ability of the armed forces to implement political decisions 
on transformation. However, the MoD was also designed to improve the quality of the 
strategic decisions in the more complex security environment of the early 21st century. 
The question is to what extent the politically robust and militarily weakened integrated 
MoD did just that, and how the integration impacted on the strategic behaviour of 
Norway. 
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From the outset, the advocates for an integrated political-military structure 
argued that such a structure would increase the strategic effectiveness, both in general 
and in the case of complex conflicts specifically.332 Based on the previous findings on 
political aims and strategy, this claim does not seem to be warranted in the case of the 
Norwegian Afghanistan strategy between 2003 and 2008. In defence of Egnell, his 
argument on increased effectiveness of an integrated organisation was based on the 
employment of a ‘….comprehensive approach to planning and operations’, an 
approach which the Norwegian government explicitly decided against. This also 
reflected the integrated Norwegian MoD. The integrated Norwegian structure did not 
have an office in charge of developing strategic alternatives or co-ordinating strategy, 
instead the MoD’s focus was on security policy, long-term planning and proper 
resources management.333 The Norwegian CHOD did not have strategy making or 
implementation in his portfolio as he was not in operational command of the actual 
forces on the ground.334 The subject of strategy and how to co-ordinate, and implement 
it was therefore conspicuously absent from the Norwegian integrated structure.  
 
The actual direction and conduct of the military forces was left to the military 
organisation, which brings us over to the second weakness of the Norwegian integrated 
structure which appeared to be the lack of professional military advice in the 
organisation. The need for political involvement in the development of strategy is 
viewed by the civilian supremacists such as Clausewitz and Cohen as a prerequisite to 
strategic effectiveness. Strategy is inextricably linked to politics; if strategy is to be 
rational it is but a means to the political purpose and the measure of strategic success is 
defined in political terms. The need to have political influence in the strategic decision-
making process is thus undisputed and the integrated Norwegian structure doubtlessly 
strengthened the political influence vis-a-vis the military views given the relative increase 
in civilian personnel in the new integrated structure.  
 
However, both Clausewitz and Cohen argue for a dialogue between the military 
and the politicians, and although the civilian political authority over the armed forces 
and strategic decisions is ‘…unambiguous and unquestioned….’ the dialogue also 
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presupposes a military that is able to form and argue recommendations based on a 
military viewpoint. 335 Cohen argued for the right of the politicians to decide in the end, 
but at closer examination his argument is not for the politicians to ride roughshod over 
the armed forces but invite advice and then carefully and analytically probe it. The 
challenge with the Norwegian integrated structure was that although the military was 
brought into the political sphere in the MoD, their commanders were simultaneously 
left without sufficiently manned staffs to generate well founded military advice. The 
reduction of the military staffs meant that the advice generated was developed within 
the framework of the ministry and the distinction between what was advice based on 
the needs of the forces involved and what was based on political desires was difficult to 
separate. As Strachan has pointed out, this is a risk that all integrated structures run, but 
in the case of the Norwegian organisation it appeared that when it came to the 
development of a practical strategy in Afghanistan the military organisation was too 
reduced in size to offer relevant advice.336 The integrated civilian and military MoD in 
Norway did not appear to improve strategic effectiveness as far as developing a 
working strategy for Norway in Afghanistan. The two weaknesses of the Norwegian 
integrated structure appeared to correlate with the weaknesses of the Norwegian 
strategy noted earlier. The political aims and objectives were well connected to the 
overall Norwegian security policy as well as consistently stated throughout the period, 
but the political aims were not developed into practical directions for the actual use of 
military force. The political direction lacked clarity and detail when it came to how, 
when and where military force was to realise the Norwegian political aims in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The absence of a strategy that dealt with the practical aspects of how to realise 
political ends with military force could thus be seen as a result of the Norwegian 
solution of an integrated MoD with a much reduced military component. This 
argument presupposes a Norwegian military ready to offer military advice, but whose 
advice was silenced by the confines of an integrated political-military organisation. But 
when one investigates the actions and the discourse within the Norwegian armed forces 
between 2003 and 2008 there is not much evidence for such a premise. Civilian 
supremacists such as Cohen and Feaver argue for the importance sounding off 
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alternative views within the armed forces when it comes to generating military advice.337 
They argue that in the interest of improving strategy, politicians, although trusting their 
appointed advisers, should not generate military advice solely from the military chain of 
command, but from alternative sources within and outside the armed forces. For this 
to take place the appointed advisers through the chain of command must engage in an 
honest debate about alternative ways to employ military forces and explain the 
assumptions underpinning it, as well as stimulate their own organisation to develop 
alternative use of military force. Throughout the period, there were no examples of the 
Norwegian military organisation attempting to challenge or clarify the existing political 
intent or strategic direction. Instead the military organisation communicated the 
political aims verbatim down to the units in the field without any elaboration or further 
explanation, effectively leaving it up to the commander on the ground to determine 
Norwegian strategy during his six-month contingent in Kabul and Faryab. 
 
During the period of this study the Norwegian Armed Forces showed no sign of 
developing or discussing alternative ways to employ force in Faryab. There were no 
overall reviews or reports evaluating its chosen strategy in Faryab, and the reports that 
were compiled mostly dealt with practical matters such as logistics and administration. 
There was also no debate within the armed forces about how to employ Norwegian 
force in Afghanistan. Throughout the period of this study the main Armed Forces 
periodical published only three articles related to the Norwegian strategy in 
Afghanistan. Two of these dealt with the subjects of counter-insurgency and complex 
conflicts in general terms, whereas the third dealt with the subject of civil-military 
interaction on the ground.338 Throughout the period, there was no debate within the 
armed forces as to how the military forces should be employed to realise the political 
aims, except for a few articles from officers on the ground in Afghanistan who 
questioned the wisdom of the Norwegian model and the inadequate size of individual 
units deployed, the latter of which was publicly reprimanded by the CHOD.339 
Although the integrated MoD was not conducive to the generation of military advice, 
there is scant evidence to indicate that the integrated organisation actually suppressed 
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military advice as the Norwegian military organisation did not seem to generate this 
independently.  
 
The Norwegian integrated strategic organisation, just as the overall Norwegian 
government organisation, did not appear well suited to develop and direct a Norwegian 
strategy in complex conflicts such as Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. The 
organisation was designed to provide long-term direction of the armed forces and to 
assert civilian control over the implementation of transformation of the armed forces, 
but did not develop an organisation that could develop a practical strategy and direct 
the use of Norwegian force in Afghanistan. The Norwegian integrated MoD became an 
organisation where the importance of military advice was reduced and which was not 
conducive to the generation of such advice, although the Norwegian military 
organisation did not appear to generate advice independently. The Norwegian strategic 
organisation between 2003 and 2008 thus appears to partially explain why the strategic 
behaviour was not better adapted to the nature of war and to complex conflicts. 
 
4. The Strategic Outlook 
Having explored the Norwegian political and strategic intent and the strategic 
organisation and process, the last step is to study what underlying ‘assumptions and 
beliefs’ concerning the use of force were present in the Norwegian strategic 
organisation.340 This will be done by studying the Norwegian governments’ 
understanding of force and its understanding of strategy, before I examine the 
Norwegian military doctrines guiding the use of military force. 
The Norwegian view of force 
Both Norwegian governments between 2003 and 2008 displayed a limited and 
reluctant view of the use of force in international conflicts. The views of force reflected 
the rationale behind the Norwegian strategic organisation, where military force was 
reserved for a sizeable threat to Norwegian sovereignty, whereas in international 
operations force was seen as a supporting tool to other security policy instruments and 
therefore a tool of last resort. 
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The fundamental direction of the Norwegian view of force during the period was 
set out by the centre-conservative government in its white paper and overall policy 
document of 2004. In both papers the use of military force was described as important, 
and the papers argued that there were conflicts where military force was a necessary 
component.341 Furthermore, both papers argued that military forces had inherent 
capabilities that made them useful in the early stages of an international conflict and 
emphasised that the military forces might have to take on tasks beyond its primary 
tasks if the situation was unstable and unsafe for other actors. From these general 
statements the papers deduced a more reluctant and limited view of the utility of force, 
in particular military force. First of all the papers expressed the view that military force 
would ‘….not be the dominant security policy tool when dealing with future security 
challenges.’342 Although military force had a role in international operations, mostly in 
the initial stages of a conflict, it was often ‘…. not the most suitable tool but 
nevertheless the only available’.343 Military force could play a role in providing general 
security in an area, but the main thrust would lie with other security policy tools. The 
question of how military force was to provide security was not described in any detail 
and the role of military force in a prolonged conflict, beyond the initial entry phase, was 
not discussed. The reluctant and limited view of military force was carried on and 
reinforced by the labour-led coalition who in 2008 and 2009 argued that other security 
policy tools were ‘….often at least as important.’344 This was argued from a perspective 
of the Norwegian Model of Comprehensive approach where improved co-ordination 
was to be achieved through a clear separation of roles between the military and civilian 
actors, both political and non-governmental. This approach was to prevent military 
force from having a ‘….counterproductive impact….’ in relation to civilian efforts.345   
 
This limited and somewhat reluctant view of military force had its basis in the 
two governments’ white papers and policy papers, and was implemented in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine which argued that given the need 
to address the underlying causes of a conflict, ‘….military means will often have a 
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limited role,…’, a role limited to the creation of general security.346 The Norwegian 
governments’ view of force was thus a reluctant and general one, where the use of 
military force was subordinate to other instruments of power. The view was consistent 
throughout the period and offered a way of understanding why the political aims and 
objectives described above were never fleshed into strategic and operational detail, and 
why the political intent was not adapted to the nature of war or complex conflicts. The 
view that the use of force, military and other, was a last resort and subordinate to other 
tools seemed to limit any serious thought about what force actually could achieve in 
complex conflicts and how to achieve it. The political and military policy papers never 
discussed how the military forces could create security in the first place or what to do if 
the military force did not manage to prevent outbreak of hostilities, beyond establishing 
that it was desirable for other tools that it did so. The policy documents never 
discussed under which conditions the use of force could be successful and how to best 
utilise the military means in international deployments. This meant that at the highest 
political and military levels there appeared to have been little time devoted to 
understanding the utility of force, and that they were unprepared to grapple with these 
questions when the situation in the Faryab province took a turn for the worse from 
2006 and onwards. 
The Norwegian view of strategy 
Related to the two Norwegian governments’ views on force were their views of 
strategy. The Norwegian governments’ understanding of the term strategy during the 
period is difficult to pinpoint precisely. The term strategy was never precisely defined, 
yet used abundantly, which created the problem of precisely understanding how the 
governments understood the term. The Norwegian governments often used the term 
to describe any action taken to further an objective regardless of means, level or 
context. In addition, both governments used the term strategy most frequently as an 
adjective to describe something important or to describe anything influencing security 
policy. The Norwegian governments followed the trend pointed out by Strachan of 
using the term strategy interchangeably with the broader term security policy.347 The 
terms strategy or strategic was thus used to describe such widely different topics as the 
Norwegian policy to enhance co-operation between the North Sea countries in the 
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fields of logistics and procurement, the ‘North Sea strategy’, or to describe general 
commodities such as minerals, cereals and rice as ‘….important strategic 
commodities…’.348 The Norwegian governments’ understanding of strategy was one 
where strategy was tied to the level of decision-making rather than the act of applying 
force. In its defence, the Norwegian government argued extensively that this approach 
followed suit from NATO and the US, and in many respects the Norwegian 
governments’ use of the term was in line with both the UK and the Netherlands, but it 
nevertheless illustrates a very loose and wide understanding of the term. 
 
Despite this imprecise usage, if the more narrow interpretations of Clausewitz 
and Liddell Hart are used, where strategy is the actual use of military force to further 
political ends, it is possible to acquire a more narrow understanding of the Norwegian 
view of strategy during the period. The Norwegian government employed an 
understanding of strategy that could best be described as a grand strategy. Its strategic 
concept of 2004 emphasised that the armed forces were but one of the tools available 
in a comprehensive approach, and this was further emphasised in the 2009-version.349 
This was linked to the overall concept of comprehensive approach but also to the 
Norwegian interpretation of the concept where the civilian and military efforts were to 
be co-ordinated but given separate tasks.350 This meant that throughout the period the 
Norwegian governments’ understanding of strategy was along the lines of Liddell 
Hart’s grand strategy approach to the use of force.351 This approach followed naturally 
from both governments’ general understanding of force where a broad understanding 
of force and power was emphasised when it came to international operations. This was 
clearly also the Norwegian Armed Forces’ view of strategy, which throughout the 
period, in addition to defining it as a general ends-means relationship, used Liddell 
Hart’s grand strategy definition as well as his definition of military strategy as the 
distribution of military means ‘…to realise the military aspects of the political aims.’352 
This was also evident in the writings of the Norwegian CHOD during the period of the 
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study, General Sverre Diesen, who in his textbook on strategy discussed both 
Clausewitz’s definition as well as Liddell Hart’s definition before concluding with a 
definition similar to Liddell Hart’s.353  
 
As was the admitted weakness with the concept of grand strategy, the Norwegian 
governments’ use of the term strategy was difficult to separate from its policies. Indeed 
in her 2004 introduction to its strategic concept, the Minister of Defence argued that 
the strategic concept ‘….provided the security policy and defence policy framework….’ 
for the armed forces and that her strategic concept ‘….constituted the political basis…’ 
for the armed forces. This tendency of a broad approach to conflate strategy with 
policy was pointed out by Liddell Hart himself who argued that grand strategy was 
synonymous with war policy, and the tendency was heavily criticised by Strachan in 
2005 for leading to unclear objectives, responsibilities, escapism and, most importantly, 
missing Clausewitz’s message that strategy was a plan for action.354 This appears to be 
the case also with Norway in Afghanistan during the period, as both governments used 
the term strategy in a manner that made it indistinguishable from its broader security 
policy, and struggled to translate its political intent into clear military objectives.  
 
The question is whether the two Norwegian governments overlooked or 
neglected the challenges posed by the actual use of military force by emphasising the 
grand strategic view. Its strategic concepts and its white papers were indeed policy 
papers and were intended to be political despite the confusing use of terminology. The 
conflation of policy and strategy became more problematic when it came to the actual 
strategy for the Faryab province in Afghanistan. The Norwegian government’s actual 
strategy documents from 2008 and 2009 were indistinguishable from its earlier policy 
statements and did not deal with the discussion of how, when and where the 
Norwegian forces were to be employed other than taking part in the training of the 
ASF. From a strategic theory perspective this meant that the Norwegian governments 
in effect did not develop a military strategy in Faryab, neither in the sense of Liddell 
Hart’s distribution of military means nor in the Clausewitzian sense of linking a series 
of physical engagements to a political purpose.  
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Furthermore, the choice of a grand strategy perspective could explain the lack of 
the practical aspects of war and strategy. The Norwegian governments’ perspective of 
strategy was not concerned with strategy in relation to the practical aspects of war and 
conflict. In all the documents dealing with strategy, the term was never used in relation 
to an identified and designated living adversary or to the more practical aspects of 
deciding where, when and against whom its military forces should be engaged. This is 
another pitfall of a general or conflated definition of strategy, as it removes strategy 
from the realm of the practical planning aspects of actually employing force.355 The 
understanding of strategy and the choice of perspective on strategy could thus explain 
the lack of clear direction and the lack of an adversary in the Norwegian governments’ 
description of its political and military objectives. To further exacerbate the problem, 
these deficiencies did not appear to have been rectified by the military organisation 
itself. Instead the armed forces in many cases applied the political aims directly to the 
tactical levels in its orders and directives, most notably in the national directives to its 
PRT commanders, leaving the tactical commanders with no conceptual links between 
their actions and the political intent; or in other words, in the sense of strategic theory 
there was no Norwegian military strategy in the Faryab province. 
 
As noted above, the pitfalls of adopting a grand strategy perspective were to 
some extent clear to Liddell Hart as he advocated for his views on national and military 
strategy, but these drawbacks would be offset against the advantage of being able to co-
ordinate all aspects of the national instruments of power and force, both military as 
well as civilian. This was also the Norwegian view throughout the period in question. 
The choice of a grand strategy perspective with its drawbacks could thus be beneficial if 
the co-ordination between the different means was good. The problem was that the 
organisation of the Norwegian strategic process was not designed to utilise this 
advantage and the successive Norwegian governments struggled to make the benefits 
of a grand strategy perspective a reality.    
 
The Norwegian view of force and strategy led to a strategy that to a large extent 
dealt with power rather than force and was indistinguishable from the general 
Norwegian security policy. Consequently, the governments’ understanding of strategy 
was one where the practical aspects of the use of force were not dealt with and the 
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possible benefits of a wider view of strategy could not be utilised. The Norwegian 
governments’ views of co-ordination thus created a political and strategic organisation 
that was not designed to co-ordinate the various actors 
 
Norwegian doctrine 
The limited role of military force in realising the Norwegian political intent in 
Afghanistan was of course linked to the overall political purpose of strengthening 
international peace and security and in particular the offices of the United Nations. 
This in turn led to the development of the Norwegian Model where the limited use of 
military force was a cornerstone. Given this political purpose it is perhaps 
understandable that the policy papers of the Norwegian MoD did not provide detailed 
direction concerning the actual use of force and left this to its military organisation.  
 
The Norwegian Armed Forces were loyal in its implementation of the overall 
political direction in Afghanistan but was in many ways ill prepared doctrinally to 
provide the direction for the use of military force in complex conflicts such as 
Afghanistan. Doctrine does not dictate strategy and does not explain everything about 
the actual conduct of military forces, but it does explain how armed forces conceptually 
prepare for certain conflicts and what options they consider prior to using force. In 
2003 (or for that matter in 2001) the deployment to Afghanistan caught the Norwegian 
military unawares. As noted above, the Norwegian armed forces were being pushed 
politically to transform from an organisation based on a total defence structure to a 
force capable of intervening internationally. In 2003 the armed forces relied on a high 
intensity operational doctrine based on the ideas of manoeuvre warfare. This meant 
that although the military doctrine was conceptually more mobile it was still operating 
with a high intensity warfare mindset.356 Its doctrines concerning complex conflicts 
were limited to overall doctrines concerning classic peacekeeping operations and a 
reading guide at battalion level to the more complex PSO. This emphasis on high 
intensity warfare was kept throughout the period in question. In 2003 the main focus in 
the Norwegian armed forces was to develop the concepts of Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW) and Effects Based Operations (EBO) in a Norwegian context to supplement 
the existing doctrine of manoeuvre warfare. This direction was politically sanctioned as 
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is evident from the explicit emphasis of technology, its emphasis on quality rather than 
quantity in the armed forces, as well as the direct references to NCW in the 2004 white 
paper.357 From the government and the military leadership this was seen in conjunction 
with the transformation of NATO’s and the US’ forces during the early 2000s. The 
Norwegian approach to this transformation was to take an active part and participate in 
NATO and the US operations with compatible and deployable niche resources such as 
special forces and forces trained for winter and littoral operations.358  
 
The emphasis on a high intensity doctrinal approach was not subject to any 
discussion within the armed forces, on the contrary, the armed forces embraced the 
development of NCW. The development was headed by the future CHOD and given a 
lot of attention. General Diesen continued the emphasis on NCW and technology after 
he became CHOD in 2005 and it influenced his views on the operations in 
Afghanistan. His 2007 speech after the first major Norwegian operations in Faryab 
illustrated this as his summary of the engagement focused on the role of the special 
forces, but more importantly he analysed the entire engagement of ‘Harekate Yolo’ in 
terms of Norwegian technological superiority versus its more technologically backward 
opponents.359 In 2007, a new Joint Operational Doctrine was issued which argued that 
the Norwegian Armed Forces were to operate along the three parallel ‘approaches’ of 
Manoeuvre Warfare, NCW and EBO, depending on the situation.360 Although it was 
possible to envisage the three approaches being applied in a complex conflict, in 
particular the EBO approach, the Norwegian Armed Forces nevertheless chose three 
approaches to its doctrine that were developed with high intensity warfare and force on 
force operations in mind.  
 
Although the Norwegian high intensity doctrines did not differ too much from 
those of the UK and the Netherlands, the main difference was the lack of service 
doctrines and specific doctrines directed towards low intensity conflict. Unlike the 
Netherlands and the UK, the Norwegian Armed Forces did not develop peace support 
doctrines dealing with the changes in the field of PSO after 2000 such as the increased 
ambitions of the United Nations and the new United Nations doctrine in peacekeeping 
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operations from 2008. Likewise, Norway did not develop any doctrines dealing with the 
problem of insurgency. Whereas in 2003 NATO and the US were focusing on high 
intensity, by 2006 most of the leading NATO countries had refocused their attention 
towards some form of counterinsurgency approach. The Norwegian armed forces 
never followed suit and did not change its focus from high intensity to low intensity 
doctrine but chose to await NATO’s initiatives which did not come to fruition until 
after 2009.  
 
This lack of a relevant doctrine to deal with low intensity threats could be 
explained by the reluctance of the Norwegian government to call the conflict in 
Afghanistan an insurgency and its reluctance to identify an adversary for the Norwegian 
forces. Instead of a counter-insurgency perspective, the Norwegian government saw 
the Norwegian forces in the Faryab province as involved in a robust peace support 
operation or a peace-building mission.361 This could explain the lack of a low intensity 
doctrine with a counter-insurgency perspective, but still does not explain the lack of an 
effort in the field of PSO. The United Nations developed its robust peacekeeping 
doctrine during the latter years of the period, but no similar development can be traced 
in the Norwegian armed forces to this day even though the Norwegian government 
had increased United Nations participation in Afghanistan as one of its goals during the 
period.362 A further argument against the political direction preventing Norwegian 
doctrine development is illustrated by a comparison with the Netherlands whose 
governments were also reluctant to adopt a counter-insurgency perspective of the 
conflict, yet its armed forces had developed extensive doctrines within the fields of 
both COIN and PSO and applied them to its operations.363 This meant that the 
Norwegian armed forces entered into the conflict with a set of doctrines based on high 
intensity conflicts rather than low intensity conflicts, and apart from a general 
participation in the development of the NATO counter-insurgency doctrine, they did 
not attempt to develop any Norwegian doctrines for Afghanistan during the period.  
                                                 
361
 Barth Eide, "Why Is Norway in Afghanistan? How Can We Best Complete Our Mission?", pp. 1 
and 5; Minister of Defence, "Our Engagement in Afghanistan",  p. 5. 
362
 United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," ed. 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support(New York: United 
Nations Secretariat, 2008), pp. 24-25. 
363
 Commander in Chief  Royal Netherlands Army, Combat Operations - Combat Operations against 
an Irregular Force  (Adp II Part C) vol. Army Doctrine Publication II - part C, Royal Netherlands 
Army Doctrine Publication (The Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 2003); 
Peace Operations (Adp III), vol. Army Doctrine Publication III, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine 
Publication (The Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1999). 
 118 
 
The lack of low intensity doctrines during the period does not fully explain the 
Norwegian strategic and operational behaviour, but it does indicate the level and 
intensity of discussion on the subject within the Norwegian armed forces as an 
organisation. Examined in this manner, the lack of low intensity doctrines goes far to 
explain the lack of military details in the realisation of Norwegian political aims and 
objectives in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. Combined with the governments’ 
reluctant view of military force, the Norwegian armed forces’ emphasis on high 
intensity doctrines also helps explain the ease with which the Norwegian armed forces 
accepted its limited role in the Faryab province and how eagerly it accepted a purely 
military role within the overall Norwegian Model.364  
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Chapter IV: The Netherlands 
‘When it comes to strategy, amateurs debate theories while professionals discuss plans.’365 
 
The Netherlands’ involvement and use of force in Afghanistan, similarly to that 
of Britain and Norway preceded NATO’s involvement in ISAF from August 2003. 
From late 2001, the Netherlands agreed to support the US in its Operation Enduring 
Freedom by relieving US’ air and naval units in the Caribbean as well as the Indian 
Ocean and the Red Sea.366 The initial non-combat participation in Operation Enduring 
Freedom was changed to a deployment of F-16 fighters which provided air support to 
Operation Enduring Freedom from Kyrgyzstan alongside Denmark and Norway, as 
well as other air assets between 2002 and 2005. In 2005 the Dutch government 
provided a detachment of Special Forces to Kandahar which ended the Dutch 
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in April 2006. 
 
In addition to its contributions to OEF, the Netherlands was also instrumental in 
the early stages of ISAF. The Netherlands provided infantry units, as well as providing 
key HQ resources to the ISAF brigade HQ, between 2002 and 2003.367 From 2004 the 
Dutch contribution in the framework of NATO’s ISAF operations took the form of an 
AH-64 wing in support of KMNB, and from 2004 the Netherlands established a PRT 
in the Baghlan province as part of NATO’s stage one expansion.368 By 2005, the 
Netherlands elected to hand over its PRT to Hungary by 2006, and started exploring its 
participation in stages three and four of NATO’s expansion. In early 2006 the 
Balkenende-III government persuaded the Dutch Parliament to take on the 
responsibility as lead nation in the Southern province of Uruzgan, as part of ISAF’s 
Regional Command South.369 In July and August 2006, the Dutch government 
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dispatched Task Force Uruzgan which consisted of approximately 950 troops, which 
included security detachments and a PRT, as well as an additional 250 troops as tactical 
and combat service support to RC South.370 The mission to Uruzgan was renewed in 
2008, however, it was not extended beyond 2010, when the Balkenende-IV government 
collapsed on the issue of renewing the mission a second time.371 
 
1) The Political Purposes and Aims of the Netherlands: 
The first step in analysing the strategic behaviour of the Netherlands between 
2003 and 2008 is to examine the political intent behind the use of Dutch military force 
in Afghanistan. This will be done by establishing a strategic logic with a political 
purpose behind the deployment and use of force on top, followed by the lesser aims 
and objectives. As with the two other cases, there was no shortage of political aims and 
objectives, but less of an emphasis on establishing a coherent strategic logic when 
communicating the Dutch political intent in Afghanistan.  
 
However, the case of the Netherlands offers a series of apparent paradoxes in 
respect to the description of its political purpose and intent in Afghanistan. The first 
paradox was that the political purpose of the Netherlands during the period at first 
glance appears to be a combination of the purposes of the UK and Norway. In reality 
the Dutch purpose was interpreted differently and was thus different than the other 
two cases. The second paradox was that in many ways the strategic logic and political 
purpose was clearer and more consistent in writing than what was at times 
communicated publicly. Connected to this was a third paradox; that despite the fact 
that the use of force in Afghanistan generated more political turmoil and domestic 
dispute in the Netherlands than in the two other countries, the political and strategic 
direction for the use of force was more consistent, clearer and realistic than was initially 
the case in the UK and Norway. 
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Political purpose 
Denying access to islamists 
 The government of the Netherlands did not explain its political and strategic 
logic in great detail in its public communication. The political purposes and the 
different strategic alternatives following from them were rarely explained or discussed 
explicitly, and the relationship between the purpose and its subordinate aims and 
objectives were not addressed in a way conducive to a debate on strategic logic and 
different strategic alternatives.372 However, just as the two Norwegian coalition 
governments described the reasons for its participation in a fairly consistent manner 
during the period, the Dutch governments from 2001 consistently linked its use of 
military force or forces to the ambition of preventing Afghanistan from once again 
becoming a ‘….safe haven….’ for terrorists.373 This was the rationale given by the 
Dutch government for providing a PRT in Baghlan between 2004 and 2006, as well as 
taking on the responsibility of lead nation in Uruzgan from August 2006. That this was 
the overall Dutch purpose was also supported by the fact that most discussions in 
respect of Afghanistan were conducted as part of the main dossier named ‘Combating 
International Terrorism’.374 Both major troop contributions to ISAF from the 
Netherlands during the period were thus initiated for this purpose.  
 
 By 2007, the Balkenende-IV government did not provide the same attention to 
the purpose of counter-terrorism, but focused instead on international security and 
solidarity, as well as ‘….support of the Afghan government and bonds with the Afghan 
population….’ and humanitarian issues as reasons to explain the government’s decision 
to prolong the Uruzgan mission for an additional two years from 2008.375 The question 
of countering terrorism was not mentioned in the introductory ‘…core of the 
decision….’ but was instead relegated to the later discussions on future challenges and 
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durability.376 In addition, the 2006 description of the Dutch Uruzgan mission published 
jointly by the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Development did not 
mention the purpose of denying access to terrorists, but instead focused on what had 
earlier been described as a means, ‘….to promote stability in Afghanistan and support 
the authorities’ reconstruction efforts.’377 This contradictory way of describing and 
discussing the overall Dutch purpose of the use of force in Afghanistan may be 
explained by the composition of the government and the influence of the Dutch 
Labour party whose opposition to the OEF’s counter-terrorism operations was no 
secret. On the other hand, although the counter-terrorism purpose was downplayed 
from the introduction, the line of reasoning was the same and was presented as part of 
the strategic logic on why the Netherlands should stay in Uruzgan. The different 
emphasis may be explained by the different contexts of the publications, as the 2007-
decision was a continuation of the original decision to deploy to Uruzgan and as such 
the 2005 statement may be seen as the point of departure. The aim of the 2006 joint 
publication appeared to be to provide the Dutch public with easily digested 
information about a politically controversial mission in which the more complicated 
issues of establishing a coherent political and strategic logic might not belong. The 
ensuing documents did not specifically establish a new purpose, but built on the 
previous documents.378 The Government’s evaluation of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan 
from 2011 emphasised the 2005 statement when it wanted to establish an overall and 
long-term ambition behind the Dutch deployment. It quoted the 2005 statement at 
length and argued that the purpose of supporting an Afghan government was 
‘….”preventing [Afghanistan] from again becoming a safe haven for international 
terrorist networks.”’379 This also illustrates a more natural strategic logic in which the 
purpose of the use of force was to deny access to terrorists, and the long-term means 
with which to deny the terrorists access was to establish a benign, legitimate and 
democratic state. Although the Dutch government did not communicate the original 
purpose and its strategic logic with equal emphasis throughout the period in question, it 
seems fair to conclude that the main political purpose behind the Dutch deployment 
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and use of force in Afghanistan was to prevent the country from becoming a safe 
haven for terrorists.  
 
International peace and security: 
 The Netherlands’ contribution to the OEF and the direct struggle against the 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban regime was different from both the UK and Norway from late 
2001 to 2005 and indicated a different interpretation of what denying terrorists access 
to Afghan soil meant. While the UK and Norway were integral parts of the OEF’s 
combat operations, the Dutch government made its contribution available to the US 
Central Command on the premise that their troops were not to be involved in combat 
operations in Afghanistan.380 Instead the Dutch government provided combat troops to 
the more internationally controlled ISAF and was an early and committed contributor 
to the security assistance force in Kabul. This emphasis on the international forces 
rather than the US’ led OEF was also illustrated by the difference in perception 
between Norway and the Netherlands when the two countries deployed a joint fighter 
force with Denmark to provide air support to the OEF in 2002 and 2003. Whereas the 
Norwegian government saw the ‘….main task….’ for its F-16 fighters as ‘….to provide 
close air support to personnel participating in Operation Enduring Freedom…’ and if 
needed to provide support to ISAF, the Dutch government saw the deployment of the 
Dutch F-16 fighters in the same detachment as a chance to be ‘….able to guarantee its 
own air support for the Dutch infantry company in ISAF.’381 This estrangement from 
the main anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan continued well into the period of this 
study and illustrated that the Netherlands interpreted its purpose of denying terrorists 
access to Afghan soil in a different manner than did the UK. By November 2005, a 
month before the Netherlands’ role in stage three of the ISAF enlargement was to be 
discussed, the Second Chamber passed a motion (the vanBaalen-motion) that 
effectively banned Dutch troops from being led by, co-operating with or supporting 
troops involved in OEF.382  
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 The political purpose of denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan should 
be understood in light of the Dutch governments’ emphasis of the responsibilities of 
the Netherlands in the international community and its interpretation of its purpose as 
congruent with traditional international law and the law of armed conflict. All three 
Dutch governments during the period between 2003 and 2008 explained the political 
purpose behind its use of force in the context of an international response to an 
international problem of terrorism.383 The Dutch commitment to the international 
community and the insistence on understanding Afghanistan as an international 
problem rather than an American problem was a consistent feature of the Dutch 
governments’ explanation of its political purpose throughout the period of 2003 and 
2008. In contrast to the UK, which repeatedly perceived the purpose of counter-
terrorism as relating to its own and US’ security, the Dutch governments stressed the 
international aspects of the threats and the broader threat that terrorism constituted to 
regional and international stability.384  
 
 The implication was that despite its wording, the political purpose behind its 
use of force was more akin to that of Norway, who stated its political purpose for 
deploying forces and using force in Afghanistan was in support of an international 
world order through the United Nations, and in support of the NATO alliance.385 
However, the Netherlands’ understanding of international peace and security was 
different from that of Norway. The Dutch interpretation of international peace and 
security did not advocate for a direct involvement of the United Nations, but was 
explicitly based on a combination of ‘…self-interest and morality’ as pointed out by 
Foreign Minister Bot in 2006:  
If a trading nation like the Netherlands fights for a more peaceful, more 
stable, more prosperous world, and for the strengthening of the international legal 
order, it is also acting in its own national interests.386 
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 Although not emphasising the bodies of the United Nations, the Dutch 
governments were extremely concerned with the legality of its actions in Afghanistan. 
Throughout the period between 2003 and 2008, the Dutch political aims and objectives 
were often juxtaposed with the mandate of ISAF and the corresponding loose mandate 
of the OEF, and all three governments were extremely concerned with the relationship 
between the two operations and in particular the fate of possible detainees taken into 
custody by Dutch troops.387 This meant that compared to the UK, and even Norway, 
the Dutch political purpose was always discussed in relation to the United Nations’ 
mandates for the ISAF operations. In contrast to the British government, which 
presented its political purpose behind its use of force as a British political purpose in its 
own right without explicit reference to the mandate, the Dutch governments always 
carefully related its political purpose to its legal foundation i.e. the mandates provided 
by the United Nations for ISAF.388  
 
 The political purpose of the Netherlands was to deny terrorists access to 
Afghan soil and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international 
terrorism. The interpretation of this purpose was, however, different from that of the 
UK as the Netherlands saw this purpose in the context of an international response to 
an international problem rather than a threat directly posed against the Netherlands. By 
emphasising the international community aspects, the Dutch political intent shared 
some of its foundation with the Norwegian political intent. The Dutch position was 
thus more explicit about its commitment to combating terrorism than Norway, but also 
more direct about the difference between the international response and the American-
led response than the UK. The Netherlands thus occupied a middle ground position 
between the two other countries as far as the political purpose was concerned. 
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Political aims and objectives 
Assisting the Afghan government 
 The main political aim of the Dutch operations in Afghanistan was throughout 
the period identical to that of the ISAF coalition: to assist the democratically elected 
Afghan government. Similarly to the other two states, the strategic and logical 
connection between the political purpose and the main political aim was not always 
thoroughly explained. Firstly, the political purpose of the Netherlands was 
intermittently communicated during the period. Secondly, the strategic logic following 
from this purpose was not fully explained as the Dutch government never seemed to 
discuss the alternative ways in which the political purpose could be reached, but instead 
automatically attached itself to the international community’s set of aims of establishing 
a centralised state in Kabul. As compared to the two other countries of the study, the 
strategic narrative was consequently lost in the fray of the political debate, and made it 
difficult to understand why the Dutch government had sent troops to Afghanistan in 
the first place.389 By not taking its time to explain the logic fully during the period, the 
successive Dutch governments set themselves up for unnecessary criticism. In 
comparison to Norway, which never tried to explain the connection between its 
purpose and its concrete aims, and the UK which changed its political purpose twice 
between 2003 and 2006, the Dutch governments did provide a framework of a strategic 
logic where the political purpose and the immediate aims were connected in the same 
sentence. Instead of explaining why the purpose had to be realised through the building 
of a centralised state and commit to discussion of other alternatives, the Dutch 
government throughout the period went straight to statements about the success of the 
centralised state so far.390 
 
 The lack of a properly communicated strategic logic, particularly a discussion of 
alternative options to a centralised state was a problem of communication rather than 
substance, as the Dutch governments were far more willing to discuss local power 
dynamics within its province at a the political and strategic level than the two other 
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states.391 However, just as in the two other states, the Dutch governments were unable 
to establish a strategic narrative where the political purpose was linked to the aim of 
assisting the Afghan state. 
 
Security 
 The first objective linked to the Dutch aim of assisting the Afghan government 
was the objective of improving security in the areas where the Dutch were the lead 
nation. The way in which this objective was to be reached set the Netherlands apart 
form the two other countries, both in the actual conduct of Dutch troops, political 
advisors and other state representatives, and the emphasis and attention to the security 
aspects by the political level in the Netherlands. The Dutch view of how to improve 
security in its areas in Afghanistan appeared to have developed in three stages. The 
initial phase between 2003 and 2004, where the ideas of how to improve security were 
general and fairly imprecise in nature, the second phase between 2004 and 2006, in 
which the approach to security was shaped by limited threats of the Baghlan province, 
and the final phase between 2006 and 2008 where the Dutch way of thinking about 
security became more visible.  
 
 During the first year of NATO’s operation, the political objective of improving 
security in Afghanistan was described by the Dutch government in very general terms. 
The aim of assisting the Afghan government was to be realised by ‘[….]creating a stable 
situation[….] in order for the Afghan government to gradually take over the 
responsibility for the security.392 These overall concepts were linked to the humanitarian 
situation and the implications on world and regional security if the Afghan government 
was left alone.393 Just as in Norway, details were scarce and the question of how the 
deployment of Dutch troops was to improve security and thus realise the aim of 
assisting the Afghan government, was not addressed. This may be explained by the lack 
of attention that Afghanistan commanded anywhere in the world in 2003 and 2004. 
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Similarly to the UK and Norway, the Dutch use of force in Afghanistan was out-
shadowed by the more controversial deployment of troops to Iraq.  Furthermore, 
between August 2003 and June 2004, the Netherlands did not have any territorial 
responsibilities in Afghanistan, making a discussion of how the objective of security 
was to be attained an academic exercise. 
  
 From 2004, with the establishing of the Dutch-led PRT in the Northern 
Baghlan province, the attention to the objective of security appeared to increase. The 
territorial responsibility, as well as the experience of providing security in the Al 
Muthanna province in Iraq, appeared to increase the level of detail as to how the 
objective was to be attained.394 Given the relatively benign security situation in Baghlan, 
the emphasis was on improving security through enabling local security institutions and 
adapting to local conditions. This pragmatic and culturally sensitive approach clearly 
emphasised that the PRT was a ‘guest’ rather than an intruding foreign body in the 
province.395 The need for a deeper definition of how to create security was limited, as 
the Dutch forces were to leave the tackling of crime to the local ASF, and only deal 
with this security aspect indirectly by buttressing Afghan security institutions.396 The 
Baghlan deployment also illustrated the Dutch emphasis on civilian and military co-
operation and how security was seen as integrated with civilian efforts and in particular 
with reconstruction. Whereas the concept of joint civilian and military operations was 
difficult in practice in the UK’s operations, and all but banned in Norwegian 
operations, the Dutch deployment to Baghlan had a pragmatic and effective 
relationship between the military security aspects of the operation and the more civilian 
side of the operation.397  
 
 The third stage of the development of the objective of security came with the 
decision to accept the lead nation responsibility in the province of Uruzgan in RC 
South. Throughout 2005, the government of the Netherlands had expressed a desire to 
take part in the stage three expansion of NATO into the South of Afghanistan. By late 
December 2005, the government explained to the Dutch Parliament why and how this 
deployment would take place. In doing so, the government discussed in some detail 
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how the objective of security was to be attained. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, and Development outlined a security objective to be attained through what 
may be described as population centric counter-insurgency. Firstly, the security in 
Uruzgan was linked to the importance of ‘….winning the support of the 
population…]’, by engaging with all elements of the population.398 In contrast to the 
Norwegian government the Netherlands interpreted ISAF’s operational concept as one 
of ‘…. winning the “hearts and minds” of the population’, and saw this as one the 
distinguishing factors between the OEF and ISAF.399 Winning the support of the 
people of Uruzgan would be done through active presence patrolling amongst all ethnic 
groups and with ‘….an open attitude….’.400 
 
 The emphasis on cultural sensitivity and respectful conduct of Dutch troops vis-
a-vis the local population and government was carried on from the previous missions in 
Iraq and Baghlan. In addition to this somewhat basic concept was a clear undertone 
that the security operations would engage with the population not only in order to ‘be 
nice to the natives’, but also in order to change the existing power relationship and 
subsequently bring some of the disenfranchised tribes into the local and province 
government.401 
 
 Furthermore, the three ministers argued for a strong link between security and 
development, and argued that the operations and organisation of the Task Force would 
reflect this. Compared to the UK and Norway, the understanding of the relationship 
between the security operations and the reconstruction efforts was better developed. 
The Dutch government argued for long-term reconstruction and development as the 
overall goal, but given the security situation in Uruzgan in 2005 and 2006, the security 
operations and CIMIC efforts were intended to bridge the gap until the Dutch 
government could enable other IOs and NGOs to begin long-term development and 
reconstruction.402 The relationship between security operations and reconstruction 
efforts were far from perfect, but better balanced from the outset than in the two other 
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countries. Norway never managed to balance the two efforts and did not desire a 
practical relationship between the security and reconstruction efforts, whereas the 
British strategy suffered from a lack of understanding of how the two efforts were to 
relate until 2007. The Dutch understanding of the relationship was in many ways 
summed up by the three ministries’ 2006 pamphlet which argued that the relationship 
was summed up by the slogan: ‘As military as necessary; as civilian as possible’.403  
 
 The 2005 statement provided general guidelines as to how the Dutch political 
level envisaged that its military forces should be used to improve security. The security 
operations were described in similar terms as the British objectives; the security 
detachments and Task Force would create secure zones in order to enable the PRT to 
carry out its tasks of improving governance and reconstruction. Furthermore, the 
Dutch government provided detail as to the time and space of these operations. The 
Dutch government explained that its main emphasis would be to focus its operations 
on the two main population centres of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawood in the southern 
part of the province, and creating two main ‘Afghan Development Zones’ (ADZ) in 
these areas. By focusing on two ADZs it took over only two out of the existing four 
OEF bases in the province. This political decision provided direction as to where and 
when the security operations were to be conducted. The decision was based on the 
considerations of the security situation and the threats against the main asset of the 
Dutch operation, the PRT, and balanced against the forces available to protect the 
PRT.404 Although the statement of December 2005 did not argue from a military theory 
or doctrinal standpoint, the priorities provided for the security objective and set the 
stage for the later operational pattern in Uruzgan. Moreover, although not mentioned 
in the political statement, this incremental and gradual approach was in line with the 
2003 Dutch doctrine of counterinsurgency on how to plan a counterinsurgency 
campaign or operation405 From August 2006 the Dutch forces initially focused on 
establishing its main bases in the two population centres and ADZs of Tarin Kowt and 
Deh Rawood, both in the Southern part of Uruzgan, before attempting to link these in 
the ensuing years. Only when the main areas were secured, did the Dutch forces 
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attempt to expand its secure areas into the Baluchi Valley and the Chora district.406 This 
was in turn done by allowing the ASF to front the operations in the urban areas 
whereas the Dutch security forces provided area security. This classic, incremental 
counter-insurgency approach to security was described as an ‘ink blot’ approach by the 
Dutch military during the autumn and winter of 2006 and the term was also gradually 
adopted by the political and ministerial levels who described the security operations as 
pursuing an ‘[….]ink-blot strategy’.407  
 
 By 2007, during the debate about the renewal of the Dutch Task Force in 
Uruzgan, the level of detail of how to use Dutch force in order to achieve the objective 
of security was increased. The overall approach to the use of military forces to create 
security continued to focus on the respectful and open attitude from the military forces, 
combined with a desire to engage with the local population at local level. The aim of 
this approach to security was to expand the support for the Afghan government. The 
relationship between the security focused battle group and the ‘core of the mission’, the 
PRT, was maintained, and the ‘ink-spot strategy’ was explained in more detail.408 The 
incremental and gradual expansion of the ADZ, or ink spot, through the security 
operations was linked to the securing of the main populated areas in the Chora district. 
This would bring approximately 50% of the population in Uruzgan under Afghan 
governmental influence, although Dutch and ASF were in control of a small part of the 
province as a whole.409 By the end of the period, the objective of security was thus 
described in more detail than five years earlier. The political objective had changed 
from an abstract and general idea about creating a stable environment with the use of 
military force, to a more detailed and specific objective which included how, where and 
when military force should be employed to attain the objective of security, and thereby 
support the general aim of supporting the Afghan government. The way the political 
objective was designed by the end of the period was closely connected to the 
population centric approach which was and is characteristic of the ideas connected to 
classic counter-insurgency. Further, by 2007 the security objective was described in 
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catch phrases from the classic counter-insurgency vocabulary such as ‘ink-spot’ and 
‘hearts and minds’, but more interesting was the emphasis at the political level of the 
reciprocal connection between the security objective and other objectives, the 
willingness to prioritise the main populated areas and the willingness to accept that the 
insurgents were operating outside the ADZ and not let this interrupt the ongoing 
operations.410  
 
Governance 
 The second objective deriving from its political aim of assisting the Afghan 
government was to improve governance within Afghanistan, Baghlan and Uruzgan. 
The development of this objective followed a similar path to that of the security 
objective in that it was fairly general and unspecific at the early stages of the 
Netherlands’ contribution in Afghanistan and then became more specific as the Dutch 
commitment grew both in scope and complexity. As noted above, the Dutch political 
purposes and its political aim of assisting the Afghan government did not thoroughly 
develop the implications of establishing a state or the various alternatives of 
governance at the state level. By the beginning of the period, the Dutch government 
discussed the objective of improving governance in general and unspecific terms, 
reflecting the limited attention that Afghanistan had in late 2003.411 Its attention was 
very much on its deployment in Iraq, where its views of governance in the years of 
2003 and 2004 was that of not getting directly involved in the provincial and local 
governance, but rather to focus on general military security and allow the central 
authorities to deal with the improvement of governance.412 
 
 The somewhat general and unspecific view of the objective was also visible in 
the 2004 to 2006 deployment of the PRT Baghlan, where the mission statement and 
the discussion on what governance meant in the province did not extend further than 
‘….to increase the authority of the Afghan government and to minimalise the causes of 
instability.’413 The PRT, in turn, defined this as providing support to the development 
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of Afghan security forces, as well as reinforcing the existing local authorities.414 
Although the PRT did also establish a network of informal local leaders, and strived 
towards the maintenance of local popular support, the PRT did not appear to see this 
in order to play an active role in the shaping of local governance, but rather to maintain 
a good relationship with the population.415 
 
 The deployment to Uruzgan, for which preparation started in 2005, changed 
the Dutch view of the political objective of improving governance. The Kabul and 
Baghlan missions did not seem to produce a detailed description of how the Dutch 
government envisaged improving the governance in its areas. By late 2005, the 
objective had become more specific and detailed, as the Dutch government saw the 
role of the Dutch Armed Forces as not limited to the buttressing of the existing power 
structures as in Baghlan. The Dutch Government argued that the objective of 
improving governance would entail influencing the local authorities towards developing 
‘….a more representative local governance in Uruzgan.’’416 Coming on the heels of an 
assessment of the lopsided power structure between the various Pashto tribes in 
Uruzgan and how this created tension, this statement illustrated that the Dutch 
government intended to actively change the composition of the local Afghan 
government in 2006. The political objective of improving governance was thus 
interpreted by the Dutch government as including the altering of existing power 
structures. This interpretation of the political objective was tied to the reasoning that 
the disenfranchised tribes were often inclined to support the Taliban inside and outside 
the ADZs, and the inclusion of these tribes in the provincial and district government 
structure would reduce the Taliban’s possibilities to operate in the province.417  The 
ambition of creating ‘a more representative’ local government was also linked to the 
issues of transparency and corruption, as the lopsided representation between the tribes 
was reflected in how much support and funds each tribe could expect to receive from 
its of provincial, district, and town governments.418  
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 The Dutch government’s change in 2005 was also reflected in its ensuing 
actions. By March 2006 it had, as the British in Helmand, successfully lobbied for a 
change of the provincial governor on the grounds of a disproportional representation 
of the Popolzai tribe and the ensuing nepotism and corruption.419 Although the Dutch 
government emphasised the importance of a transparent and representative 
government at a provincial and local level, it also maintained its emphasis on 
understanding and utilising the informal power structures. 420 Accordingly, it built on its 
practical (although in the case of Iraq not governmental policy) experiences from its 
Iraq and Baghlan deployments, and nurtured its relationship with alternative power 
structures throughout the period by maintaining contacts with the former governor as 
well as working with local shuras inside and outside the Afghan official government. By 
2007, the Dutch emphasis of balancing the formal and informal power had become an 
integral way of realising the political objective of governance. Whereas in 2003 the 
Dutch government had deployed to Iraq with the explicit intention not to get involved 
in local governance, by 2007 the Dutch government saw the need in Afghanistan to get 
directly involved in the improvement of governance by influencing and directing, as 
well as accepting and utilising both the formal and informal structures in order to make 
headway in the province given the weaknesses of the centrally appointed authorities.421 
 
 The Netherlands defined and realised its political objective differently than did 
the UK and Norway. The initial definition of the objective, derived from the aim of 
assisting the Afghan central authorities, was not substantially different from that of the 
two other countries; it did not analyse or discuss what governance meant in 
Afghanistan in relation to their use of military force. Indeed, if the experiences of the 
Dutch forces in Iraq from 2003 are an indication, the Dutch government saw the 
objective of governance in a very passive and reluctant manner, and did not see a 
practical relationship between the objectives of improving security and improving 
governance. This meant that at the beginning of the period there were similarities 
between the Dutch and Norwegian understanding of improving governance. These 
similarities were harder to find towards the end of the period. Through its experiences 
in Iraq, Baghlan and in Uruzgan, the Dutch government defined its objective of 
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improving governance as meaning an active engagement with all ethnic communities, 
and influencing the actual provincial and district government in order to achieve its 
security and developmental objectives. The Norwegian government did not want to 
influence the provincial and district governments and were not willing to put sufficient 
pressure on the appointed administration to include the disenfranchised Pashto 
population, although this was described by its military as the main problem in the 
province.422 In contrast, the Dutch government saw the need to pressure its provincial 
and district governments and were even instrumental in the removal of the provincial 
governor in order to encourage ‘….a more representative local governance in 
Uruzgan.’423  
 
 The Dutch understanding of the political objective of improved governance 
was closer to that of the British government’s, particularly from 2006 and onwards. 
Both governments saw the relationship between the objectives of security and 
improved governance, and thus pushed for new and less tainted provincial political 
leadership. Neither of the changes of provincial governors was particularly successful, 
as the change of governor in the Helmand province resulted in a total alteration of the 
British strategy in the autumn of 2006, and the Dutch had to find a new governor 
already by 2007.424 Despite the initial similarities and problems, the Dutch appeared to 
have a more engaging and pragmatic approach to the objective of governance. As its 
deployments in Afghanistan began in earnest in 2004, the Dutch government appeared 
to be aware at the political level of the local power dynamics in its provinces and 
defined its governance objective somewhat broader than did the UK. Whereas the UK 
were caught unawares by the request of Governor Daoud to leave the populated areas 
in Helmand in favour of the so-called ‘platoon-house strategy’ further North, the 
Dutch were able to get its new governor on its side in making the two initial ADZs 
(Deh Rahwood and Tarin Kowt) its priorities before expanding into the Chora 
district.425 In addition, the Dutch government appeared more willing to deal with the 
informal power structures in its two provinces. It maintained a complex relationship 
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with the deposed, yet still powerful, Jan Mohammad Khan, by never acknowledging his 
authority but always understanding his power and trying to make him engage in the 
process of improving security and the formal government.426 Furthermore, the Dutch 
appeared to have a more active and pragmatic approach of engaging the local 
leadership and the various ethnic and tribal communities. The British did engage the 
local tribal leaders, however, they appeared to be caught off guard or distanced 
themselves from the local power structures, as was the case in the locally negotiated 
truce at Musa Qalah in September 2006.427  
Reconstruction 
 The third objective tied to the political aim of assisting the Afghan government 
was the objective of reconstruction (wederopbouw). The objective of reconstruction was 
an important element of the Dutch strategic behaviour throughout the period, although 
the emphasis and clarity of the objective was more pronounced towards the end of the 
period.  
  
 From 2001, Afghanistan had become one of the important recipients of Dutch 
humanitarian aid and development funds, and the reconstruction and development of 
Afghanistan was thus an important element of Dutch policy in the area.428 During the 
period of 2003 to 2005, reconstruction featured on the list of political aims and 
objectives provided by the Dutch government as guiding its policy and strategy in 
Afghanistan, but it was not elaborated upon in any detail. The deployment of its PRT 
to the Baghlan Province offers a case in point. The core of its mission was to increase 
the influence of the Afghan central government and to ‘….minimalise the causes of 
instability.’429 This meant that the PRT was to facilitate reconstruction through its 
security and governance efforts, but not necessarily get directly involved. Thus in its 
final report, the PRT gave more emphasis to the security and governance aspects of its 
mission than to reconstruction. The political objective of reconstruction was not 
directly linked to the security operations, but was seen as the domain of civilian 
organisations, with the Polad of the PRT acting as an intermediary between the civilian 
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and military actors.430 This separation between the civilian and military, and the 
reluctance to see reconstruction and development in relation to the ongoing security 
operations was, during the first years of period, quite similar to what became 
Norwegian strategic behaviour. It may well have been a result of the security situation 
in Baghlan, which was benign throughout 2004 to 2006, but a similar approach to the 
political objectives of security and reconstruction in a less benign area could be seen 
simultaneously in the Dutch AOR of the Al Mutannah province in Iraq between 2003 
and 2004. In Al Mutannah, the Dutch government wanted a distinction between 
reconstruction efforts and the more general efforts to establish security in the 
province.431 The distinction was upheld as a political objective to distance the Dutch 
troops from the role of an occupation force, but the underlying idea of separating the 
reconstruction from security was similar to that of the Baghlan PRT.  
 
 The similarities between the Dutch and Norwegian approaches to the political 
objective of reconstruction appeared to be limited to the years of 2003 through 2005, 
and only to the political intent, not the behaviour on the ground. Although the two 
governments shared the intent of not entangling troops in complicated civilian 
processes and local political games that were beyond their competency; in practice, the 
Dutch political objective of reconstruction was integrated with the objectives of 
security and governance to a much a larger degree. In Baghlan, the initial distinction 
between reconstruction and the other operations was not kept in practice, as the main 
focus of the reconstruction operations were security and governance enabling projects 
in addition to civilian infrastructure.432 Furthermore, whereas the Norwegian 
government organised its PRT so as to keep the two objectives of security and 
reconstruction from interacting, the Dutch government organised its PRT in Baghlan 
(and Iraq) with political and development advisors with the task of co-ordinating 
military and civilian actors and their activities.433 
 
 During the process of deciding if and how the Netherlands should deploy to 
the Uruzgan province, the political objective of reconstruction developed and changed 
the strategic behaviour of the Netherlands. By the time the Dutch government 
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presented the decision to deploy in December 2005 the political objective of 
reconstruction was given more emphasis than in the previous deployment in Baghlan, 
as the objective of reconstruction was ‘….one of the most important goals of the 
PRT.’434 Whilst the PRT in Baghlan was given a co-ordination task, the PRT in 
Uruzgan was given direct responsibility for reconstruction efforts in the province, 
‘….as soon as possible.’435 The increased emphasis of the political objective of 
reconstruction and its direct impact on the Dutch strategy may be explained through 
various factors. The situation in Uruzgan was, in contrast to the Baghlan province, that 
by 2006 ‘….international and credible national NGOs [were] practically absent from 
the province.’436 Consequently, this change in the Dutch government’s approach to its 
political objective of reconstruction, where the Dutch PRT was to take a more direct 
and active part in reconstruction operations, was to some extent a necessity rather than 
a choice. Further, the emphasis on reconstruction prior to the Uruzgan deployment 
appeared to be somewhat driven by the Dutch government’s need to present the 
deployment as less belligerent and more peaceful vis-a-vis the political opposition and 
broader public opinion.437  
 
 However, the changes in the political objective of reconstruction cannot fully 
be explained by the two preceding factors. During the preparation to the Dutch 
deployment to Uruzgan the government changed the way reconstruction related to the 
two other objectives as well as the overall political aim and purposes. In other words, 
the Netherlands changed or at least clarified its strategy before the Uruzgan 
deployment. The reconstruction efforts were now closely linked to the two other 
objectives of improved governance and increased security, so much so that the Dutch 
official report after the mission argued that ‘….[t]he underlying thought is that security, 
good governance and development are inextricably linked.’438 In early 2006, the Dutch 
Foreign Minister argued that the Dutch response in Uruzgan was to be based on a 
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‘….trinity of politics, security and development.’439 This use of Clausewitzian logic was 
intended and desired as the Clausewitzian theoretical concept provided the degree of 
integration between the three objectives that was necessary to realise the aim of 
assisting the Afghan government. This integrated understanding of the relationship 
between reconstruction (the Foreign Minister used ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ 
interchangeably through his speech), governance and politics, and security, was tied to 
the overall political purposes of the Netherlands’ participation in NATO’s operations; 
the realist purpose of rooting out international terrorists and the more ideal purpose of 
international peace and security, could both be realised through a proper understanding 
of the trinity of governance, security and reconstruction.440 The objective of 
reconstruction was not only given more emphasis, but was also seen as an instrument 
to support the overall political aims and purposes as evident in Foreign Minister Bot’s 
statement:  
Where we are trying to win over the population for a more peaceful 
and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be 
seen to support the overall effort.441 
 The trinity of politics, security and development was reflected in the 
corresponding Foreign Office doctrine of Diplomacy, Defence and Development, or 
the 3D-approach. This doctrine, which became the mantra of Dutch policy from late 
2006 and onwards, continued the argument that ‘….military, diplomatic and 
developmental efforts need to be integrated as much as possible to achieve the ultimate 
goal: the strengthening of local institutional capacity.’442 In contrast to the approach of 
Norway, the Netherlands changed and developed its strategy from late 2005 and early 
2006, and thus its objective of reconstruction, in the direction of a population centric 
counter-insurgency strategy. The reconstruction effort was to support the overall aim 
of assisting the Afghan government, and to be integrated, and support the actual 
security operations as well as the efforts to improve governance. Whether the political 
levels of government understood that their reasoning about the relationship between 
reconstruction and other objectives amounted to a classic version of population centric 
counter-insurgency is debated, but the political reasoning (regardless of its military 
theoretical origins) laid the political foundation for operations where reconstruction 
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was to be integrated with military force and with the explicit intent of separating the 
Taliban and other insurgents from the broader population in Uruzgan.443  
  
 This view of the political objective of reconstruction and its integrated 
relationship with security and governance also required an integrated organisation. The 
Norwegian Model necessitated a separation of the reconstruction and security 
organisations since the civilian and military actors were to have ‘daylight’ between 
themselves from the ministries in Oslo down to the dust in the Faryab province, 
however, the Dutch organisation developed along diametrically opposite lines. The 
operations in Iraq and Baghlan had already shown that the Dutch use of integrated 
civilian advisors had been successful in taking on local political responsibilities and co-
ordinating civilian and military efforts.444 The missions in Iraq and in Baghlan revealed 
the benefits of inter-ministerial co-operation throughout the chains of command, but 
also revealed the problems that could arise when there was insufficient co-operation or 
integration in the planning and operational stages of a deployment. In Baghlan the 
integration between the different ministries involved was insufficient in order to make 
headway in the areas of reconstruction and development. The PRT-deployment to 
Baghlan led by the Netherlands’ MoD created problems in developing joint military 
and civilian assessments prior to deployment, and in bringing in experts from civilian 
NGOs and businesses, as well as required expertise from other ministries.445 
  
 The Dutch view of the political objective of reconstruction became a lot more 
emphasised after 2006, but also more aligned with the other objectives supporting the 
aim of assisting the Afghan government. By adopting this view, the reconstruction 
efforts contributed to the direction of the security operations and appeared to create 
less confrontation between the needs of security operations, improved governance 
operations, and reconstruction efforts. In Helmand the lack of mutual understanding 
between security operations and reconstruction and governance efforts surfaced during 
late 2006 and early 2007 in the form of the question of whether the QIPs were 
desirable, and more importantly where the funding should come from.446 The Dutch 
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interpretation of the same problem created less conflict as the chosen understanding of 
reconstruction and development allowed for these projects, on the conditions that they 
were either in line with the overall development scheme within the ADZ, or quick 
because they were outside the ADZs.447 This approach to reconstruction and 
development and the corresponding objectives, also prepared the ground for a more 
integrated organisation and operations than were the case in the UK and Norway. The 
Netherlands’ political objective of reconstruction during the period between 2003 and 
2008 therefore developed from an objective that was of great importance but not seen 
as integrated in the Dutch strategy, to an objective that became integrated fully in a 
population centric counter-insurgency strategy.  
Other aims and objectives: Counter-narcotics 
 The Dutch view of counter-narcotics represented a middle position between 
the two other states. Counter-narcotics was from the outset seen as an underlying 
socio-economic problem, but in accordance with the general direction from ISAF, the 
Dutch government initially did not see this as an objective which should directly guide 
the use of force.448 This understanding of the problem apparently led the Dutch 
government to see counter-narcotics as a subordinate objective, not a separate and 
independent aim as the British did, but an objective related to the objectives of security, 
governance and reconstruction and limited by the ISAF mandate.449  
  
 The counter-narcotics objective was initially seen in relation to the efforts in the 
fields of improving governance. The Dutch government was aware of the impact that 
the production and trade of opium had on the political scene in both Baghlan and 
Uruzgan provinces, and the provincial and local authorities’ involvement in the trade, 
as well as the ensuing corruption in all levels of government.450 Throughout the period, 
the Dutch efforts in improved governance were directed towards ameliorating the 
impact of the drugs trade on local and provincial government. The Dutch efforts both 
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in Baghlan and Uruzgan were directed at improving the judiciary and the police efforts, 
as well as throughout the period emphasising the importance of supporting the 
government through information operations in support of the Afghan drugs 
operations.451 
 
 In addition to seeing the narcotics trade as an underlying socio-economic factor 
and related to governance, the narcotics situation influenced the security operations. 
The Dutch government realised early on that the dilemma was that the Dutch PRT’s 
success in enhancing stability depended on ‘….good relations with the local 
populace….’, and a good relationship was not forthcoming if ISAF went too far in its 
counter-narcotics strategy.452 On the other hand, the drugs trade was seen as an 
important source of funding to the Taliban, to general instability and to criminal and 
informal structures working counter to the Dutch security operations.453 As a solution 
to this, Dutch forces were initially to provide general support to the counter-narcotics 
operations of the Afghan authorities in their efforts to eradicate the substantial opium 
production in Uruzgan. As Dutch troops had ‘… no authority…’ to carry out 
‘….independent actions against the drug producers’, the support of the security forces 
were limited to general training, logistics, and public awareness in its province.454 This 
statement of 2005 was modified by 2007, when the Balkenende-IV government 
changed their stance. The initial support from Dutch troops to the direct counter-
narcotics operations was withdrawn, and Dutch troops were to avoid any involvement 
in direct counter-narcotics operations such as the eradication of opium fields.455 The 
Dutch understanding of its counter-narcotics operations therefore had the same 
trajectory as its British counterparts, although from a more inauspicious starting point. 
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2) Were the Political Purposes and Aims Adapted to the 
Nature of War, the Character of Complex Conflicts and 
Coalition Warfare?  
After the examination of the Netherlands’ political intent, the next step in this 
study is to analyse how these political purposes, aims and objectives were adapted to 
the nature of war in general, and to complex conflicts and coalition warfare specifically. 
  
 The Netherlands’ main political purposes, aims, and objectives may be 
illustrated in this manner: 
 
 
Adapted to the nature of war: Instrumentality? 
The first question of adaptability relates to whether the political purposes, aims 
and objectives were instrumental in relation to strategy, i.e. whether they were clear 
enough to provide direction for the use of Dutch force. The strategic logic of the 
Netherlands was that the two purposes of counter-terrorism and contributing to 
international peace and security were to be realised through the aim of establishing an 
Overall Dutch 
purpose: 
International Peace and 
Security 
Counter-terrorism 
 Coalition aims and 
objectives 
Dutch aims and 
objectives  
Political aims of a 
higher order 
Assisting the Afghan state No independent aims 
Political objectives of 
a lower order 
Security  
 Improved governance  
 Reconstruction   
Related objective Counter-narcotics  
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Afghan central state. This aim was in turn to be realised through the objectives of 
creating a secure environment, improving governance, and socio-economic 
reconstruction, as well as supporting the Afghan efforts to reduce the narcotics 
economy. This logic, just as in the two other states, was rarely described fully and even 
more rarely discussed. Just as in the cases of Norway and the UK, the government of 
the Netherlands did not discuss alternative ways to realise its two purposes. The 
governments of the period also struggled to reconcile the objectives of reconstruction 
and security. Nevertheless, whilst the Dutch political intent did not provide an 
unambiguous strategic logic as to what was to be done, it did gradually provide more 
direction as to how Dutch force was to achieve the political intent than did the two 
other states. 
 
The dual purposes of counter-terrorism and international peace and security 
could from the outset appear somewhat contradictory given that the explicit intent 
behind the OEF was to conduct anti-terrorist operations within Afghanistan combined 
with the Dutch refusal to actively participate in OEF until 2005. However, unlike their 
Norwegian counterparts, the Dutch governments discussed in detail the relationship 
between the two purposes, resulting in clear direction as to what the relationship 
between Dutch forces and OEF forces should be, the limits of co-operation, as well as 
the legal foundation for the Dutch participation in counter-terrorism and ISAF’s 
security operations. The reason for the discussion on the relationship and the clear 
limitations was not only because the governments recognised the need to discuss and 
clarify areas of conflict between the two purposes, but also because the three 
governments were in a precarious parliamentary situation where they had to clarify and 
bargain with internal opposition within the coalition governments as well as a critical 
opposition in the Second Chamber.456 Hence, despite the apparent contradiction 
between the two purposes, there did not appear to be a great problem of reconciling 
the two issues in practice during the period.  
 
 The strategic logic of the Dutch government was not clearer or better 
communicated than the other two states, but the political debate forced the three 
governments to iron out any contradictions between the purposes, aims and objectives 
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earlier than in Norway and the UK because of the constant political pressure put on the 
governments. The strategic logic of the Dutch governments received its share of 
criticism, particularly the perceived lack of a strategic narrative. 457 As noted above, by 
the time the renewal of the Uruzgan deployment was to be discussed in 2007, the 
Balkenende-IV government did not continue the clear emphasis of the purpose of 
denying a terrorist safe haven, but chose instead to focus on the purpose of 
international peace and security. The lack of a strategic narrative appeared not to be 
particularly pressing during the first two years of the Dutch participation in NATO’s 
operations, but the problems arose before and during the Netherlands’s deployment to 
Uruzgan. The main problem was the question of whether the Task Force Uruzgan 
(TFU) was a security force or a reconstruction force and the relationship between the 
objectives of security and reconstruction.458  
  
 In its preliminary arguments, the government was quite clear that there were 
large areas of Uruzgan where the OMF enjoyed support rather than the Afghan 
authorities or the OEF, and that the security situation in the future Dutch deployment 
area had deteriorated severely during 2005.459 Furthermore it made clear that there were 
parts of Southern Afghanistan ‘….where reconstruction is impossible due to the 
security situation.’460 The Balkenende-II government was thus ‘….conscious of the 
great risks of the mission…’ and nowhere in its initial statements was the reader left 
with the impression that the Dutch forces would not meet opposition as it entered 
Uruzgan.461 However, after facing parliamentary and public opposition between 
December 2005 and February 2006, the Balkenende-II government started emphasising 
the reconstruction aspects of the mission more than its initial assessments actually 
warranted.462 Viewed from the side-line, given the context and the preceding as well as 
the subsequent communication, the criticism of the Dutch government was too harsh. 
The initial governmental analysis did not overly emphasise the peaceful reconstruction 
aspects of the deployment, and the subsequent communication emphasised the Dutch 
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concept of balancing security and reconstruction operations depending on the local 
security situation. By late 2006 the Balkenende-III government emphasised that 
progress in the field of reconstruction was dependent on the security situation, and the 
security situation was only marginally better as the TFU and the PRT was strained by 
October 2006.463 Furthermore, even in its public relations pamphlet the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign affairs explained the relationship and integration between reconstruction 
and security operations through the slogan: ‘as military as necessary– as civilian as 
possible’.464 
 
As noted earlier, the strategic logic and narrative was not expressly clear 
throughout the period, but the lack of clarity had more to do with the Dutch 
governments’ presentation of its political purposes rather than substantive issues.465 
The political purposes, aims and objectives were presented consistently through the 
period with no abrupt changes despite the three changes of governments. The strategic 
logic was not complete as it left the question of the links between purposes and the 
main aim unexplored, and it was not always communicated clearly, creating the outcry 
for a strategic narrative. The case of the Netherlands’ political intent was thus riddled 
with the same problems as those of the UK and Norway, although to a lesser degree as 
Norway never resolved the inconsistencies between its purposes and the UK only 
managed to establish and communicate a consistent strategic logic later in the period. 
 
 In order to provide instrumentality, the political intent must be clear as to what 
to do, but equally important it must describe how it is to be realised through force. It is 
precisely here that the case of the Netherlands’ political intent was markedly different 
from that of the two other states. Between 2003 and 2005, although the purposes and 
the general dilemmas stemming from them were discussed, the Dutch political aims 
and objectives were of a general nature and did not delve into the practicalities and 
details of the use of force. The ISAF detachments to KNMB as well as the PRT in 
Baghlan were provided general tasks such as ‘[c]reate circumstances and conditions that 
will improve the stability….’ and increase the authority of the Afghan authorities as 
well as ‘….minimalise the causes of instability.’466 This mission statement was of course 
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an intent, but this intent was not followed up by more detailed instructions that would 
make the development of a strategy easy. Just as in the Norwegian government papers, 
the early Dutch political aims and objectives did not explore elements essential to 
strategy; namely the use of force in relation to time and space. In its initial statement, 
the Dutch government provided its PRT with ambiguous directions that said that the 
PRT could approach its objectives in ‘…various manners….’ such as to stay in contact 
with the local government and the local population and ‘…to gain good insight in local 
conditions….’ in order to improve stability and prevent inter-militia strife.467 There 
were no directions as to what factions that should be made a priority, or in what end of 
the province to begin. This lack of detail of course reflected the uncertainty and the 
novelty of the PRT concept, and the fact that the PRT in Baghlan represented the first 
independent Dutch command outside the confines of the KMNB in Kabul. It also 
reflected the limited resources provided to the PRT, as it was limited to 150 personnel. 
On the other hand the lack of resources was used precisely as a reason for providing 
detailed direction and priorities.468 The general approach to the Baghlan mission also 
mirrored the approach of the Dutch government in its operations in Iraq during the 
same period. In its deployment to Iraq, the Dutch government relied on its 
peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s and provided the contingent with similarly 
general guidelines of ‘….creat[ing] a safe and secure environment…’.469  
  
 Up until 2005 the level of detailed direction did not set the Netherlands apart 
from Norway or the UK. This seemed to change in 2005 as the Netherlands tried to 
decide whether or not to deploy to Southern Afghanistan and the Uruzgan province, 
and during this process the level of detailed direction increased significantly. First of all 
the statement to the Second Chamber in late 2005 gave an overall direction as to how 
the use of force should be used to increase the influence of the Afghan authorities. The 
starting point of the directions to the use of military force was that if the Dutch Task 
Force was to be successful ‘….it is important to win the support of the population….’ 
470 This meant that the realisation of the main political aim was linked to a specific 
military doctrine with clear implications outlined in the Dutch military doctrine issued 
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three years earlier, which stated ‘….the support of the civilian population for the 
insurgents tends to be the centre of gravity.’471 The significant aspect of this direction 
of the use of force was not that it was a novel move, as it simply placed the Dutch 
approach of 2005 squarely in classic counter-insurgency theory, but rather that it 
actually communicated a political choice of how to employ military force. This choice 
was in line with the preferred military doctrine. In this regard, a comparison with the 
other two states is interesting. In Norway no clear choice was provided at the political 
level during the period with respect to how the military force should be employed. In 
the UK a similar choice was chosen as the preferred operational method in 2005, but 
not clearly communicated at the political level until 2007. The Dutch direction of the 
2005-statement was followed up by intermittent government communication between 
2006 to 2008, but with the emphasis on the use of force in order to gain the support of 
the people and thereby create support for the Afghan authorities was preserved as the 
Balkenende-IV government presented its case for a renewal of the Uruzgan mission in 
November 2007.472  
 
 Secondly, the 2005 statement provided direction from the political level as to 
the time and space of the use of force. The statement argued that the Dutch forces 
would not be able to take over the four bases of the OEF in Uruzgan, but instead 
would have to focus on the two main bases of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod.473 This 
meant that priority was given to the two main population centres in the province, both 
situated in the Southern part of the province, and only if the security situation 
‘….developed in a favourable direction….’ would Dutch operations ‘….expand in a 
Northerly direction.’474 The decision to make the two population centres a priority 
rather than spreading out was made after the government considered the number of 
troops that was to be deployed in relation to the size of the province. Although the 
decision was not made along the lines of explicit classic counter-insurgency theory, in 
which the aim is to secure large population centres first, the political statement gave 
direction to the use of force by explicitly giving priorities as to where and when force 
should be directed. This operational concept was more consistently communicated 
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than the population centric aim and by 2006 the concept of gradually expanding from 
the main centres was established in government communication and was described as 
an ‘ink-blot concept’ or strategy.475 The concept of the ‘ink-blot strategy’ was used 
throughout the Balkenende-IV government’s statement on the renewal of the mission 
in 2007, which provided detailed descriptions on how the ADZ’s and inkspots of Deh 
Rawood and Tarin Kowt had been created and how the district of Chora was to be 
linked up to one of the existing inkblots. By 2007, the detailed explanation as to how 
force was to be directed included the reasoning that ‘[t]hus, a significant part of the 
population (about 50%) of Uruzgan will be reached.’476 
 
 After providing only general direction to the use of force during its first two 
years under NATO command, the Dutch government provided significantly clearer 
guidance for its use of force between 2005 and 2008. The government adopted two key 
military concepts from classic counter-insurgency theory and practice; aiming to win 
over the population in order to reduce insurgent support, commencing with the most 
populous areas and not chasing the insurgents outside these areas.477 These two ideas 
were central tenets of classic counter-insurgency, but the Dutch governments did not 
themselves use the phrase counter-insurgency, or at least not ‘consciously’, as argued by 
Thijs Brocades-Zaalberg.478 Indeed, successive Dutch governments went to great 
lengths to avoid the term counter-insurgency, while paradoxically, employing its logic 
more conscientiously than most other Western governments.479 Regardless of the 
choice of terminology, compared to the two other states, the Dutch political objectives 
of security, governance, and reconstruction provided clearer and more detailed 
direction for the use of force, particularly during the last four years of the period.  
  
 The UK did not produce similarly detailed political objectives until 2007 and 
Norway never managed to produce detailed direction for its use of force between 2003 
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and 2008. This Dutch clarity pertaining to the actual use of force thus stood in stark 
contrast to the lack of clarity in communication to the opposition and the broader 
public in the Netherlands. The two last Dutch governments of the period struggled to 
communicate the strategy to the opposition and to the broader public because of the 
widespread opposition to the Afghanistan mission. What was a clear counter-
insurgency strategy by 2007 was not necessarily easy too communicate to the broader 
public or elements of the opposition and led to a confused debate about what type of 
mission the Dutch deployment really was. This brings up the question of whether the 
Dutch governments’ political objectives were almost too instrumental, detailed and 
clear in relation to the use of force and adopted too much military terminology given 
the domestic political situation between 2005 and 2008. 
 
Adapted to the nature of war: Unpredictability and reciprocity in strategy? 
Instrumentality is a vital element of strategy; the political intent must be 
translated into clear directives as to how the use of force is to realise the political 
ambitions. On the other hand, the use of force is to realise the political purposes, aims 
and objectives under the uncertain and unpredictable conditions of war. The 
instrumental element of strategy must be adapted to these conditions, or in other words 
to the nature of war. Strategy must take its initial direction from the political intent, but 
in the face of the uncertainty and unpredictability of war, the political intent must be 
prepared to be adjusted and adapted. This view of the strategy, whereby the process of 
strategy is more complicated than a simple instrumental ends and means relationship 
between political intent and the use of force, calls for a reciprocal process of strategy. 
This reciprocal process demands that the original political intent, or the participation in 
the conflict, must be adapted to the changing circumstances of war as the actual 
operations unfold. 
 
The greatest source of uncertainty and unpredictability in conflict, and thus 
strategy, is the fact that strategy must be developed with the presence of a living 
adversary or enemy in mind. The initial Dutch strategic behaviour, when it came to the 
question of adapting to the nature of war, was unspecific and quite general. Similarly to 
the Norwegian and British governments, the Dutch government during the years of 
2003 and 2004 did not specifically relate its deployments of troops to the actual 
conduct of an adversary. To its credit, in 2004 the Dutch government went further than 
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its Norwegian and British counterparts in its discussion on the Baghlan deployment in 
June 2004 where it discussed the actual content of the term OMF and the activities of 
the groups.480 However, the Netherlands’ government did not relate this directly to the 
mission statement or the actual tasks of the PRT, sticking instead to general terms such 
as ‘….increasing stability…’ and ‘….minimizing the sources of instability’, without 
relating the tasks to an actual living adversary who might react and counter the initial 
move.481 This more general and somewhat unspecific approach vis-a-vis the adversaries 
could be explained by the small size of the PRT and its limited abilities, as well as the 
limited influence of the Taliban in the North as early as 2004.482 On the other hand, the 
government itself painted a picture of a resurgent and active Taliban and other 
insurgent groups in the Baghlan province in 2004, although the province was somewhat 
sheltered from the influence of the South.483 By 2004, the Dutch government did not 
relate its political purpose and aims and its use of force to an adversary that could 
thwart its plans. 
  
 This general approach of 2003 to 2004 did not differ significantly from the 
other two states. The British government gradually developed its political purpose and 
aims to take the Taliban into account, whereas the Norwegian government in fact never 
made any reference to an adversary confronting it. The process of developing the 
Dutch deployment to Uruzgan instigated a change. When the 2005 decision (or intent) 
to deploy Dutch forces to Uruzgan was communicated to the Second Chamber, the 
Balkenende-II government dealt with its adversaries in much greater detail and related 
its adversaries to its political aims and use of force. In December 2005, after almost 10 
months of deliberations, the Dutch government emphasised that Uruzgan was a 
province where the Taliban had strong support both historically and currently, and 
where the Taliban and other groups operated frequently.484 Uruzgan was a province 
with ‘….strong ties to the Taliban,…’, and that the Taliban and other groups had 
‘….extensive freedom of action…’ in large parts of the province as of late 2005.485 It 
also made the analysis that this freedom of action was tied to the support from the 
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traditionally conservative and marginalised tribes. By 2005 the Dutch government gave 
a lot of attention to its adversaries, but more importantly it then linked this analysis to 
its political aims and objectives. Whereas in 2004 its analysis was thorough but not 
related to its actual mission and operations, the main aim of the Dutch forces was to: 
‘….increase the support from the local population for the Afghan authorities, and 
reduce the support for the Taliban and affiliated groups.’ 486 This meant that the aims of 
the 2006 TFU were directly tied to a physical adversary. The 2005 statement did not 
follow up directly by directing security, government and reconstruction operations 
directly in relation to the adversary, but from the mission statement followed that not 
all parts of the Dutch strategy could be decided in The Hague in 2005, some of its 
strategy would have to be adapted to the actions of its adversaries. This was in turn 
related to the strategy of gradual enlargement of the ADZs through the so-called ‘ink-
blot’ strategy. 
  
 This picture, of a gradually increasing awareness of its physical adversaries’ 
impact on Dutch strategy continued after the deployment of the TFU in August 2006. 
The 2005 process laid the foundation for classic counter-insurgency strategy, and this 
was continued as the mandate for the TFU was to be renewed in 2008. In October 
2007, the Balkenende-IV government argued for the continuation of the TFU and 
appeared to develop a tighter relationship between its strategy and its adversaries. The 
adversaries, mainly Taliban and affiliated groups, were described as having intensified 
their small scale operations as a result of the Dutch and Australian operations in 
Uruzgan, and the groups were intensifying these operations in an attempt to maintain 
their hold on the population.487 Elements of the Taliban were also seen as engaging in a 
political battle throughout the province by only targeting international forces and 
refraining from engaging the troops of Hamid Karzai.488 The political aims for the use 
of force were then specified not only with an enemy in mind, but also in light of the 
enemy intent and modus operandi. The Dutch strategy continued the effort of enlarging 
its two main ADZs in the South of Uruzgan before linking them up with a third ADZ 
in the Chora district further north and subsequently linking all three ADZs. Given the 
analysis of the enemy, the immediate aim of the Dutch forces ‘….was not primarily to 
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defeat the Taliban militarily…’, since it was proving difficult to engage the Taliban in 
large scale engagements but rather to ‘….make the Taliban irrelevant.’489 This was to be 
done indirectly by out-governing the Taliban in the ADZs as well as directly by 
disrupting the Taliban’s command structure, logistics, and lines of communication. In 
addition the leadership was to be targeted, ‘….where possible through the means of 
reconciliation….’.490  
 By the end of the period the Dutch governments were thus designing their 
strategy according to a classic counter-insurgency model, and simultaneously 
developing this strategy with the uncertainty of a living adversary in mind. The actual 
discussions and analysis at the political level was not extremely sophisticated, but 
compared to the other two states the Dutch political aims took account of the fact that 
there was an adversary that could affect the state’s own plans sooner than did Norway 
and the UK. This leads into the more general aspect of reciprocity in the strategic 
process, and the question of whether the political purposes, aims and objectives were 
adapted to the changing conditions of the operations in Afghanistan during the period. 
The overall impression of the strategic behaviour is one of continuity as far as the 
political purposes behind its strategy, and a gradual development and adaptation of its 
aims and objectives as the operations in Afghanistan unfolded. 
  
Whereas the overall purposes of the Netherlands were kept unchanged 
throughout the period and not adjusted to events on the ground, the Dutch political 
aims were. Another change came in the field of counter-narcotics in which the Dutch 
troops took on a passive role before 2005.491 As the deployment was discussed in late 
2005 the Dutch concept was altered to provide direct support to the Afghan 
eradication efforts in the form of training, logistical support and information 
campaigns. The Dutch troops were to support eradication efforts but stop short of 
actually carrying out the eradication.492 Two years later and after 15 months in Uruzgan, 
the Dutch government changed its stance as a result of the experiences gained as well 
as a change in Afghan policy. Instead of actively supporting eradication, the Dutch 
government stated in October 2007 that it would no longer take part in the eradication 
efforts, and made no mention of providing support, but instead emphasised the 
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development of alternative livelihoods through British support as well as continued 
information campaigns within the province.493 By 2008 the Dutch government had 
begun to find a way out of the dilemma it had identified as early as 2004; the problem 
of maintaining popular support while reducing the impact of the drugs trade through a 
combination of development schemes in order to develop alternative livelihoods, 
combined with emphasis on the judicial and government sectors to limit the networks, 
as well as a limited direct Dutch involvement in the counter-narcotics operations. Both 
the 2005 and the 2007 changes were choices made by the Dutch governments. The 
Norwegian governments chose to maintain a passive profile throughout the period, and 
the ISAF directives left the members of the coalition with a lot of interpretation on the 
issue of counter-narcotics.494 Based on the 2007 statement the reasons for the change 
of the political aim appeared to be that eradication created unrest with the rural 
population and added support to the Taliban. 
 
The relationship between the aims of security, governance and reconstruction 
were also gradually adapted to developments on the ground. The main adaptation was 
that whereas the PRT in Baghlan was a straightforward advisory and assistance force, 
the TFU adopted a counter-insurgency approach to its assistance where the Dutch 
government became more directly involved in provincial governance. This 
development was based on the Dutch view that the provincial governance, unlike in 
Baghlan, was weak and unrepresentative, but also by the Dutch need to prioritise its 
resources. This change was brought on by the conditions on the ground, particularly 
the level of opposition that was expected and actually encountered, and the need for a 
more direct link particularly between the objectives of reconstruction and governance. 
This also resulted in organisational changes where the civilian element of TFU was 
substantially strengthened throughout the period. The PRT in Baghlan deployed with 
one POLAD (political adviser) and gradually introduced an OSAD (development 
advisor). The civilian component in TFU was enlarged and deployed with three civilian 
advisers, including an adviser on tribal relations, and as the operations unfolded this 
was further enlarged to twelve, with the senior POLAD taking charge of the Dutch 
PRT by 2008.495 This meant that the deployment was changed from a predominantly 
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military affair to include a sizeable civilian leadership. This organisational change 
reflected the inter-relationship between the objectives of security, governance, and 
reconstruction through the combination of the ADZs and the inkblot strategy, as well 
as the increased co-operation between the military and civilian elements in the 
execution of the Dutch strategy in Afghanistan. 
  
This illustrated that the political aims and objectives were adapted to the 
conditions on the ground and that the relationship between the political intent and the 
means that were to realise them was indeed reciprocal. On the other hand, the Dutch 
deployment in Iraq between 2003 and 2005 went through the same process, only 
earlier. In Iraq the initial political aim of only dealing with the general security situation 
and not getting involved in the messy process of local governance or reconstruction 
was abandoned quite quickly by the troops on the ground. The political aim was then 
gradually changed, and the civilian element of the deployment was similarly increased. 
496 The Dutch government in 2003 was able to adapt and change its political aims, but it 
appears that it did not catch on quickly enough that the situation in Uruzgan called for 
increased civil-military integration in Uruzgan two years later. Furthermore, despite 
running into heavy resistance during the enlargement of the ADZs northwards in 2007, 
there were no ideas about reinforcing the TFU and carrying out a surge in the newly 
established ADZ. Instead, the troops for the new ADZ were to be provided from the 
existing ones although the crucial Baluchi Valley which linked Chora to Deh Rawood 
had to be retaken several times, and the Deh Rawood ADZ experienced several 
setbacks.497 This can be explained by the fact that the strategy called for an expansion 
only after the initial ADZs were stable, but also because by 2007 the Dutch Land 
Forces were strained, and few reserves could be generated. The Dutch governments 
involved therefore did not appear to be fully prepared for possible setbacks that might 
have required additional forces. 
  
This criticism aside, what was noteworthy about the Dutch political aims, 
compared to that of Norway in particular, but also to the UK, was how the political 
aims and objectives were developed and presented with military challenges in mind. 
The most important example of reciprocity in the Dutch strategic behaviour was 
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evident in the way the political aims were adapted to the conditions on the ground 
before and during the deployment to Uruzgan and the thoroughness with which the 
Dutch government went into detail about the conditions where they were to apply 
force. This thoroughness was not always the design of the Dutch government itself, as 
the challenges of maintaining a coalition government necessitated a step by step 
process of eliminating practical obstacles in the way of Dutch deployment to Uruzgan 
during the autumn of 2005, and the level of detail about the Dutch deployment present 
in the two statements of December 2005 and October 2007 were a result of the 
expected opposition in the Second Chamber.498 On the other hand, the three Dutch 
governments in charge of sending troops to Afghanistan used a similar framework 
(Toetsingskader) to outline the missions, a framework that went into detail about the local 
conditions, possible adversaries as well as the design of the military operations. This 
decision-making framework was in turn linked to a series of assessments of local 
conditions of the area in which force was to be used. Further, the Dutch government 
appeared more willing to integrate the military doctrines and concepts into their 
political intent and apply the existing Dutch military doctrine explicitly when it 
gradually developed a more detailed COIN strategy for its TFU. Although the three 
Dutch governments between 2003 and 2008 did not change the overall political 
purposes based on the changing character of the Afghanistan conflict, they constantly 
developed and adapted their aims and objectives in relation to the actual or anticipated 
conditions on the ground. Compared to Norway and the UK, which did not develop its 
political objectives with a similar attention to the actual conditions until the aftermath 
of the initial Helmand deployment in 2007, the level of adaptation to the actual 
conditions on the ground was striking. 
  
Adapted to complex conflicts? 
 The final element of the analysis of the Dutch political intent and its 
adaptability is the question of whether their political purposes, aims and objectives were 
adapted to the peculiar character of complex conflicts and coalition warfare. The 
challenging aspect of making strategy in Afghanistan was that the conflict demonstrated 
several features of what has been described as complex or hybrid threats.499 The first 
challenge was the dichotomous character of the conflict which meant that the conflict 
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exhibited varying levels of intensity and displayed features that were simultaneously 
modern and primitive. The second challenge was the drawn-out nature of 
contemporary conflicts, and finally that complex conflicts involve a multitude of 
different actors, both nationally and internationally. The challenges posed required a 
strategic behaviour that was able to understand and subsequently adapt to such 
conflicts.  
 
 The three governments of the Netherlands included in this study appeared to 
grasp the complex aspects of the conflict gradually as the Netherlands became more 
involved in the conflict, but also adapted its strategic behaviour to the problem 
somewhat earlier than the two other states. During the first two years of the period, 
there were few indications that the Dutch government understood the threat as a 
composite one. The deployments of the AH-64 wing to KMNB in 2004 and the PRT 
to Baghlan were done without a discussion of the nature of the threat that the Dutch 
forces would be up against. The threat was described as general low intensity threat 
from the OMF, spearheaded by the Taliban, but there was no description of how this 
threat could vary or how the threat would materialise.500 The process of deciding 
whether to deploy to the Uruzgan province again changed this. The statement in 
December 2005 described a direct and sizeable threat to the Dutch forces in Uruzgan 
and that the OMF and Taliban attacks had improved ‘….tactically and technically….’ as 
well as being ‘….better co-ordinated.’  The threats could range between ‘….attacks on 
patrols, supply lines, and the bases of Afghan and coalition security forces’ and 
intimidation of the local population and their leaders, as well as a political subversion 
campaign against the Afghan authorities.501  
  
 This understanding of a composite threat was not immediately translated into 
the operational pattern in 2005, as the operational directions were of a general nature 
such as winning the support of the population as well as an emphasis on presence 
patrolling.502 As the deployment unfolded from August 2006, however, the strategy and 
the ensuing operations clearly took into account the composite threat. The operations 
were designed to face the range of threats indicated in December 2005, as the Dutch 
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forces first executed relatively low intensity security operations around the two main 
ADZs, before launching repeated high intensity operations against enemy strongholds 
in the Baluchi Valley and the Chora district in order to establish a third ADZ.503 This 
adaptation to the range of threats did not appear to come as a great surprise to the 
government or its armed forces. By the autumn of 2006, the Dutch government’s 
slogan was ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’, which was developed in 
2007 to ‘….reconstruction where possible, military action where necessary.’504 The 
adaptation to the composite threat was also evident in the composition of the TFU. I 
have already pointed out the willingness to increase the civilian component after 2006, 
but in parallel the TFU illustrated its understanding of the high intensity aspects of the 
threat by deploying heavy artillery, mortars and AH 64s in Uruzgan from the outset, 
and were willing to use them, while simultaneously maintaining the emphasis on light 
foot patrols as the main element of its operations.505 Compared to the two other states, 
the Dutch governments appeared to gradually understand that the conflict in 
Afghanistan would present a composite threat and its strategic behaviour was adapted 
to this. This meant that where the British struggled to adapt an understanding of a 
composite threat at the political and strategic levels until 2007, the Dutch governments 
had laid the groundwork for such an adaptation as they began their involvement in 
stage three of NATO’s enlargement operation. The Norwegian governments never 
appeared to come to grips with the range of threats in the Faryab province and did not 
adapt its strategy to the threats beyond general security policy statements, however, the 
Dutch governments were able to adapt its strategy between 2005 and 2008 to counter 
the actual threats facing its forces in Uruzgan. 
 
 The second aspect of the question of whether the political intent of the 
Netherlands was adapted to the challenges of making strategy in complex conflicts is 
the question of whether the political intent and strategy was adapted to the drawn out 
character of complex and contemporary conflicts. In addition to the composite threat 
of simultaneous high and low intensity action, contemporary conflicts are signified by 
their drawn out nature, and any strategy during the period would need to address this 
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issue.506 The case of the Netherlands between 2003 and 2008 in Afghanistan in many 
ways offered a double image. The actual strategy and operations were throughout the 
period designed with the emphasis on taking part in a long-term and drawn out conflict 
where progress and end results would be difficult to measure. Although the 
deployment of the PRT in Baghlan 2004 to 2006 did not discuss the issue, the Dutch 
government in its 2005 statement appeared to take into account that the Dutch use of 
force could only be seen in a long-term perspective. The Balkenende-II government 
adopted a modest and realistic approach to what it expected to achieve during its first 
deployment to Uruzgan. As noted earlier, the Dutch government was fully aware of the 
discrepancy between the size of the province and the number of troops it made 
available. Furthermore, the challenge of the political aim of assisting the Afghan 
government in extending its authority in the province was a long-term project, and 
‘….it is not realistic to expect….’ that this aim would be completed in the two years of 
initial Dutch deployment or that the Afghans would not need further support after 
2008.507 This understanding was confirmed during the renewal of the mandate for the 
deployment in 2007, when the new government argued that, although some progress 
had been made, the Afghan authorities would also still need outside support to govern 
after 2010.508  
 
When designing its political aims and objectives, the Dutch governments were 
thus fully aware of the long-term nature of the tasks it had undertaken. The problem 
was that all three Balkenende governments of this study struggled to transform this 
awareness into a long-term political support for the Afghanistan mission. The initial 
decision to deploy to Uruzgan came after a prolonged parliamentary debate and 
discussion within the government. The mission was renewed only once in 2007 after 
yet another compromise where the government promised the opposition inside and 
outside the government that the mission would not go on beyond 2010.509 The debate 
on whether to prolong the mission led to the fall of the Balkenende-IV government in 
2010, and the subsequent pullout of Dutch troops the same year. This meant that 
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although the Dutch political aims and objectives described a strategic behaviour that 
made a long-term presence necessary, the actual political situation did not make such 
strategy realistic. The challenge for the Dutch governments was thus that although they 
understood the need for a prolonged commitment, the demands of the opposition and 
public opinion made such an understanding irrelevant. Compared to Norway and the 
UK, the Netherlands struggled to adapt its political intent to the requirements of the 
conflict; whereas the commitment to a general long-term presence in Afghanistan was 
not a challenge to either of the Norwegian and British governments, the Dutch 
governments struggled throughout the period to develop political aims that were 
compatible with the needs of a drawn-out complex conflict.  
 
 The third aspect pertaining to the relationship between complex conflicts and 
strategy is the question of whether the political purposes, aims and objectives of the 
Netherlands took into account the demands of contemporary and complex conflicts in 
relation to multi-functionality and multi-agency. Complex conflicts present an array of 
societal and wider security challenges which renders a one-dimensional military 
response an insufficient tool. Realising political aims and objectives in such a 
complicated environment requires a broad response of civilian and military political 
efforts and agencies that are able to cover a wide area of political, military and societal 
functions, as well as the ability to co-ordinate these efforts. The Afghanistan conflict 
during the period in question was a case in point. The aim of the Netherlands was not 
limited to the defeat of a military adversary, but rather to establish a centralised state 
with all the civilian efforts that such an aim entailed. The challenges were consequently 
not only of a military nature, but also a challenge to the Netherlands’ ability to co-
ordinate ‘….the full inventory of national instruments of power’ in order to achieve its 
political aims and objectives of assisting the Afghan state through improving security, 
governance and reconstruction.510 
 
 The political purposes, aims, and objectives of the Netherlands related 
differently to the issue of multi-agency and multi-functionality than did the two other 
states. The British approach had the close co-operation between all actors as its 
ambition but struggled until 2007 with the actual co-operation on the ground. The 
Norwegian political aims and objectives were designed to keep the different agencies 
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separate in the theatre of operations and on the ground while still maintaining joint 
planning and evaluation. The Dutch approach to multi-functionality and multi-agency 
was characterised by an emphasis of the need for multi-functionality and multi-agency, 
combined with the willingness to use and co-ordinate various agencies during 
operations in Afghanistan.  
 
 The political aims and objective were not necessarily designed for 
multifunctional operations from the outset. During the Dutch deployments to Kabul 
and Baghlan, the emphasis on how to co-ordinate the various agencies of the 
Netherlands was not prevalent, partly because of the size of the missions, but also due 
to a lack of awareness and understanding of the challenges. The PRT in Baghlan did 
not see the aims of reconstruction and security as integrated in 2004, although the 
government stated that the reconstruction depended on the level of security.511 The 
mainly civilian task of reconstruction was initially not integrated with the more military 
tasks but co-ordinated through a POLAD, and although the PRT included a CIMIC 
detachment, the detachment was seen mainly as supporting other activities and severely 
limited by the lack of available CIMIC experts.512 A similar approach of not seeing the 
mainly civilian and military tasks of reconstruction and security as integrated was also 
visible during the Dutch deployment to the Al Muthanna province in Iraq in 2003 and 
2004 where the Dutch troops were explicitly restricted from getting involved in 
governance and reconstruction efforts.513 Although the Dutch approach during the first 
two years was akin to the Norwegian approach of not integrating the tasks, there were 
some important differences. Quite early in the Iraq deployment, the actual operations 
were developed to include the more civilian tasks of governance and reconstruction 
which made an increase in the number of civilian advisors and an increased integration 
necessary.514  
 
The main difference between the Dutch approach and the other two states’ 
approaches to the question of complex conflict and multi-functionality became visible 
from late 2005. From 2005 the political aim of assisting the Afghan authorities in 
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Uruzgan was understood as requiring both civilian and military agencies, and, crucially, 
these agencies would have to integrate, not only co-ordinate, their actions at the various 
levels of government; in the Hague, in Kabul, and most importantly on the ground in 
Uruzgan. This understanding fit with the ongoing development within the Dutch 
government of inter-ministerial co-operation and planning. Although there were 
conflicts between the MoD and the MFA during the Uruzgan planning process, these 
problems were not permanent obstacles to an integrated plan being developed, if 
anything the exchanges between the various agencies of the Dutch government 
produced more detailed understanding of the problems in Uruzgan and highlighted 
issues that needed to be addressed before a plan could be presented.515 When the 
decision (or intent) was presented it was presented jointly by the three ministers 
involved, using the established framework. The Netherlands’ view of responding to 
complex responses was further developed through 2006, and in April 2006 the Dutch 
Foreign Minister argued that: 
To address such a multidimensional set of issues, you require 
an integrated approach that makes full use of your political, 
developmental, economic, military, police and intelligence 
instruments.516 
 During this speech he made it clear that all Dutch security and reconstruction 
efforts would have to be integrated and adapted to an overall plan which was to win the 
support of the local population. The earlier separation of civilian and military tasks was 
thus abandoned and instead he made it clear that complex challenges were to be met by 
‘….an inseparable trinity’ of politics, security and development.517 This understanding 
was then developed into the Dutch doctrine of the ‘3D approach to Security and 
Development’ which was implemented in 2006 and 2007. As opposed to the two other 
states, by 2006 the Netherlands had its MFA and MoD arguing for inter-ministerial and 
inter-agency integration and explicitly warned against the risk of organisational stove 
piping which was so prevalent in the Norwegian approach to multi-functionality.518 
 
 The co-operation between the various civilian and military agencies thus 
appeared to be less conflict ridden in the TFU than in the Norwegian area. An 
illustrative comparison of the approach to the co-ordination and integration of civilian 
and military agencies was that while the Norwegian government eventually pulled its 
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civilian advisers out of the Faryab province and stationed them in Kabul, the 
Netherlands appointed a civilian adviser as head of its PRT from 2008.519 The 
Netherlands’ political aims and objectives were thus well adapted to the challenges of 
multi-functionality and multi-agency that were evident in Afghanistan between 2003 
and 2008. 
Adapted to coalition warfare? 
 The final question of the analysis of the political purposes, aims and objectives 
of the Netherlands is the question of how the country dealt with the challenges of 
making strategy within a coalition and as part of an alliance. The political purposes, 
aims and objectives of the Netherlands presented a composite image as far as coalition 
warfare was concerned. On the one hand, the Netherlands appeared to adapt its 
political intent well to coalition operations on the ground, however, it also had great 
difficulties in adapting its operations to the ongoing counterterrorism operations of the 
coalitions’ largest contributor, the US led OEF. The question of how to align its 
political intent and develop its strategy vis-a-vis the OEF was a constant problem for the 
successive Balkenende governments because of the opposition within the coalition 
government itself, in the Second Chamber, as well as in the broader public. The 
challenges vis-a-vis the OEF stemmed from the understanding of Dutch political 
purpose of counterterrorism which was difficult to reconcile with the US when it came 
to the level of force used and the legal status of the combatants and terrorists. This 
meant that any co-operation with OEF created difficulties for all the three 
governments of this study, internally as well as externally. This led to practical 
challenges for the Dutch forces as ISAF and NATO relied on co-operation with the 
OEF forces between 2003 until late 2006, when the two operations were merged into 
one command. The Dutch governments spent much time and effort to clarify how the 
Dutch NATO troops should deal with OEF-forces when it came to matters such as 
detainees, transfer of authority and ensuring that co-operation was kept to a 
minimum.520 Early on it created a confusing situation as the Dutch joint fighter mission 
with Norway and Denmark in 2003 was operating with a different purpose when it 
came to providing air support to the OEF. The deployment of AH 64 helicopters to 
ISAF in February 2004 also suffered from challenges as the air support structure of 
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ISAF in 2004 relied heavily on support from the USAF who did not distinguish 
between the two operations when it came to airspace, training or actual operations. The 
challenges of coalition warfare were enhanced in November 2005 when the Second 
Chamber passed a motion (initiated by a member of a government coalition party) that 
instructed Dutch troops not to co-operate with countries in violation of international 
law, and the US’ treatment of illegal combatants were seen as falling under this 
category.521 This meant that Dutch troops could only provide support to OEF forces 
‘….in emergency (in extremis) situations.’522 Given the fact that OEF could operate in 
the province, this created a challenging situation for the troops, particularly since the 
Dutch government in 2005 relied on international support to reinforce the TFU. The 
Dutch interpretation of its combined purposes of counterterrorism and international 
peace and security thus created problems when Dutch use of force was to be aligned 
with other international forces in Afghanistan. 
 
In comparison to the Norwegian government after 2005 the Netherlands, 
however, were transparent about its caveats and restrictions and tended to make these 
restrictions clear prior to deployments. This meant that although there were substantial 
challenges for the Netherlands in co-operating with other coalition and alliance 
members, the Dutch stance was clearly communicated before the actual deployments 
took place. Moreover, whereas the Dutch governments met challenges with squaring its 
political purposes with OEF and other US elements of the coalition, its co-operation 
with ISAF forces met few of the same challenges. The co-operation with its ISAF 
partners within Baghlan and Uruzgan was unproblematic. The Uruzgan operations 
were conducted with Australia as a partnering nation, a co-operation that included an 
integrated effort in the field of improving governance.523 The Australians were a part of 
the TFU and participated with Special Forces and a designated reconstruction unit. The 
co-operation went so smoothly that the Australian forces received Dutch funding to 
carry out reconstruction missions, which sometimes left the local population with the 
impression that the Dutch actually did less than the Australians.524 In addition, the 
Dutch forces on the ground were in practice able to co-operate with elements of the 
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OEF and ISAF, particularly Australian Special Forces, as they conducted operations 
outside the Dutch ADZs, and although some co-ordination issues were reported, the 
TFU in general were able to co-operate with these forces without serious problems.525 
Compared to their British counterparts, this co-operation seemed to have been less 
problematic, partly due to the Dutch willingness to co-operate, but also because of the 
relative calm of Uruzgan compared to Helmand. The willingness to adapt to other 
partners within the coalition and the alliance was also seen in the Dutch efforts to draw 
on experience and expertise from other nations and agencies such as the use of British 
experts and the DEA in the turning around of the Dutch strategy of counter narcotics 
in 2007 and 2008. Hence, the British and Dutch methods appeared to be largely similar 
at the operational level, although the British forces experienced more problems as they 
tried to co-ordinate OEF operations within their own AOR. The main difference 
between Dutch and British strategic behaviour resided in their respective relationships 
to the Afghan authorities. The Netherlands were able to establish a working 
relationship with their newly appointed provincial governor and get the Afghan 
authorities on board in its counter-insurgency strategy with its emphasis on the main 
population centres, whereas the British were opposed by the provincial governor at a 
crucial stage in 2006. 
 
The political purposes of the Netherlands were thus difficult to adapt to the 
complex array of coalition partners in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to the OEF, 
but its political aims and objectives were well communicated and consequently created 
less complications than what would otherwise have been the case. 
 
3) The Organisation of the Strategic Process 
The structure and integration 
The making of strategy involves the practical process of transforming political 
aims into military objectives, which in Western democracies consequently means the 
interaction between elected politicians, appointed civilian officials and professional 
military officers. The making of strategy is thus a practical activity that has to be 
organised and led.  The manner in which the process of developing strategy is 
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organised and led is significant to the strategic behaviour of any state. Compared to the 
two other cases, the organisation of the strategic process in the Netherlands between 
2003 and 2008 was characterised by political involvement, as well as political and 
military integration throughout the process,. The organisation appeared to balance the 
need for political direction and military advice and expertise, in order to realise the 
practical aspects of the strategy in the political theatre of the Second Chamber as well 
as the theatres of Baghlan and Uruzgan. The organisation of the strategic process in the 
Netherlands was far from perfect, but nevertheless an important factor in 
understanding the relative advantages of the strategic behaviour of the Netherlands.  
 
Figure: The organisation of the strategic process in the Netherlands. 
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The first element of the political involvement in the strategic process came 
through the influential role of the Dutch Parliament’s Second Chamber, whose 
influence was both partly unintended and intended. The basic organisation of the 
Dutch government was similar to that of the two other parliamentary democracies of 
this study, in that the executive powers lay in the hands of the Prime Minister (Minister 
President) who was dependent on the Parliament’s Second Chamber for overall political 
support. The domestic political situation made the organisation of the strategic process 
more influenced by politics in the Netherlands than in the two other states. A 
government in a parliamentary democracy cannot rule against a majority in parliament, 
and during the period of this study all three Balkenende governments were dependent 
on establishing a working relationship with the Dutch Parliament. This was of course 
particularly important in the case of the Balkenende-III government which was a 
minority government and thus depended on creating a parliamentary majority from 
case to case, but also the Balkenende-II and -IV majority governments had very slim 
majorities and were coalition governments in a volatile Dutch political culture where 
party and individual defections as well as backbencher rebellions were not uncommon. 
Complicating matters further, the international response to the Afghanistan conflict 
and its Dutch participation were controversial issues throughout the period. The 
strategic process in the Netherlands was thus influenced by the need to secure political 
support within the coalitions and in the Second Chamber. The Balkenende 
governments were forced to not only inform but also convince the Second Chamber in 
a public discussion and to present thoroughly reasoned explanations of its strategic 
behaviour in Afghanistan in 2004, 2005 and 2007. 526 The two other states in this study 
did not have similar political and legislative involvement in the process. Both 
Norwegian governments during the period were majority coalitions, and just as the 
British, had no need to convince or involve the legislature as both the British and 
Norwegian governments enjoyed solid majorities across the isle on the issue of 
involvement in Afghanistan. 
 
With respect to the use of force abroad, the governments were required by 
paragraph 100 in the Netherlands’ Constitution to inform the Second Chamber ‘….on 
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the intended use of the armed forces for the purposes of maintaining or promoting the 
international legal order…’.527 In addition, this information was required to be provided 
in accordance with the standard ‘Assessment Framework’ (Toetsingskader ) for the 
deployment of military forces outside the territories of the Netherlands.528 Established 
days prior to the Srebrenica debacle, the framework demanded that the governments 
provided the Second Chamber with detailed information on their political intent, the 
situation on the ground, the risks involved, the legal ramifications of the deployment, as 
well as detailed information about the military forces deployed, and most importantly, 
how the military forces were to use force in order to achieve the political aims. 
Although the term strategy was used confusingly in the briefings and discussions (see 
below) it was nevertheless clear that the framework steered the governments of the 
Netherlands in a direction where they were forced to explain and discuss the 
relationship between their political intent and the use of force. The process of making 
strategy was thus from the outset subjected to more political oversight than was the 
case in Norway and in the UK, both due to deliberate design as well as due to the 
political situation. 
 
The second aspect of the organisation of the Dutch strategic process pertaining 
to its strategic behaviour was the integration and co-ordination between political and 
military actors. The Dutch strategic organisation was similar to the Norwegian and the 
British organisations on paper when it came to the role of the executive. The 
differences lay in the organisation and tasks, as the Dutch Prime Minister was in charge 
of the Ministry of General Affairs, whose task its was  to co-ordinate the governments’ 
policies via the various ministries. The Prime Minister’s own ministry had specific 
responsibilities in the organisation of the strategic process and its Secretary General was 
‘…co-ordinator of intelligence and security service.’ 529 The actual impact of the 
Ministry of General Affairs on the co-ordination between the ministries during the 
period was somewhat disputed, and a 2009 advisory report criticised the Prime Minister 
and the Ministry of General Affairs of not being sufficiently involved in the actual co-
ordination.  In addition to the co-ordination mechanisms within the cabinet in which 
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the Prime Minister’s own ‘office’ had enlarged responsibilities compared to both the 
UK and Norway, the Netherlands also had a permanent system of inter-ministerial 
committees. Whereas the Norwegian executive revolved around the cabinet as a unit 
and then the individual ministries, the cabinet of the Netherlands was divided into first 
cabinet committees and like the British cabinet system had a series of inter-ministerial 
co-ordination groups. The most important groups for the purpose of this study were 
the inter-ministerial co-ordination group for military operations (Stuurgroep Militaire 
Operaties, SMO), which comprised of representatives from the ministries of General 
Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Defence, as well as the groups for security and 
development (Stuurgroep Veiligheidssamenwerking en Wederopbouw, SVW), comprised of the 
Ministries of Finance, Defence, and Foreign Affairs, as well as a group for police and 
rule of law. 530  
 
The SMO was involved throughout the process of developing the strategy for 
the Uruzgan deployment in 2005 and met every week. 531 The SMO co-ordinated the 
operations but also involved the Ministry of General Affairs, and thus the Prime 
Minister. Other steering groups did not have a similar impact, for example the SVW 
had no participation from the Ministry of General Affairs. 532 How successful the actual 
co-operation was within the organisation is disputed, particularly when it came to the 
actual co-operation between the Prime Minister and the ministries, and their ability to 
lead field operations. 533 The inter-ministerial co-operation was not perfect in the 
Netherlands during the period but compared to the two other states, a visible product 
of the Dutch organisation was that the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan was always 
presented as a joint effort between the different ministries in the Second Chamber as 
well as in public. This was a noticeable difference compared to the two other states 
where the ministers met individually with the legislature or public. The Dutch 
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organisation of the strategic process was thus designed and used for political guidance 
and inter-ministerial co-operation to a larger degree than in Norway. 
 
As in Norway, the actual planning of the military deployment was left to the 
Ministry of Defence. The Dutch MoD was reorganised between 2003 and 2005 and 
developed an integrated organisation with elected politicians, civil servants and military 
officers within the same structure.534 The 2003 change, which was implemented in 
2005, introduced a central staff (Bestuurstaf) whereby the main civilian and military 
actors in the MoD were included. The Central Staff was headed by the senior civil 
servant in the MoD, the Secretary General, whose responsibility was to co-ordinate the 
policy development, operations, and materiel. The Central Staff included the Chief of 
Defence who was in the same organisational position as the Norwegian CHOD, with a 
civil servant between him and the politicians.535 This raised the same challenges as in 
the Norwegian case with respect to how the interaction between politicians and their 
military experts was to take place and how ‘the dialogue between the unequals’ was 
handled.536 The organisation of the strategic process in the Netherlands clearly let the 
political side have sufficient control, as well as ensuring that there was political and 
civilian involvement in the making of strategy, but the question was how the military 
advice could be taken into the equation when there was no organisational connection 
between the statesmen and the soldiers? 
 
The integrated MoD and Defence Staff in the Netherlands was not designed with 
strategic effectiveness in mind, but rather, similarly to Norway, with financial efficiency 
in mind. The integration of the new Central Staff between 2003 and 2005 was to 
‘….ensure that the armed forces remain affordable…’ and to ‘….improve the efficiency 
of the Defence organisation….’537 The influence of management terms was so 
pronounced that the NDD described the Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces as 
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the ‘Corporate Operator’. The purpose behind the reorganisation was not described in 
terms of improving political and strategic decision-making but rather to work 
‘….towards a new equilibrium: a balance between the tasks of the armed forces and the 
resources that are available to carry out those tasks.’538 The emphasis on the financial 
and economical issues rather than traditional strategy was also evident when the Central 
staff described its organisational model. It described the new organisation in terms of 
management rather than leadership and discussed ‘implementation results’ rather than 
strategic effect.539 As was also the case in Norway, the need for integration of civilians 
and military in its MoD had little to do with strategy as such, but more to do with the 
desire of the political level to supervise the use of resources allocated to the Dutch 
Armed Forces. 
In Norway the integration of the MoD meant that the military organisation’s 
ability to provide relevant military advice was reduced. An analysis of the Dutch 
political and strategic documents during the period did not reveal a similar tendency. 
The four Dutch assessment frameworks were all detailed as to what was expected of 
the military forces and how they were to operate. The military advice was included in all 
steps of the process and also directly involved with the political discussions. The Dutch 
CHOD presented his plan for Uruzgan to the Second Chamber on at least two 
occasions together with the ministers involved and was available for the actual debate 
on the issue.540 In addition, the political decision makers were presented with more than 
one piece of military advice as a matter of procedure.541 Prior to the CHOD’s report on 
Uruzgan, the intelligence services of the Netherlands (MIVD) presented their own 
report which was not in agreement with the CHOD.542 It was this disagreement that 
amongst other factors led to the listing of sixteen critical points that would have to be 
resolved before the Dutch strategy in Uruzgan could be revealed. The organisation of 
the Dutch strategic process with a system of different organisations looking at the 
problem from various angles, illustrated the point made by Cohen that there is no 
uniform military advice and that politicians need to seek out various opinions and by 
doing so the politicians got involved not only in what was to be achieved but had 
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enough information to look into how the political aims were to be realised.543 This 
illustrates that although the Dutch military advice was integrated at a relatively low level 
in the MoD, there was more than one source of military advice and the advice carried 
substantially more weight in the strategic decision-making than in Norway. 
 
The reason for this may be found in the way the Dutch CHOD was integrated 
in the Central Staff and the role he was assigned as the highest military official. 
Although he was described as just a member of the Central Staff alongside the heads of 
other directorates, when it came to developing policy the Dutch strategic organisation 
gave the CHOD an unequivocal responsibility with respect to the implementation of 
the military strategy and operations: 
The Chief of Defence directs the Operational Commands from his 
position within the Central Staff and bears primary responsibility for the 
carrying out of military operations.544  
 
Compared to the Norwegian CHOD his Dutch counterpart was not only the 
prime adviser concerning military advice, the Dutch CHOD bore the responsibility for 
the military forces’ realisation of the policies and strategy.545 The Dutch strategic 
organisation came closer than the two other states in realising Carl von Clausewitz’s 
intent when he described how the military operations were to be in tune with the 
political aims. Clausewitz argued that the military commander should take part in the 
policy meetings in order that the policy makers could supervise the military 
operations.546 The Dutch Central Staff was on a lower level than Clausewitz suggested, 
but the principle of involving the commander in charge of the military forces in the 
council responsible for policy so that the commander could understand, advise and be 
supervised, was much the same. The Dutch CHOD’s responsibility of realising the 
strategy with military forces was also emphasised in the Netherlands’ Defence 
Doctrine, the NDD. The responsibility of the Dutch CHOD was according to the 
doctrine ‘…. to translate the political objectives and guidelines into feasible military 
objectives down to tactical level’, or in other words to actively take part in the making 
of Dutch strategy.547 This understanding of the vital role of the Dutch armed forces in 
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developing and implementing military strategy could be found in the NDD’s purpose 
which was to explore ‘….the way in which military activities are performed (the ‘how’)’, 
as opposed to the what and why..548  
 
The organisation of the strategic process in the Netherlands was characterised by 
a higher degree of political involvement in the process of developing and implementing 
Dutch strategy during the period. Politicians from the executive and the legislative 
branch were more involved in the process than their Norwegian counterparts; this 
involvement was partially due to the difficult political situation in the Netherlands but 
the involvement was also by design. The organisation of the strategic process was 
designed for political involvement and inter-departmental co-operation, and it 
integrated the politicians, civil servants and the officers in a way that balanced the need 
for civilian control and involvement on the one hand, with the integration of the 
military advice and military responsibility for the implementation of the chosen 
strategy. 
4) The Strategic Outlook 
The next step is to explore the strategic outlook of the Dutch strategic 
organisation. Strategic outlook is defined in this study as the ‘….shared beliefs, 
assumptions, and modes of behavior….’ pertinent to the strategic behaviour.549  In 
order to do so, the views of the strategic decision makers in the Netherlands will be 
explored, particularly in respect to the use of force and their understanding of strategy, 
as well as investigating the doctrines with which the Netherlands strived to implement 
their strategy.   
The Netherlands’ view of force and strategy  
 In comparison to the case of Norway, the Dutch views on the use of force and 
strategy were better documented and more coherently presented. The main reason for 
this was the comprehensive doctrine development that took place in the Netherlands 
between 1996 and 2005, but also the established procedures for strategic decision-
making as mentioned in the previous chapter.  
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As one of the purposes behind the Netherlands’ deployment of troops to 
Afghanistan was support to international peace and security, the Dutch use of force in 
the Netherlands was throughout the period closely linked to international law. Similarly 
to Norway, the Netherlands’ point of departure was international law and its 
limitations, but despite similar origins, the successive Dutch governments developed a 
strategic outlook where the use of force had a more pronounced role than in Norway.  
The relationship between the use of force and the promotion of international rule of 
law was embedded in the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet) which proclaimed that the 
Dutch Governments were obligated to promote the ‘….development of international 
law’ (Rechtsorde), and that force could be employed to protect the interests of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, but also ‘…to uphold and promote international law.’550 
The difference between Norway (post 2005) and the Netherlands was that the Dutch 
governments saw itself actively upholding and supporting international law also in cases 
where the United Nations could not provide a clear mandate, and reserved the right to 
use force in case of a humanitarian intervention.551 International law was thus seen as 
enabling the use of force rather than limiting it. The reason for this was the Dutch 
understanding of what it meant to uphold and promote international law. Promoting 
international law was closely tied to Dutch interests per se, and not necessarily bound to 
the interpretation of the United Nations.552 In this respect the Dutch governments were 
much closer to the British interpretation of international law, and consequently saw a 
larger role for the use of force in international society than did Norway. There was no 
mentioning of force only being used as a last resort, instead the use of military force as 
well as other instruments of power were described as useful in itself rather than just a 
necessary evil for a limited time. In the actual deployments, this positive view of force 
was more evident in the cases of the Uruzgan deployments of 2005 and 2007 than the 
deployment to Iraq in 2003, where the use of military force was described in more 
reluctant terms.553 However, the overall impression is that, much like the UK, the 
Netherlands’s view of force was optimistic rather than reluctant and limited as was the 
case in Norway. The Netherlands’ view of force was that the use of force could be 
necessary to realise national interests, and uphold and promote an international order 
based on international law. . 
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The next question is how the Dutch view of force related to actual strategy. 
Strategy, as understood in this study is the process of utilising force or the threat of 
force for the purpose of political ends. The discussion of the Dutch view of strategy 
will be framed by two alternative views developed from this basic definition; the views 
of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart. The Clausewitzian view of strategy is closely linked to 
the use of military force, combat and violence to realise the political intent, and puts 
emphasis on the practical and physical application of military force. Liddell Hart’s view 
of strategy, the grand strategy perspective, emphasises power rather than force and is 
thus concerned with the co-ordination of all instruments of power available to the 
government, not only the military instrument. The main challenge of the grand strategy 
view is that the emphasis on power and co-ordination may make strategy 
indistinguishable from politics in general.  
  
Similarly to the Norwegian governments, the successive Dutch governments did 
not use the term strategy in a consistent or coherent manner. At the political level, the 
term strategy was used interchangeably with policy and security policy. The term was 
also used as an adjective describing everything connected with security policy and 
elements associated with a particular level such as ‘strategic transport’, or indeed any 
plan or undertaking regardless of whether or not force was envisaged to be part of its 
realisation.554 All in all, the usage of the term strategy at the political level in the 
Netherlands was not precise and subject to the criticism presented by Howard and 
Strachan, who argued that strategy had lost its meaning.555 This lack of conceptual 
clarity aside, the Dutch government clearly adopted a grand strategy view, where it saw 
itself developing parallel and connected strategies which were to be realised by the 
different government agencies. This was clearly stated in its strategic doctrine, the 
NDD, but also in its various statements on its deployment to Baghlan and Uruzgan.556  
  
By adopting a grand strategy view the Netherlands were able to co-ordinate the 
efforts of its various actors. In comparison to the other two states this was noticeable 
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in the Dutch campaign in Uruzgan where the Dutch government went to great lengths 
to present its foreign policy, developmental, and military aims as a whole, all being 
realised by one plan, conceptually and practically. Although the actual co-operation on 
the ground was not without flaws, the Dutch strategy in Baghlan and Uruzgan clearly 
benefitted from the governments’ desire to co-ordinate its civilian and military efforts 
compared to Norway, who did not want to see its efforts as a practical whole, and 
compared to the UK, which suffered from a lack of practical integration in the early 
stages of its Helmand campaign.557 The Dutch organisation of its strategic process, with 
its emphasis on procedures, appeared to prevent one of the drawbacks of the grand 
strategy perspective, namely the tendency of grand strategy to become ‘….practically 
synonymous….’ with policy.558 Strategy, if it is to have a meaning distinct from policy, 
must focus on the way that force is to realise the political aims, not simply reiterate 
them; a challenge if policy and strategy become synonymous. The strategy of the Dutch 
governments in Uruzgan was not unambiguous, but it was possible from the outset to 
discern how the different elements of the Dutch grand strategy were to realise the 
political ambitions and what practical steps were to be taken in relation time and space. 
The Dutch strategy went beyond policy when in 2005 it made a priority out of the 
Southern parts of the province, and only focused on the two main towns in this area, 
making this the only priority of the Dutch military and civilian assets.559 This practical 
approach to grand strategy, which was notably absent from the Norwegian 
governments’ approach to Afghanistan emerged as part of the Balkenende-II 
government’s presentation of the framework (toetsingskader) for decision-making, which 
demanded that the Dutch governments analysed and presented the relationship 
between its ends, available means, and the possible ways to realise its ends. 
  
 A second challenge with adopting a grand strategy perspective is that as the 
main focus is to co-ordinate the different actors’ strategies, the overall strategy does not 
properly take into account that military strategy involves direction of the actual use of 
force. The Netherlands’ approach during the period appeared to avoid this pitfall to 
some extent, as its armed forces deployed to Afghanistan were provided with political 
direction on how, where and when the armed forces were to employ force. Although 
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not a distinct feature of the political directions given to the Dutch forces in Al-
Muthannah in Iraq, by 2006 the political involvement in the way that Dutch forces 
used force was more prevalent.560 The 2005 and 2007 briefing to the Second Chamber 
included chapters on the way that force should be used to realise the political intent, by 
stressing the outreach with the local population, operational procedures and the 
assistance of the ASF, but it also gave direction as how, when and where force should 
be employed. This indicated that the Dutch governments, helped by the procedures of 
the framework, gradually improved its understanding of practical strategy during the 
period and that the normal criticism of the grand strategy perspective did not apply 
fully to the Dutch strategic behaviour during the period. 
  
The Netherlands’ doctrine 
As indicated above, the Armed Forces of the Netherlands embarked on its 
missions in Kabul, Baghlan and Uruzgan with an internally coherent and 
comprehensive system of doctrines. The Dutch military doctrines of the period 
corresponded with the actions of the Dutch government and its military forces on a 
number of issues, and were thus important in explaining Dutch strategic behaviour 
during the period. 
 
 Between 1996 and 2005, after the debacle of Srebrenica, the Dutch armed 
services, excluding the Marechaussee, all developed new service doctrines in addition to 
the development of an overall defence doctrine in 2005.561 The doctrinal platform was 
comprehensive in scope and included an overall Army doctrine (ADP I) in addition to 
specific doctrines for general operations (ADP IIA), conventional operations (ADP 
IIB), as well as specific doctrines addressing counter-insurgency (ADP IIC) and PSO 
(ADP III). Compared to Norway and the UK, the system and hierarchy was somewhat 
more authoritative and comprehensive, in that the theoretical platform was consistent 
throughout the process of writing the doctrines from the initial general military 
doctrine of 1996 via the conflict specific doctrines, ending in the overall defence 
doctrine of 2005.562  
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 The link between the Dutch political intent and its military doctrine was not 
altogether clear. Although the political aims described the conflict in Afghanistan in 
terms akin to irregular warfare and described its own strategic goals in ways that were 
close to counter-insurgency, the Dutch government refrained from using the same 
terms as did the military doctrine. The government consistently referred to the 
operations as ‘reconstruction’ operations rather than irregular warfare or counter-
insurgency, whereas the 2003 military doctrine used the term ‘counter-insurgency’ from 
page one.563 When characterising the Dutch strategy from 2006 and onwards the Dutch 
government used terminology not found in the Dutch doctrine from 2003.  This 
divergence in terminology could be attributed to the politically controversial nature of 
the Dutch operations in Afghanistan and the three governments’ desire to make the 
military operations appear less forceful, as well as the desire to adapt its terminology to 
ISAF and the other members of the coalition. Nevertheless, when comparing the 
governments’ actual descriptions and guidelines for the military operations between 
2003 and 2008 with the 2003 military doctrine, there were significant similarities that 
indicated that the doctrine influenced the strategic behaviour or at least represented a 
common Dutch understanding of the situation in Baghlan and in particular the 
insurgency in the Uruzgan province. The similarities went to the core of the 
understanding of the character of the conflict, the development of strategy and the 
choice of strategic direction in Uruzgan, as well as how the Dutch actors should be 
organised and operate. The Dutch armed forces were thus well prepared doctrinally in 
order to advise the Dutch government and subsequently carry out operations that 
would realise the political intent of the Netherlands in Afghanistan. 
  
 The doctrines most relevant to explain the strategic behaviour of the 
Netherlands in Afghanistan were the Royal Netherlands Army’s doctrines on 
counterinsurgency and PSO. Issued in 2003 and 1999 respectively, the two doctrines 
drew the distinction between counter-insurgency and PSO through the questions of 
consent and impartiality. Both doctrines employed the traditional British ‘wider 
peacekeeping’ perspective that the defining aspects of PSO are consent and 
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impartiality.564 In order to define peacekeeping, consent from all parties involved was 
needed, whereas peace enforcement required an ambition of employing force 
impartially within the framework of a peace agreement, past or future.565 The Dutch 
doctrine thus was in line with the peacekeeping ideas of the 1990s, but not in line with 
the new United Nations’ peacekeeping ideas that developed during the period of 2003 
to 2008.566 From the perspective of the Dutch armed forces, the distinguishing features 
between counter-insurgency operations and PSO were consequently consent and 
impartiality. The Dutch doctrines stated that if these features were not present, the 
international force had taken sides in the conflict and the conflict belonged in the 
category of counter-insurgency. Therefore, the Dutch armed forces argued that 
‘[c]ounter-insurgency operations thus belong in the category of combat operations’567 
This meant that when the Dutch government defined its objectives as taking the side of 
the Afghan government against the Taliban and the OMF, the military forces had a 
doctrine that suited this line of thinking; the 2003 Dutch doctrine on combat 
operations against an irregular force. The existence of a Dutch doctrine helps explain 
the comparative ease with which the Dutch government and its armed forces adapted 
to the peculiar character of the conflict in Afghanistan and developed its strategy 
between 2004 and 2010. This was in contrast to the Norwegian government, who 
defined the Norwegian operations in the terms of PSO and peace building operations 
until 2010 and rarely discussed its operations in relation to an adversary.568  
  
Although the Dutch governments were reluctant to use the term counter-
insurgency it saw the conflict in Afghanistan in much the same light as its armed forces’ 
doctrine. Particularly its two briefings for the Second Chamber prior to the Chambers’ 
vote on the deployment and continued deployment of the Dutch contingents, 
illustrated a view of the conflict that saw the problem in Afghanistan as a political and 
ideological struggle between the Netherlands (through its ally the Karzai regime) and in 
particular the Taliban movement. The problem was thus fundamentally of a political 
nature, and the political struggle was played out with the support of the people of 
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Uruzgan as the key factor. The briefings argued that ‘[t]he Taliban depends on the 
population for support….’ and that the Dutch detachment would achieve its objectives 
through ‘….increasing the support of the local population for the Afghan authorities, 
and reduce the support for the Taliban and other groups.’569 This way of understanding 
a conflict was at the heart of the 2003 insurgency doctrine, which argued that ‘….the 
support of the civilian population for the insurgents tends to be the centre of 
gravity.’570 Furthermore, the doctrine argued that any measures against insurgents was 
‘….designed to strip the insurgents of their credibility and support among the 
population.’571 The 2003-doctrine and the Netherlands’ governments during the period 
thus saw the conflict in the same light, as that of an insurgency where the key was to 
gain the population’s support. 
  
 As a consequence of the 2003-doctrine’s understanding of the political nature 
of counter-insurgency, the doctrine required a direct and active political involvement in 
the development of the overall strategy, strategic alternatives, as well as the actual 
campaign plan.572 The Dutch experience, particularly in Uruzgan, reflected this. The 
volatility of the Dutch political process of getting the Second Chamber to vote for the 
Uruzgan deployment meant that the process of developing the Dutch strategy was very 
elaborate and the ensuing political debate was rich in operational detail. The two 
government briefings in the Chamber outlined a population centric approach, making 
the two largest towns in the more populated Southern part of the Uruzgan province a 
priority rather than maintaining all four OEF-bases.573 This matched the overall view of 
the 2003-doctrine, which argued for a conceptual approach which emphasised physical 
protection of the population ‘….against the influence of the insurgents and to create a 
division between the two’ as soon as the insurgents’ freedom of movement was 
restricted.574 The 2003-doctrine also advocated an incremental strategy where areas 
were gradually secured from a secured base area, using either an ‘eccentric’ or a 
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‘concentric’ approach.575 Compared to Norway, where a divergence developed between 
the government’s political intent and the operational ideas of its armed forces towards 
the end of the period, the Dutch case illustrated a clear link between the Dutch armed 
forces’ doctrines and the strategy decided by the Dutch government two years later. 
  
 After 2006, the Dutch government and its armed forces described its strategy in 
terms of an ‘ink spot’ (inktvlek) approach in the province where the centre of the ink 
spot was represented by the ADZs .576 The enlargement of the ADZs and its eventual 
link-up with others was described by the Dutch governments’ own study as a Dutch 
interpretation of counter-insurgency and the Shape -Clear- Hold - Build approach.577 
The 2003-doctrine did not use these terms, which could indicate other sources of 
influence on the Dutch strategy. The terms ‘ink spot’ and ‘Shape - Clear – Hold – 
Build’ were found in the British and US’ doctrines from 2001 and 2006 respectively, 
but were also part of the same population centric counter-insurgency theories 
developed during the Malayan and Algerian campaigns of the 1950s; theories that the 
Dutch doctrine relied on extensively.578 The discrepancies between the terminology was 
in itself not a significant departure from the Dutch Army doctrine but rather illustrates 
the increased use and exchanges between the various strands of the classic population 
centric theories during the period. The essence of the Dutch strategy was the choice of 
protecting the population and winning their support and by doing so starting in the 
most heavily populated areas and gradually expanding these areas instead of chasing an 
enemy in the outlying areas of Uruzgan. This was also the essence of the Dutch Army’s 
doctrinal approach from 1996, reiterated in 2003, which argued for an emphasis of 
separating the insurgents from the general population by protecting the population and 
then gradually expanding the protection from the base areas into forward bases while 
limiting the insurgents’ freedom of movement. Although the 2006 terminology was 
somewhat different from the Dutch official doctrine from 1996 and 2003, the 
terminology and the doctrines used the same underlying theories, indicating the 
influence of the doctrines in Dutch strategic behaviour or at least a shared 
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understanding between the armed forces and the government in their counter-
insurgency approach.579 
  
The Dutch doctrines and the chosen Dutch strategy were also in line on how 
force should be used. Both the doctrines and the government’s briefings in 2005 and 
2007 emphasised the limited use of force and the ‘….respectful […] and open 
attitude…’ required by the Dutch troops in contact with the insurgents and the civilian 
population in order to win the population’s support as ‘[t]he frequent and excessive use 
of force will lead to the evaporation of support among the favourably disposed part of 
the population.’’580 In both the doctrines and the government briefings, the limited use 
of force was argued both from a perspective of utility; that limited use of force 
produced popular support and thus legitimacy, but also from the perspective of 
international humanitarian law. The Dutch strategy, supported by its doctrine, thus saw 
a relationship between the limited use of force and counter-insurgency, a relationship 
not always borne out by historical evidence.581 Nevertheless, the emphasis on limited 
use of force, combined with an open and inviting attitude, was seen by many as the 
basis of the so-called Dutch approach, which set the Dutch troops apart from the more 
aggressive contingents in Afghanistan.582 The idea that there was a distinctly unique 
Dutch way of operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Dutch Approach, is hard to 
substantiate as the different authors emphasise different factors, but also because the 
Dutch ideas were taken from existing counter-insurgency theories. What is more 
interesting for this study was the congruence between the doctrinal platform of the 
Dutch armed forces and the political directions with respect to the use of force. 
  
  The final point on the links between the Dutch armed forces doctrine and the 
Dutch strategy deals with organisation. The 2003-doctrine’s initial understanding of an 
insurgency as a predominantly political conflict was followed by the conclusion that 
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direct political involvement was necessary as the ‘[d]esired military and political end 
state [is] directly and closely linked to each other.’ 583 Consequently, it was ‘….vitally 
important to achieve unity of effort between the components of the operation ….’, and 
to develop an integrated operations plan led by ‘….a civilian or political official, who 
would ‘….then quickly set up a joint military-civil command and control 
structure,…’ and perform his tasks according to ‘…strict political guidelines.’ 584  This 
mirrored the emphasis of the Dutch operations between 2003 and 2008 where there 
was a pronounced emphasis on the integration of civilian and military resources under 
civilian authority as the doctrine envisaged.585 The 2003-doctrine helps explain the 
willingness of the Dutch government to deploy civilians into both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but perhaps more so the willingness of the armed forces to accept the 
civilians as experts and eventually as heads of the Dutch PRT. This doctrinal approach 
was similar to the British Army’s doctrinal position, which also advocated that the 
counter-insurgency effort was to be led by one person who was guided by ‘….strict 
government guidelines and overall control’, whilst the British 2001-doctrine left it up to 
situation and ‘….personalities of the individuals involved’ to decide whether a single 
command or a committee system should be used.586 Compared to the Norwegian 
perspective, the Dutch 2003-doctrine was diametrically opposite because whilst the 
Norwegian armed forces did not have doctrines for either peacekeeping or counter-
insurgency operations, the Norwegian government held the position that the military 
and the civilian organisation should be kept separate. 
 
The main principles found in the RNlA’s 2003-doctrine were not revolutionary; 
indeed most the doctrine was directly influenced by British and French counter-
insurgency ideas from the 1950s and onwards, in particular the ideas of Robert 
Thompson derived from his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam.587 However, there was 
a distinctly Dutch flair to the manner in which the Dutch armed forces reasoned and 
discussed when it came to insurgencies. The Dutch army’s own experiences in 
Indonesia were integrated with the British and French experiences, as well as more 
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modern examples of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, making the traditional 
counter-insurgency theories relevant to the Dutch Army. The Dutch armed forces had 
a doctrinal platform that prepared them for the general challenges of insurgencies and 
to some extent the immediate challenges of Afghanistan, and thus provide relevant 
advice to its government. Most significantly, the Dutch armed forces had a doctrine 
that was congruent with the political intent before and during the operations in 
Afghanistan. This helps explain the comparative ease with which the Netherland’s 
government and its armed forces managed to create a comprehensive strategy for its 
operations in Uruzgan - a characteristic of its strategic behaviour during the period. 
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Chapter V: The United Kingdom 
‘For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home.’’588 
Cicero 
1) The Political Purposes and Aims of the United 
Kingdom: 
The UK was involved in Afghanistan during the early stages of the conventional 
deployment in the initial struggle to topple the Taliban and secure the new interim 
Afghani regime established after the Bonn Conference in November 2001. The UK 
maintained its presence in both the US led Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as 
taking on a lead role in establishing ISAF in 2001 by providing troops as well as 
seconding General McColl as ISAF’s first commander.589  
Political purpose: 
Denying access to terrorists: 
As in the two other cases, examples of political aims behind the UK’s use of 
force during the period were plentiful and not difficult to find.590 Throughout the 
period of this study it was possible to discern no less than eight or nine different aims 
given by senior officials and politicians at different stages. The problem was therefore 
not finding them but to determine how they related to one another, and what kind of 
strategic logic they represented. Although the period illustrated that there were multiple 
and conflicting British aims, one overall purpose surfaced for the period as a whole. 
The purpose of preventing Afghanistan from being an ungoverned territory, and 
thereby denying access to Afghanistan to radical Islamists was intermittently presented 
as the main purpose by the British government and was logically of a higher order than 
most other aims and objectives. The overall political purpose behind the British 
strategy during the period from 2003 to 2008 was to deny Al Qaeda, the Taliban and 
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other radical Islamists access to the territory of Afghanistan and prevent Afghan soil 
from once again becoming a base and breeding ground of international terrorism. This 
political purpose behind the British use of force preceded the NATO operation of this 
study and was evident from the first the time British military force was used in 
Afghanistan in October 2001.591 The purpose was initially linked directly to the 
September 11 attacks and the harbouring of Al Qaeda on Afghani soil by the Taliban 
regime and was further linked to the aim of removing the Taliban regime. Prime 
Minister Blair’s speech to the House of Commons in early October 2001, illustrates 
this: ‘….our immediate objectives are clear. We must bring bin Laden and other al-
Qaeda leaders to justice and eliminate the terrorist threat that they pose, and we must 
ensure that Afghanistan ceases to harbour and sustain international terrorism.’592 
 
The initial use of force relied on the rationale of denying the radical Islamists 
access to bases in Afghanistan, but by 2003 and 2004 this purpose had become less 
prominent. Although British operations in Kabul and to a lesser degree in Mazar-E-
Sharif were involved in counter-terrorism- and law and order operations, the overall 
purpose of preventing radical Islamism a foothold in Afghanistan was less clearly 
communicated.593 The overall purpose took a back seat to more subordinate political 
and strategic aims. The Parliamentary proceedings and hearings in 2002 and 2003 were 
not concerned with the overall purpose of the British deployment to Afghanistan.594 In 
2004 Foreign Minister Jack Straw’s speech on Afghanistan gave scant attention to any 
overall purpose that had led to the British commitment, but emphasised instead the 
more concrete objectives such as the strengthening of the Afghan state, the DDR-
process, and most importantly the counter-narcotics operations that lay ‘….at the heart 
of all our work in Afghanistan.’.595 This lack of attention to an overall purpose behind 
the British deployment corresponded with the situation on the ground in Afghanistan 
in 2003 and 2004, where it appeared that Afghanistan did not face significant threats 
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from radical Islamists. An even more important factor was of course that the 
operations in Iraq took centre stage from late 2002 and onwards, leaving only minor 
British units in Kabul and in the PRTs in Northern Afghanistan.   
 
From late 2004 the British attention was again turned towards the operations in 
Afghanistan through Tony Blair’s promise to commit troops to stage 3 of the NATO 
enlargement.596 With this change and the ensuing planning of the Helmand operations, 
the need to communicate a clear political purpose behind the British deployment 
resurfaced. Whereas the purpose of denying radical Islamists access to Afghan soil lay 
dormant during the first two years of the UK’s NATO operations, the purpose 
reappeared in late 2005. John Reid’s speech in the House of Commons proposed a 
series of strategic and operational objectives, all of which were ‘….to ensure that 
international terrorism never again has a base in Afghanistan.’ 597 He added that the 
risks involved were ‘….nothing compared to the dangers to our country and our people 
of allowing Afghanistan to fall back into the hands of the Taliban and international 
terrorism.’598    
 
During the ensuing hearings in the Defence Committee in early 2006, the 
Director General of Operational Policy in the Ministry of Defence, Martin Howard, 
explained that the UK was in Afghanistan to ‘….reduce the risk of Afghanistan either 
in part or whole reverting to the kind of ungoverned space….’ that it had been during 
the 1990s.599 The overall purpose to deny access to Afghan soil to radical Islamists was 
therefore important prior to the British operations in Helmand and the subsequent 
involvement in stage 3 of NATO’s enlargement of its responsibilities. However, one 
year later during the first review of British operations in the Helmand, there was no 
similar emphasis on the purpose of denying access to radical Islamists, instead the 
hearings and evidence indicated a preoccupation with the more concrete political and 
strategic objectives such as strengthening security and improving regional governance. 
Given the nature of the British experiences in Helmand Province in the autumn of 
2006, where original operational plans were rendered irrelevant by the changing 
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priorities of the regional Afghan authorities, the lack of focus on the overall purpose is 
understandable, but it was indicative of the lack of overall logic and consistency that 
the purpose was not brought to the forefront of the discussions.  
 
The British government’s intermittent focus on the political purpose and intent 
when explaining the British use of force in Afghanistan is emphasised by the statement 
made by the new Secretary of Defence Timothy Hutton a year and a half after these 
Parliamentary hearings. In his Remembrance Day speech at the IISS he argued that the 
main purpose and intent behind the British deployment was indeed to prevent radical 
Islam and terrorism from returning to Afghanistan. By the end of 2008 he argued that 
Britain remained in Afghanistan ‘….based on a hard-headed assessment of our clear 
national security interest in preventing the re-emergence of Taleban rule or 
Afghanistan’s decline into a failing state again.’600 This re-emergence of the purpose was 
also visible in the 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS), where the national security 
aims were geared towards the threats posed by terrorism and failed states, two of the 
main challenges facing the UK.601 The National Security Strategy argued for an 
important role for the armed forces in pursuing terrorists and used Afghanistan as an 
example of an operation designed to pursue terrorists, and the purpose of the 
Afghanistan mission was ‘….to deprive terrorist networks of their sanctuaries.’602 The 
end of the period therefore appeared to have produced a somewhat clearer political 
intent and purpose than between 2003 and 2006. The increased emphasis on 
communicating one purpose or intent towards the end of the period was also 
reinforced by a speech made by PM Gordon Brown in 2009, where he reiterated the 
purpose provided by Hutton and the NSS, even utilising the same phrases during the 
speech. In his speech the PM stressed that although the UK had multiple political and 
strategic aims in Afghanistan they should not be confused with the purpose or the 
intent behind the deployment: ‘The fundamental reason [for the British presence in 
Afghanistan] is to ensure Al Qaeda cannot again use this region as a base to train and 
plan terrorist attacks across the world.’603 Brown also argued that this purpose or intent 
behind the British use of force in Afghanistan was the same in 2009 as in 2001. 
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Although communicated intermittently and more strongly towards the end of the 
period, the purpose of denying radical Islamists access to Afghanistan guided the 
British use of force most of the period. The challenge was that it was not used to 
establish a strategic logic, it was also unclear who was to be denied access or deprived 
of sanctuaries, and the purpose was not communicated consistently during the period. 
Political aims and objectives 
Assisting the Afghan government 
The political purpose and intent was not communicated consistently or precisely 
throughout the period of this study. Instead it took a backseat to other political and 
strategic aims. The most frequently communicated political aim directing the use of 
force in Afghanistan was the aim of assisting or strengthening the Afghani government 
appointed during the Bonn-conference in 2001 and popularly confirmed through the 
Loya Jirga of 2003-2004 and the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2004 and 
2005.  
 
Throughout the period of 2003 and 2008, the aim was emphasised and in line 
with ISAF connected with subordinate aims designed to strengthen or extend the reach 
of the Afghan authority in Kabul, its capacities and its system of government. The aim 
was emphasised through out the period, from the initial deployment of forces to Kabul 
in 2003 and the stage 1 expansion into the Northern provinces in 2004.604  Initially the 
aim was designed to strengthen the Kabul regime in and around Kabul, but through the 
NATO expansion plan, the British aim was changed to the ambition of extending the 
Afghan government’s reach.605 The aim of strengthening the Afghan state and 
extending its reach was one of the two important factors influencing the decision to 
deploy British troops to Helmand rather than any of the other Afghan provinces.606 
The need for extending the Afghan governance was not necessarily linked directly to 
the province of Helmand, as there was no analysis as to what made the province more 
in need of assistance compared to other Southern provinces. The choice of Helmand 
was instead influenced by the desire to deal with the fact that the province was the 
most important area for opium production. (See below) After the UK de facto reduced 
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its ambitions in the field of counter-narcotics in 2006, the aim of improving governance 
became the focal point of the evaluation of the first year of operations in Helmand in 
2007. The aim was henceforth communicated as the political aim directing the use of 
force and therefore the UK’s strategy. The return to the focus on governance came 
after the original Helmand plan ran into difficulties during autumn of 2006.607 The 
emphasis put on the aim is illustrated by the fact that it was sometimes referred by 
government officials as the political purpose behind the British deployment to 
Afghanistan, on par with the purpose of preventing a return of the Taliban and the AQ 
to Afghanistan.608 The aim was emphasised through the years of 2007 and 2008, but 
with the publications of the National Security Strategy and AFPAK strategy in 2008 
and 2009, the aim of expanding Afghani governance was seen as the most important 
way to further the overall purpose rather than being the purpose itself.609 This was also 
evident in the speeches given after 2006, where the aim of improving and extending 
governance was directing the overall counter-insurgency strategy and the Afghanisation 
of the security operations, and was seen as the best means to realise the overall purpose 
described above.610 
 
Security 
During the early stages of the NATO period, from 2003 to 2005, the emphasis 
from the UK, and NATO, was on the DDR-process in the area in and around Kabul. 
The strengthening of the central Afghan government was seen as linked to the 
disbanding of the remaining militias of the Northern alliance.611 In conjunction with the 
DDR process, which was largely completed by 2005, the aim was to assist the new 
regime in Kabul with the maintenance of security. The security operations initially were 
provided by small units providing law and order and protection of the regime in Kabul, 
and then later in the Northern province of Mazar e-Sharif. This security presence took 
the form of support to local police while the first Afghan National Army units were 
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being formed. During stages 3 and 4 of NATO’s expansion process, whereby British 
forces took over the Helmand province, the aim of providing security was adapted to 
the changing context. In 2006 and 2007 the security assistance to the Afghan 
government was transformed to operational support to Afghan Security Forces (ASF), 
and the UK took a more active role in order to ‘….build Afghan National Army and 
Police capacity….’. This with a view to enable the ASF to take over the responsibility 
for security in the ‘….medium term….’, without committing to any firm dates. 612 The 
use of British forces was not only envisaged to be limited to indirect assistance, as the 
Ministry of Defence saw the need for British forces to be prepared to actively defend 
the PRT in the new and less benign area of operations in Helmand. 613  
 
The aim of improving security through the use of British force and supporting 
the build-up and the operations of the ASF increased in importance as the true extent 
of the Taliban insurgency in the Helmand province became visible. During the 
Parliamentary hearings following the initial deployment, the aim of providing security 
was interpreted by the Defence Committee as one of the two main purposes of the 
British operations in line with the purpose of denying the Taliban and the AQ the 
ability to operate on Afghan soil. Although the Secretary of Defence chose different 
words and related the security objective to the extension of Afghan governance, the 
role of the security aim vis-a-vis an overall purpose and other aims did not appear 
clear.614 Towards the end of the period, the aim of security became even more tied to 
the development and performance of the ASF. By late 2007 and 2008 the UK 
government was using the term Afghanisation, and the political aim of providing security 
was interpreted as meaning: ‘Helping the Afghans take responsibility for their own 
security.’ 615 Enabling the ASF to operate on their own was a part of the security aim 
throughout, but if one compare the statements of the Secretaries of State prior to the 
Helmand deployment with those given by the Secretary of State two years later, there is 
an increased emphasis on enabling the ASF rather than having British forces providing 
the actual security.616 The political aim of assisting the Afghan governments in 
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providing security therefore changed throughout the period from the aim of providing 
low key assistance via taking on the responsibility for the actual security, to the aim of 
actively assisting the ASF units. This development of the objective during the period 
becomes more evident when compared to the development immediately after the 
period, where in 2009 both the British PM and his AfPak policy further developed the 
aim towards Afghanisation and further towards mentoring and partnering the ASF rather 
than provide security through British forces.617 
 
Governance 
Another objective that was corollary to the general aim of assisting the Afghani 
government was the aim of strengthening the Afghan government structures and 
improving governance and democratic structures. The objective of improved 
governance was initially not communicated in detail, but described in general terms and 
linked to the general aim of assisting the Afghan government and other objectives such 
as improving security and enhancing the Afghan government’s ability to counter the 
opium production.618 The objective of improved governance as communicated between 
2003 and 2005 did not discuss the relationship between the central, regional, or local 
levels of government, or the limits of democracy in Afghani culture. Despite this lack 
of specifics, the British government spearheaded the development of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and alongside the Americans and Germans developed 
PRTs before NATO took over responsibility in August 2003. The British forces 
established PRTs in the Northern provinces of Mazar e-Sharif in 2003 and in 
Maymaneh in 2004.619 By stage 3 of NATO’s expansion of its AOR, the objective of 
improved governance and democratisation was emphasised and linked more clearly to 
the objectives of security and reconstruction, and in turn the objective was linked to the 
overall aim of assisting the Afghan government. The objective of improved Afghan 
governance and democracy was communicated as the determinant of British strategy as 
the Minister of the Armed Forces argued that: ‘[t]he strategy is to create the conditions 
where, effectively, we allow for good governance to take place…..’, and the Secretary of 
State argued that in the end the ability to improve Afghan governance was key to all 
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other objectives; security, reduction of opium production, and creating socio-economic 
development.620  
 
After the Helmand deployment, the objective’s role was adjusted. Whilst it was 
seen as the determinant of the British strategy in Helmand in 2006, the role of 
governance took more of a backseat to the challenges of establishing security in the 
province. In the aftermath of the Helmand deployment, the British aims of security, 
governance and reconstruction were discussed in light of a comprehensive approach 
This was of course a result of the challenges that the British security forces had faced in 
the Autumn of 2006 and early 2007, but it was also linked to a more precise description 
of the objective itself. The experience of regional governance in Helmand made the 
new Secretary of State elaborate on the objective and made it clear that the 
improvements in governance and democracy had to be based on local requirements 
and consent, ‘….despite its shortcoming in Western eyes.’621 This more precise and 
somewhat reduced interpretation was carried on in the Prime Minister’s Afghanistan 
speech of 2009, where he emphasised the local aspects of the governance rather than 
the general. The more modest role of improving governance was also evident in the 
2008 National Security Strategy, where the objective of improving governance in 
complex conflicts such as Afghanistan was seen as part of an overall strategic logic. The 
NSS saw the objective of governance as part of the action to prevent the main threats 
of counterterrorism through the CONTEST-‘strategy’, and actions to prevent the 
effects of failed states.622 The objective of governance went through a transformation 
and redefinition during the period: from a general and unspecific objective to the 
determining element of British strategy in Helmand, and towards the end of the period 
one of the many elements in an overall political and strategic logic subordinate to the 
overall aim of assisting the Afghan government. 
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Reconstruction and development 
The third objective associated with the broader aim of assisting the Afghan 
government was the aim of contributing to the reconstruction and development of the 
war-torn country of Afghanistan. Development and reconstruction may be seen as two 
distinct processes, but throughout the period the British government appeared to treat 
them as one objective, and I have followed suit.623 The objective included a vast range 
of socio-economic initiatives in order to assist the Afghan government and could 
therefore be seen as an objective subordinate to the overall aim of assistance to the 
Afghan government.624  
 
The objective of reconstruction and development was in theory a part of the 
British portfolio of aims and objectives from the start of the NATO involvement. The 
small British PRTs in Northern Afghanistan that preceded NATO’s takeover were 
tasked with assisting the regional authorities with reconstruction and development 
efforts, but given the limited forces and resources available in 2003 and 2004, the 
efforts were ‘….modest…’..625 The objective was not given emphasis until late 2004 
and 2005, when the British government decided to increase its involvement in 
Afghanistan. The objective was by then not clearly articulated by the British 
government, but communicated in terms of intent or aspirations.626 As with the other 
objectives related to the aim of assisting the Afghan government, the emphasis on 
reconstruction and development increased with the decision to deploy British forces to 
Helmand. In the run-up to the deployment, the Secretary of State argued that the 
deployment was focused on reconstruction and pledged that £1 million would be made 
available for reconstruction purposes. Indeed his reasoning was that the security 
detachment was to protect the PRT, which was to operate in a less benign area than 
previously in Northern Afghanistan.627 The precise relationship between the objective 
of reconstruction and other objectives was not always clearly communicated. Although 
the security efforts were to be tailored to the needs of reconstruction, and the 
reconstruction efforts were to focus on developing alternatives to the drug based 
economy, the Ministry of Defence simultaneously saw the PRT’s main effort as 
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focusing on police reform, brokering local cease fires, and other governance related 
activities.628  
 
The pre-Helmand hearings also revealed a tension in the British thinking between 
the objectives of providing security for British troops through QIPs that would provide 
short-term goodwill, and the more long-term reconstruction efforts.629 The experience 
in Helmand throughout 2006 and 2007 revealed this lack of clarification between the 
objective of reconstruction and other aims and objectives, and illustrated that the 
political objective of reconstruction was not sufficiently precisely communicated and 
articulated to constitute a platform for actual strategy; or in other words, who does 
what, where, when and how. The post-Helmand deployment hearings in the Defence 
Select Committee revealed tension between the long-term development projects and 
the short-term security related QIPs.630 However, the lessons of the first Helmand 
deployment appear to have made the British government clarify the balance inherent in 
the objective and emphasise the long-term rather than short-term development, as the 
Secretary of State Browne argued in the hearings that the British government was 
spending more on long-term than short-term projects.631 This reinterpretation of the 
reconstruction and development objective was also evident in the redevelopment of the 
British strategy that took place in 2007 and 2008. In late 2007, the Prime Minister 
argued for an interpretation of the objective in line with long-term development rather 
than QIPs as envisaged two years earlier, while the 2008 NSS argued for the same and 
only saw the need for short-term reconstruction projects in specific instances, and then 
only in co-operation with civilian actors.632 
 
Other aims: Counter- narcotics 
The communicated British aims were for the most part in line with the aims of 
ISAF and the aims of the other coalition partners. However, the strategy of the UK 
was also determined by political aims which were linked directly to British domestic 
concerns rather than the coalition aims. The best example of the pursuit of particular 
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British interests in Afghanistan was the controversial aim of reducing the opium 
production in Afghanistan. As seen in the case of the Netherlands, the UK was not 
alone in its aim of reducing the opium production in Afghanistan, but during the years 
2004 to 2007 the UK stood out in its emphasis of the importance of counter-narcotics, 
in its direct link to domestic concerns and how it influenced British strategic 
behaviour.633  
 
Throughout the period of 2003 to 2008 the UK was the G8’s lead nation in 
counter-narcotics. Initially, the problem of narcotics was seen as a part of the context 
of the conflict in Afghanistan, and a factor in the funding of the Taliban. In 2003, the 
British ISAF forces did not see counter-narcotics as their main task, as this was carried 
out by other actors.634 This public stance on counter-narcotics changed in 2004 as the 
aim of reducing opium production was elevated from the context of the Afghanistan 
conflict to becoming an active, albeit unclear, element in British strategic behaviour. In 
2004, the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, explained that his ambition was to 
‘….put counter-narcotics at the heart of all our work in Afghanistan.’635 Reduction of 
opium production was thought to be central to the realisation of other political and 
strategic aims, and was seen as the most pressing problem in Afghanistan. To Straw, 
the opium production and trade had deeply troubling humanitarian consequences and 
constituted an obstacle to the socio-economic development in Afghanistan. The opium 
and heroin trade was seen as detrimental to the wider security situation in Afghanistan 
beyond its role as a source of funding to active insurgents and furthermore, the opium 
trade was a source of regional instability.636 
This increased focus on counter-narcotics was not only a question of public 
communication.637 The increased focus on counter-narcotics from 2004 also influenced 
UK strategy more directly. During the ISAF expansion, the UK chose in 2005 to hand 
over its two PRTs in the Northern Provinces of Mazar e-Sharif and Maymaneh to 
Sweden and Norway respectively, as well as its QRF assigned to RC North. The UK 
instead decided to realise its political aims by taking on the responsibility of the 
Southern province of Helmand. The decision to emphasise the South and particularly 
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the Helmand Province, rather than the North or the larger and more important 
Kandahar Province, was based on the idea that the UK could ‘….make a difference in 
supporting the counter-narcotics effort….’. As further underscored by the Ministry of 
Defence in 2005, it was in the British interest to make that difference because ‘[t]he 
province is in the heartland of the narcotics trade, with more opium poppy cultivated 
there annually than in any other region in Afghanistan.’638 Thus seemingly, the aim of 
counter-narcotics was elevated in importance vis-a-vis other aims such as counter-
terrorism, as the government argued it was no longer ‘…. terrorism, but the cultivation, 
processing and distribution of opium products that is the greatest threat to Afghan 
security.’’639 The aim of reducing the opium production and narcotics trade, albeit not 
central to the British political aims, appeared to elevated in importance and directed 
where and how force should be employed, and thus, it may be argued that it was a 
factor influencing British strategy between 2004 and 2006. 
 
Following the operations in Helmand from the summer of 2006 and into 2007, 
the aim was reduced in its importance in relation to other aims and objectives. Whereas 
the Foreign Secretary in 2004 argued for placing counter-narcotics ‘at the heart’ of 
British Afghanistan efforts and the Ministry of Defence in 2005 argued for counter-
narcotics as one of the two deciding reasons for involving British forces in Helmand, 
by 2007 and 2008 the political aim of reducing the opium production was not 
mentioned as a central aim, but had reverted to a role as one of many objectives 
explaining the context of the insurgency and its funding.640 By late 2007, the political 
aim of reducing the narcotics trade was seen as linked to the overall aim of stability and 
assistance to the Afghan government.641 Naturally, the ambitions also changed. 
Whereas the rhetoric of 2004 through 2006 employed terms as ‘stamp out drugs’ and 
‘taking the senior players out’, by 2007 and 2008 the terms had changed to those of 
containment and reduction.642 The aim of reducing the opium production had been 
reduced in importance and its contents altered. 
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The changing fortune of the political aim of counter-narcotics was clearly a result 
of events on the ground. In 2004 through 2006, British forces were to assist in and 
directly support the eradication efforts.643 By 2007, it became clear that the high 
ambitions in the field of counter-narcotics were counter-productive vis-a-vis other aims 
such as strengthening Afghan governance and security. The eradication efforts were 
seen as counter-productive at the tactical and even operational levels, as the eradication 
policy increased local discontent and ‘…. was fuelling the insurgency.’644 The British 
forces were keen to distance themselves from the actual eradication process. In fact, 
and according to the Select Defence Committee members British troops handed out 
leaflets where they distanced themselves from the eradication efforts in order to remain 
on good terms with the local communities. The Ministry of Defence was reluctant to 
let British troops participate in eradication operations unless the efforts to create 
alternative livelihoods were effective.645 
 
In 2009, a year after the end of this study, the Prime Minister completed the 
turnaround regarding the aim of counter-narcotics when he used the aim as an 
illustration of the difference between the vital aims and the lesser objectives: ‘Attacking 
the heroin trade, while a worthy objective, is not, of course, the fundamental reason 
why we are in Afghanistan.’646 
The alliance aim: 
The political purpose and aims discussed so far were all communicated during 
the period to some degree by the British government. The final political aim affecting 
British strategy that will be discussed is paradoxically a purpose or aim that was not 
expressly communicated by the British government; whether maintaining ties with the 
US or NATO was an important part of British strategic behaviour. Norway was explicit 
about using force in Afghanistan to support its purpose of strengthening ties with the 
US and NATO, whereas the Netherlands saw itself contributing to a broader 
international order. The UK did not deal directly with the question, but as this was 
questioned several times during the period, I have thus decided to include it in this 
study. 
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Although the beginning of the British involvement in Afghanistan was seen as 
support to the US following the attacks in 2001, the British government did not 
publicly state that its NATO operations in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 were 
guided by a political purpose or aim to uphold the alliance with the US, or maintain 
NATO as a relevant security actor.647 In none of the official documents, hearings or 
relevant speeches were these aims listed as guiding British strategy during the period, 
although vague declarations of common values and history were given.648 Even when 
confronted directly on the subject, the British PM, Gordon Brown, did not agree that 
the maintenance of alliances influenced its strategy in Afghanistan .649 This official line 
was questioned as important British strategic theorists challenged the official reasoning. 
Strachan argued that maintenance of the alliance with the US was not only an aim, but 
the entire purpose behind the British involvement in the Afghanistan conflict: ‘Britain 
is in Afghanistan for the same reason that it took part in the invasion of Iraq: the 
Anglo-American alliance is the cornerstone of British foreign and defence policy.’650 
Michael Howard’s line of reasoning was similar when he confronted the PM on the 
subject, and argued that the UK would commit forces to Afghanistan as long as the 
conflict mattered to the US.651 Theo Farrell argued along similar lines when he 
maintained during the Foreign Committee’s hearings that one of the main reasons for 
the British involvement ‘….is to support our relationship with the United States,…’ 
and it was therefore important for the British troops to perform well and convince the 
Americans of their worth.652 To Anatol Lieven, the maintenance of transatlantic 
relations was evidently part of any country’s decision to use force in Afghanistan.653 
This raises the question of whether a discussion of what the British government 
intended with its use of force is complete without this aim; and further why the 
maintenance of the transatlantic relations did not feature prominently on the list of 
British political aims and purposes?   
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The insistence of not seeing transatlantic relations as the purpose or even one of 
the aims behind the strategy of the UK during the period may be explained by the 
factors of popular support and how the strategic establishment in Britain views itself. 
Throughout the period Britain was under strong criticism of simply following the lead 
of the increasingly unpopular Bush-regime in the US. Publicly stating, as other 
countries did, that one of the main determinants behind British strategy was to 
maintain or strengthen ties with the US would have encouraged stronger domestic 
criticism of an already unpopular foreign and security policy. This explanation does not 
explain all aspects of the question because the US foreign policy was at least as 
unpopular in other countries. Instead it appears that the explanation could lie in the 
more active and independent role that the UK saw itself playing in Afghanistan and the 
region. As pointed out by the CGS General Staff General Dannatt, the UK was not just 
any country in Europe but ‘….perhaps uniquely placed among the European nations to 
deliver global influence to prevent conflict through military capacity building and 
strategic partnering.’ Moreover, unlike other European nations, the UK still saw itself 
as a main player on the international scene, and this role was ‘….hardwired into our 
political and national DNA.’ The UK had to accept a different role than other 
European nations, and according to Dannatt this was not ‘….”punching above our 
weight” but I would suggest it is “operating commensurate with our 
responsibilities”.’654 The UK saw itself as an independent actor in Afghanistan with its 
own policies and strategies that were in line with the US’ but was still independent. 
 
This view of British political purpose, aims and strategy as independent 
compared to the other states of the alliance also is strengthened when one examines 
how the UK related to the aim of maintaining NATO as a relevant security 
organisation. Whereas the two other states saw its use of force in Afghanistan as a 
means to strengthen the NATO-alliance and to make NATO relevant as a security 
organisation, the British view was somewhat different in its execution. The British 
decision to partake in NATO’s stages 3 and 4 was clearly influenced by the potential 
failure of NATO’s operations in Afghanistan as it was perceived to run ‘…out of 
fuel…’ after stage 2 in 2004.655 The British involvement in stage 4 was thus in support 
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of the NATO-coalition, and as in the two other cases it was also an attempt to get the 
USA involved in Afghanistan after the Iraq-invasion had taken most of the US’ 
attention after 2003. The two aims of supporting NATO and getting the US involved 
were seen as intertwined as stages 3 and 4 would involve the US further than its narrow 
focus on counter-terrorism would allow in 2004.656  
 
The difference between the UK and the two other cases was the way the UK 
sought to influence the NATO-coalition. Throughout the period of 2003 to 2008, the 
British position was that of making the other NATO-countries, and thus the alliance, to 
increase their share of the burden and to fit in with British aims. This became evident 
during the NATO expansion where the UK handed over its Northern PRTs to Sweden 
and Norway, in order to focus on its own deployment into the Helmand province.657 
Even as early as the pre-deployment hearings, members of the Defence Select 
Committee questioned whether other NATO countries were willing to apply enough 
force and that the British would have to take on ‘….the dangerous missions….’, and 
although the Ministry of Defence officials were reluctant to name specific countries 
they shared the concern.658 After the first year in Helmand the British government 
actively lobbied for more countries to remove restrictions on their troops and to 
provide more forces to the British-led sectors.  The British role of persuading and 
coaxing other members to improve its efforts became more pronounced as PM 
Gordon Brown explained to the House of Commons that he was ‘….urging them 
[other NATO members] to look at innovative ways to burden share….’, and to provide 
more troops and resources to Afghanistan.659 Particularly from 2005 and onwards, the 
UK sought a leading role in NATO’s Afghanistan operations and, in support of the US 
and NATO, attempted to make other coalition members increase their commitments 
and to follow British policy and strategy. The UK’s involvement in the coalition, 
although not consistently communicated, was thus based on the same desire to 
strengthen NATO as in the two other cases, but it sought to do so by pursuing a more 
active policy, commensurate with its view of its role in NATO,  vis-à-vis the other 
members.  
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2) Were the Political Purposes and Aims Adapted to the 
Nature of War, the Character of Complex Conflicts and 
Coalition Warfare? 
The discussion and description of the British purposes and aims have provided 
an understanding of what the British government intended to achieve with its use of 
force in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. The next step in this study of British 
strategic behaviour is to analyse to what extent these purposes and aims were adapted 
or suited to the nature of war, and to the character of complex conflicts and alliance 
warfare. 
The British purpose and aim through the period can be described as: 
OVERALL 
BRITISH 
PURPOSE 
COMMUNICATED:  
DENYING RADICAL ISLAMISTS 
IN THE FORM OF AQ AND THE 
TALIBAN ACCESS TO AFGHAN 
SOIL. 
 NOT 
COMMUNICATED: 
MAINTAINING 
THE US ALLIANCE 
AND NATO-
COALITION? 
 COALITION AIMS AND 
OBJECTIVES: 
INDEPENDENT 
BRITISH AIMS AND 
OBJECTIVES: 
 
POLITICAL 
AIMS OF A 
HIGHER 
ORDER 
ASSISTING THE AFGHAN 
GOVERNMENT AND 
EXTENDING ITS REACH 
COUNTER-
NARCOTICS 
 
POLITICAL 
OBJECTIVES 
OF A LOWER 
ORDER 
ENABLING ASF TO PROVIDE 
SECURITY 
  
 IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND 
BUILDING DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES 
  
 RECONSTRUCTION, 
DEVELOPMENT  
  
 DDR, UNTIL 2005   
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Adapted to the nature of war: Instrumentality? 
The question of whether these British purposes and aims were adapted to the 
nature of war first of all addresses the fundamental question of instrumentality in 
strategy, that is, did the British purposes and aims provide a clear direction for the use 
of force in Afghanistan?  
As noted previously, there was no shortage of political aims and objectives, but 
to what extent and how did these provide direction for the strategy? The British 
purposes, aims and objectives in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008 did not present a 
clear, instrumental logic where the purpose, ends and means were tied together 
throughout the period. The overall purpose of denying access to Islamic radicalists was 
not emphasised during the first two years of the NATO operations, instead other 
ambitions were fronted by the British government such as governance, reconstruction, 
and DDR. It appeared that the overall purpose was there, but it was not communicated 
properly as the starting point of a strategic ends–means relationship. The strategic logic 
behind the British (and NATO) use of force was not illogical, but on the other hand it 
was not self-explanatory. Given that the purpose was to deny access to radical groups 
and prevent terrorism from Afghan soil, establishing a centralised Afghan state was not 
the only means available to realise this purpose. The purpose could have been realised 
through various forms of less ambitious denial actions, or by establishing other forms 
of governance in Afghanistan. By not emphasising its purpose and how it related to the 
ends and means, the British government failed to establish a proper logic for that could 
explain its strategy. This has been pointed out on an overall level by Hew Strachan who 
argued that British defence policy after 2001 lacked ‘….a “strategic narrative”, a plan 
against which the events in Iraq and Afghanistan can be set; which relates setbacks as 
well as successes to an overall strategic vision; and which is adjusted against the realities 
of war.’660  
 
Strachan saw the lack of a clearly communicated strategic logic as explaining the 
lack of public support and interest in British defence policy; however the lack of a 
strategic logic also had more tangible effects. The lack of a strategic logic based on 
purpose, ends and means whereby some aims were superior to others also impacted 
strategic decisions and actual military operations once Britain increased its efforts in 
Southern Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006. Although the original purpose of denying 
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radical Islamists access to Afghan soil resurfaced in 2006, there was confusion as to 
how the different aims and objectives related to one another. The initial deployment of 
British troops in Helmand was based on a population centric counter-insurgency 
strategy where the central triangle of the province was to be secured and to be the 
focus of governance and reconstruction efforts. The relationship to the overall aim of 
assisting the Afghan regional government was not clarified as the British forces quickly 
found themselves required to deal with the security concerns of the newly appointed 
governor of the province, which required significant numbers of combat troops to be 
redirected to the North of Helmand leaving the PRT without enough troops further 
South.661 The British Commander, Butler, was confronted by requirements from two 
separate political aims, that of assisting the Afghan regional government and that of 
securing the PRT’s governance and reconstruction efforts. Only when the decision had 
to be made did it become clear at force level that the former aim in practice trumped 
the latter objective. Although the aim of supporting Afghan authorities became the 
main aim, this in turn led to the main problem of British strategy in Helmand, that of 
the dispersal and the subsequent overstretch of the available British forces. The issue of 
overstretch was noted by the Select Committee in 2006, but once the initial plan of 
concentration was abandoned it was difficult to find a suitable remedy to the problem 
of too many tasks and too few troops.662 Although British operations in late 2007 and 
2008 tried to concentrate its efforts, the problem of holding ground with the available 
troops remained throughout the period of this study. 663 In comparison to the 
Netherlands, the problem of balancing the desired ends with the available means was 
not realised as early, and the political and military leadership were not as willing to 
accept the consequences of the mismatch between the ends and the means.  
 
Furthermore the relationship between the objectives of establishing security, 
which was to be the task of the combat troops, and those of governance, 
reconstruction that were the responsibility of the PRT, was not firmly understood or 
clarified. In the run-up to the deployment there was no clarification as to whether 
reconstruction activities were to support the security operations with QIPs, or whether 
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the security operations were there ‘….to create the conditions where, effectively, we 
allow for good governance to take place…..’664 The relationship was described by the 
Secretary of State: ‘In helping Afghanistan, we cannot look to resolve just one of those 
issues. Everything connects.’665 The problem was that this analysis did not function as a 
clear, instrumental strategic logic in resolving the practical priorities that emerged on 
the ground. There were disagreements between the different military commanders and 
between the civilian and military officials as to how everything connected in practice in 
Helmand.666 This is not to say that the problem could have been solved at that stage, 
but that the political purpose and aims were not clearly communicated and the 
relationship was not clear during the initial planning. 
 
The lack of a clearly communicated and prioritised strategic logic was also 
evident with respect to the role of counter-narcotics in Helmand in 2006 and 2007. As 
shown previously, although never the central purpose or aim for the British 
government it nevertheless played an important role in British strategy between 2004 
and 2007.667 The aim of counternarcotics influenced the government’s decision to 
direct the British use of force towards the Helmand province, and not towards the 
strategically more important province of Kandahar as well as other provinces.668 The 
aim was part of a strategic logic in so far as it tied in with the overall purpose of 
denying access to radical Islamists and attacked an important part of the funding of 
terrorist activities as well enabling more transparent and reliable governance, but it was 
based on the idea that opium production was a greater threat than the actual insurgency 
in 2006.669 In practice, the aim was in direct contradiction to the objective of 
establishing security and forged alliances between the insurgents and the drug 
traffickers and exacerbated the security problem in the province.670 As a result, the 
Ministry of Defence altered the aim and only supported the eradication of opium fields 
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in closer conjunction with reconstruction efforts to provide alternative livelihoods 
which later became the main interpretation of the aim.671  
 
Thus, the British political purposes and aims between 2003 and 2008 struggled 
from the outset to provide instrumentality for the use of force. The logic connecting 
ends and means was at times unclear and the different aims were not clarified in 
themselves or in relation to one another. 
 
Adapted to the nature of war: Unpredictability and reciprocity in 
strategy? 
The political purpose and aims of British strategic behaviour in Afghanistan from 
2003 to 2008 cannot only be discussed in relation to whether the purpose and aims 
were sufficiently instrumental. The question is also whether the strategic purposes and 
aims were adapted to the changing fortunes that are part of any armed conflict and the 
very nature of war. Strategy cannot only be seen in the light of the aims set forward at 
the onset of a conflict; equally important is that the political direction and 
instrumentality during the war can be adapted to the changing conditions on the 
ground and that there is reciprocity between the aims and the means in the 
development of strategy.  
 
The factor that more than any other contributes to the unpredictability in war 
and demands flexibility in political purpose and aims when developing and maintaining 
strategy, is the fact that force is used against and in relation to human adversaries.672 
For political aims to direct strategy and be adapted to the nature of war or conflict, the 
aims must take into account the uncertainty and unpredictability of the human actors 
involved in the conflict and allow the actions of adversaries or enemies to influence its 
purpose and aims. The British political purpose and aims of the period between 2003 
and 2008 appeared not to be designed with this perspective in mind. The Afghanistan 
conflict was and is a confusing conflict with a multitude of different adversaries, actors 
and enemies, and developing political aims taking this multitude of possible actors into 
account was extremely difficult. From 2003 to 2005, the British political aims did not 
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relate to any particular opponents. The political aims appeared to be prepared to 
encounter developmental problems and societal problems, but there is little evidence 
that the political aims were designed with the perspective of an organised and willed 
counteraction in mind.673 This was of course understandable given the apparent calm in 
Afghanistan during the 2003 and 2004, however, the lack of emphasis on a human 
adversary was also evident during the British preparation for the expansion into 
Helmand in 2005 and 2006. During the planning for the Helmand operations there was 
a certain focus on both the Taliban and so called ‘bad elements’ constituting a security 
threat towards the British deployment, but the these groups appeared to be part of the 
environment rather than opponents that would actively counter the British political 
aims.674 It was not that the development of British political aims did not envisage that 
there would be threats to British forces, such a threat was clearly expected, but there 
was little evidence that the political aims, and thus the strategy deriving from it, saw this 
threat as coming from a determined enemy with a will of its own, reacting to and 
actively countering the British use of force.675  
 
It may be argued that not emphasising an adversary so not to legitimise or 
overplay the insurgent’s cause was in line with the basic principles of counter-
insurgency operations. However, the adversary was not absent from the context of the 
British political aims and purpose. Instead, the Taliban and the ‘bad elements’ were 
throughout the period described in contemptible terms, and not seen as an enemy in 
the strategic sense of the word.676 The lack of incorporating a reacting foe when 
developing the British political aims and purposes was illustrated during the Autumn of 
2006 and spring of 2007, when the Taliban launched their counter offensive in 
Northern Helmand forcing the British forces to react and then abandon their initial 
priority of securing the central part of the province first.677 Instead of conducting a 
population centric counter-insurgency campaign between Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, 
the British security forces were forced to spread its forces into the more sparsely 
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populated areas of Sangin, Now Zad and Sangin where the Taliban had the initiative.678 
A year later, the new Secretary of State admitted that the British political aims and 
strategy had not taken into account that their adversaries would react to British 
operations in Helmand. During the 2007 Defence Committee hearings Des Browne 
admitted: 
I think the obvious lesson that was learnt, and I have spoken about 
this before publicly, was that the Taliban reacted to our presence in a way 
that had not been expected in terms of the violence and the nature of the way 
it deployed the troops.679 
 
This failure appeared to have been corrected to some extent during the years of 
2007 and 2008. During the last two years of the period, the British government, whilst 
maintaining its previous rhetoric, appeared to view its adversaries as thinking actors 
rather than just a part of the scenery. Defence secretaries Browne and Hutton as well as 
Prime Minister Brown included considerations about how Britain should relate to the 
enemy, and how the enemy could react to British strategy after 2007. The British 
political purpose and aims between 2003 and 2006 and thus British strategy were 
insufficiently attentive to the fact that Britain’s aims and purposes were to be developed 
into a strategy against adversaries with a will of its own who would react to the British 
use of force. Having experienced the effects of an enemy able to react and thwart its 
plans in 2006 and 2007, there was a marked shift towards understanding that the British 
political intentions were pitted against an unpredictable human adversary. 
 
British strategic behaviour during the period suffered severe criticism, however, it 
is important that the criticism forwarded against British strategic behaviour in 
Afghanistan does not adopt a static point of view. An analysis of the British case 
should also include to what degree the purpose and aims were adapted and adjusted 
after the initial problems became evident. Not all criticism of British strategic behaviour 
took into account the changes in the British political purpose, aims and objectives that 
took place between 2006 and 2008. Prior to 2006 the British operations in Afghanistan 
were conducted in the shadow of the much larger commitment to Iraq, and the 
emphasis on Afghanistan and the political purpose and aims appeared to be low. 
However, from the planning of the British involvement in ISAF stage 3 enlargement 
which started in earnest in 2005, the focus on the purpose, aims and objectives and 
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their precision and co-ordination increased. This work accelerated as soon as the troops 
were deployed on the ground, came in contact with a determined enemy, and were 
confronted by the problems of co-ordinating British military efforts with those of the 
regional government and other civilian actors. From 2006, the political purpose and 
intent was significantly clarified in relation to the operations in Afghanistan and the 
relationship between mutually inconsistent aims was harmonised.  
 
The interesting aspect to this study is that many of the changes appeared to be 
initiated from the ground level and then corrected through the chain of command. One 
example was the British policy on opium where the British government’s active efforts 
to eradicate the opium production in Helmand changed as a result of the experiences 
of British troops facing the challenging task of carrying out Hearts and Minds 
operations while simultaneously depriving the local population of an important 
livelihood. By 2007, the British policy on opium had been altered as a result of changes 
instigated at ground level and then adopted by the British political level.680 Similarly, the 
aims of governance and reconstruction underwent significant changes with respect to 
the balance between short-term and long-term reconstruction, as well as co-operation 
between civilian and military actors in the field. The confrontation with a determined 
enemy in 2006 and 2007 also led to changes in the political direction and relationship 
between the Foreign Office, the DFID, and the military forces on the ground, 
including how the PRT and the security forces operated. 
 
Finally, throughout the final two years of this study the political aims and 
objectives in Afghanistan were incorporated into an overall structure of British policy 
documents which included a National Security Strategy, a joint Afghanistan and 
Pakistan strategy, as well as a counter-terrorism strategy.681  The criticism of British 
strategy is of course correct to the extent that these aims could have been corrected 
prior to the operations commencing, and that many of these problems could have been 
predicted. However, the fact that the British strategy organisation between 2006 and 
2008 showed that it was able to adapt and change its political aims and its strategy 
when faced with operational challenges showed there was increased reciprocity 
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between the ends and the means. A similar change in strategic behaviour was not 
apparent in its Norwegian counterpart, indicating that the British strategic behaviour, 
whilst imperfect, showed signs of improvement towards the end of the period.  
Adapted to complex conflicts? 
The final question on how the British political purpose and aims were adapted to 
the conflict relates to the challenges of complex conflicts and coalition warfare. The 
first years after the British deployed troops to the NATO operation, there was no 
discernible focus on distinct adversaries and no particular emphasis on the type of 
intensity displayed in the conflict. The threats and challenges were described in terms 
of socio-economic and societal problems.682 The threat against which the political aims 
were developed between 2003 and 2005 thus appeared to be one of multifunctional 
peacekeeping, where force in the NATO context was to be applied against political and 
societal threats, rather than against actively fighting insurgents. This is understandable, 
given the low level of opposition activity during the first years of the NATO 
deployment, particularly in the area of Kabul where most British forces were deployed. 
On the other hand, even during the relative calm of the first two years British and 
NATO forces were attacked on the outskirts of Kabul on several occasions through a 
combination of asymmetric threats such as IEDs and ambushes. Although many 
ambushes took an asymmetric form as far as means and methods were concerned, 
some ambushes displayed the opponents’ willingness to hold ground and fight it out 
even as close to Kabul as the Lowgar province and the Surobi district of Kabul. As 
early as 2004, there were signals that the conflict in Afghanistan displayed the variety of 
intensity found in complex conflicts. 
 
As the NATO expansion gained traction in stages three and four, in the South 
and the East, the question of the threat facing the British troops became more acute. 
During the preparations for the British deployment into Helmand in early 2006, the 
British government appeared to realise that the threat level was very different from 
what it had been in Kabul and in the North. This was understood in relation to 
complex wars in general as well as the specific situation of Helmand.683 In his statement 
to the House of Commons, the British Secretary of State for Defence John Reid argued 
that the threat against British troops was ‘greater’ which was precisely why he deployed 
                                                 
682
 See: Straw, "The Challenges Ahead for Afghanistan." (2004) 
683
 John Reid, "The Challenges of Modern War,"(King's College London: KCL, 2006). 
 211 
elements of the 16th Air Assault Brigade to secure the British PRT in Lashkar Gah.684 
Although Reid later made a comment that he would be pleased if British troops did not 
have to fire a single shot in Helmand, it appears clear that the British political aims and 
subsequent strategy were certainly prepared for a greater threat to British troops.685 The 
British government was also prepared to counter the greater threat with more troops, 
as Secretary Reid made clear earlier the same year: ‘What matters is that we put the 
right forces in to do the job and to do it safely and well, and I make no apology if that 
requires more soldiers than some people initially envisaged.’686 What was not expected 
was the reaction from its main antagonist, the Taliban, and the nature of the reaction. 
The lack of an enemy in relation to the political aims has been described above, but it 
appeared that the development of British political aims and strategy did not fully 
anticipate the composite threat and the different levels of intensity utilised by its 
opponent in Helmand. As the British forces deployed into Helmand in the summer and 
autumn of 2006 they were not only confronted by an enemy whose dispositions they 
had not accounted for, they were also surprised by the level of conventional intensity 
that confronted them as they reacted to the Taliban offensive in Northern Helmand. 
The British deployed one of their most combat ready units into Helmand, but the 
nature of the enemy action was not anticipated when the political aims and the strategy 
were developed. As pointed out a year later by John Reid’s successor, Des Browne, the 
intensity anticipated from the Taliban was not a hybrid one, but a purely asymmetrical 
one in the shape of a classic guerrilla campaign. The Secretary of State argued that: 
….the accepted wisdom was that we could expect a reaction from the Taliban 
and, indeed, possibly from others but that the nature of it would be what people 
refer to as asymmetric. We were being advised by all the experts that that would 
be the nature of the way in which they would deploy their violence. It turned out 
that they did not.687 
 
The British view of the threats and intensity in 2006 was not the same as the 
previous years. Thus, arguing that the British political aims and strategy was developed 
in a peacekeeping mindset does not appear to be precise.688 The British government 
appeared fully aware of the increase of the threat in Helmand, and that kinetic force 
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was needed to counter it. What was missing was the understanding that the threat 
would come in the form of both low and high intensity simultaneously, and being able 
to adjust the British strategy accordingly.  
 
The second aspect of complex conflicts that the British political purpose and 
political aims in Afghanistan should be analysed against, was the drawn-out nature of 
such conflicts and the tendency of contemporary conflicts not to be concluded in a 
definitive manner. The purpose and aims behind the British strategy in Afghanistan 
appeared to stress the longevity of the campaign that the UK had embarked on. 
Throughout the period the purpose and aims were always presented in an open-ended 
context, where no step in itself was seen as a deciding factor. The British aims were 
presented in the context of expressions such as ‘….for the long haul….’ and that the 
British government was fully committed.689 Furthermore, the British government was 
prepared to back up these statements by reinforcing its troops when needed, something 
the two other states were not prepared to do.690 
 
On the whole, the British political purpose and aims seemed to be so focused on 
the long-term aspects of the campaign that it was difficult to find any evidence of any 
measurement of success or any quantification of achievement. The purpose and aims 
of the UK, and thus its strategy, were in many ways mostly ‘aspirational’ and not 
defined in relation to what a situation on the ground could possible have looked like.691 
The British focus on a long-term commitment indicated resolve, and a profound 
understanding of the realities of contemporary conflicts, but its long-term commitment 
was not matched by an ability to create realistic and practical aims attainable by military 
force.  
 
Adapted to coalition warfare? 
The final aspect of the discussion on British political purpose and aims against 
the requirements of contemporary complex conflicts is the question of how the British 
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intent in Afghanistan was adapted to the fact that contemporary and complex conflicts 
are conducted in a multinational and multi-functional setting. As pointed out in the 
chapter two, interventions in contemporary conflicts are almost inconceivable without 
a coalition of countries providing international legitimacy for an operation. The UK 
gained significant experience from multinational operations during the 1990s in both 
PSO and intervention operations. Still, this experience did not prevent the political 
aims and strategy of the UK from running into significant challenges vis-a-vis its allies in 
Afghanistan. The complexity of the problem appeared to have been larger than the 
British experience during the 1990s and the experiences of Northern Ireland and 
colonial counter-insurgency had prepared British planners for. The multitude of 
international partners appeared to be a challenge to the British way of thinking and to 
surprise even experienced British security analysts and strategists. 
 
The British political aims did not take the relationship with its Afghan host fully 
into account when dealing with the aim of creating security at the province level. A 
primary example emerged early on during the British deployment in May and June 
2006. Immediately preceding the deployment the British authorities worked with 
President Karzai to replace Governor Akhunzada with a new and less corrupt 
governor, Daoud, whose support in Helmand was limited, but who was seen as better 
suited to the British aims of governance in Helmand. The challenge was that, in 
contrast to the similar Dutch move, Governor Daoud had limited support locally and 
could not support the British scheme of manoeuvre as the Taliban’s offensive in 
Northern Helmand became evident. This meant that the original counter-insurgency 
based scheme of manoeuvre in central Helmand was discarded in favour of Governor 
Daoud’s need to protect the Northern villages against the Taliban offensive.692 
Although the political aims and strategy were adjusted during 2007, the problems of co-
ordinating with the Afghan government at operational level persisted throughout the 
period, as the command structures of the British forces did not match the local 
government who did not have corresponding levels. Similar problems occurred in 
relation to its NATO allies, where the shared battle space between the British troops 
and American troops under Operation Enduring Freedom command created friction. 
During the first years the friction was relatively low, but after the British political 
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ambition and strategy shifted its focus towards Helmand, the friction between US and 
British forces became evident.693 Although the main bulk of US forces came under 
NATO command late in 2006, the problem appeared to persist with reports of the 
problem being filed during operations Herrick 6 and 7. Furthermore, the British 
political aims and the subsequent strategy resulted in disagreement between the US 
forces with respect to the operational choices during the autumn of 2006.694  
 
The challenges of adapting the political intent and the strategy to that of a 
complex conflict were also evident when it came to other NATO countries. Although 
the initial British aim was to support NATO in light of a impending crisis in 2003, just 
as the other two states, it became evident during the Helmand deployment that the 
British aims, objectives and ways were not entirely in line with the rest of the NATO 
countries. This was evident in the differences between the discussions before and after 
the Helmand deployment. In early 2006, the other NATO countries were discussed 
only in so far as their willingness to contribute, but from late 2006 and into 2007 it 
became clear that the various coalition countries approached the mission in 
Afghanistan differently.695 By 2007 opposition members of the Defence Committee 
were concerned that the behaviour of some NATO-countries amounted to freeloading 
compared to the British effort.696 Furthermore, the members of the armed forces 
reported operational problems between British forces and adjacent allies and problems 
of accommodating different states’ agendas within the theatre.697  
 
In Britain’s defence, it can be argued that the problem of burden sharing in 
NATO is an eternal challenge and the emphasis on increasing the participation of other 
members was hardly unfair given the British commitment. Furthermore, there was 
scarce evidence of the British challenges with coalition operations being critical; indeed 
for every report of problems, there is a report praising the co-operation between 
Britain’s Danish, Dutch and Canadian partners.698 However, the increased criticism and 
the inter-operational problems evident after the Helmand deployment indicate that the 
British aims, and objectives were not fully tuned to the multinational and coalition 
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aspects of the complex conflict of Afghanistan. The British experience of counter-
insurgency was relevant when designing the UK’s strategy but the British government 
had not fully understood the complexities of operating in a coalition, as the British 
ISAF commander David Richards lamented:  
When asked to compare others in my position people often 
mention Templar in Malaya. Well, he was in charge of a single 
nation’s campaign there, and basically he ran it; he did not really 
have to go and ask anybody. 699 
 
 The British strategy was designed without taking the complexities of developing 
a political purpose and political aims in a coalition setting fully into account. The 
political purposes and aims of complex conflicts did not only demand a multinational 
approach to realise them. Given the socioeconomic and societal ambitions of the UK 
in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008, the British purpose and aims were to be 
realised by more than military forces.700 From 2003 to 2006, the British government 
operated its Department for International Development (DFID) with a small staff in 
Kabul to work alongside other British efforts. The British government included 
elements of DFID in its development of the political aims and made DFID part of the 
actual operational planning prior to the Helmand deployment, and more importantly 
made DFID see itself ‘….as part of a wider HMG strategy in support of Helmand.’701 
This illustrated that the political aims of the UK were partly designed with the 
complexities of contemporary conflicts in mind, similarly to that of the Netherlands, 
and diametrically opposite to the Norwegian Model. However, whilst the ambition was 
to design the political aims and to develop a strategy with more than military forces in 
mind, from 2006 and onwards the political aims were difficult to realise through the use 
of multiple agencies. The ambitions were hampered by the lack of a commonly 
accepted doctrine (see below) streamlining the various agencies, creating tension 
between the MoD, FCO and DFID on the ground in Helmand as the strategy was to 
be enacted.702 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the political aims of reconstruction and democratisation 
were difficult to harmonise between the short-term needs of the security forces and the 
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long-term needs of the DFID and the NGOs. This problem revealed the problem of 
who was to set the pace and direction for the development and reconstruction in the 
British sector.703 As a result, DFID received criticism for its efforts in the Helmand 
province during 2006 and 2007, particularly for its inability to provide enough 
resources and personnel to provide long-term development in an insecure 
environment.704 The challenges of defining political purpose and aims in the context of 
a multi-agency setting was obviously more demanding in 2006 and 2007 than the 
British government had envisaged. However, as with the overall problem of adapting 
the political aims and objectives to the actual operational environment, the British 
government demonstrated a willingness to deal with these problems as well as flexibility 
in its approach. The experiences of 2006 and 2007 were included in the 2008 NSS, 
where an increased emphasis on interagency co-operation was emphasised, and the 
problem of deploying enough competent civilians into a combat zone was improved.705 
The UK demonstrated a commitment to the idea of an integrated and comprehensive 
approach, in that the FCO and DFID had to be an integrated part of the solution in 
implementing British strategy in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. In comparison to 
the two other states of this study, this integration went a lot further than in Norway 
and by the end of the period brought it at least on par with the Netherlands, who 
encountered much less opposition in its province. 
 
3)  The Organisation of the Strategic Process 
The structure and integration 
The organisation of developing British strategy was important in understanding 
the strategic behaviour of the UK. The organisation of the strategic process in the UK 
during the period was characterised by a structure that in theory appeared well designed 
to deal with the challenges of making strategy in Afghanistan, but in practice the actors 
involved struggled to use the structure, and interact in a manner that was conducive to 
developing a coherent strategy.  
 
 
                                                 
703
 UK Operations in Afghanistan: The Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-2007, ev.p. 12. 
704
 Prof. Philip Wilkinson and the Senlis Council in Ibid., ev.pp. 88-89. 
705
 HMGovernment, "The National Security Strategy: Security in an Interdependent World." 
 217 
Figure: The organisation of the strategic process in the United Kingdom: 
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two other cases was the active role of the legislature when it came to oversight of 
British strategic behaviour. The British Parliament, through its system of Select 
Committees, had a far more active role in than its Norwegian and Dutch counterparts. 
The two Select Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs carried out a series of 
hearings throughout the period, hearings that dealt with all aspects of British strategic 
behaviour prior to, during and after the use of force in Afghanistan. Despite the fact 
that there was no serious opposition to the British involvement in Afghanistan as such, 
the hearings were substantial in their analysis of the various British deployments during 
the period. The British deployment during NATO’s stage three enlargement were 
subjected to hearings by the Defence Select Committee in early 2006 as the plans were 
being developed, as well as a hearing in 2007 a year after the initial deployment, and 
followed up its hearings with visits in the field. These hearings were done in parallel to 
the Foreign Affairs Committee which carried out its own hearings relating to British 
foreign policy. The role of the Committees was nevertheless limited to that of 
oversight, and although the recommendations were surprisingly direct and frank, their 
findings did not have a direct impact in the decision-making process, and the 
committees could not force the co-operation of the executive but relied on its co-
operation.706 The hearings nevertheless created an arena for a discussion on British 
strategy and alternative approaches which was totally absent in Norway, and heavily 
politicised in the Netherlands. The role of the parliamentary committees was thus a 
positive one with respect to clarifying British ends, means and ways in Afghanistan, but 
the organisation of the committees into separate fields of government meant that an 
overall perspective on Afghanistan was difficult to attain. 
 
Although the legislative took on an active role during the period, it had no 
constitutional tools with which to impact the strategy. The executive thus played by far 
the most important role in the organisation of British strategy. The executive structure 
was one of separate ministries in charge of their respective fields meaning that the 
strategy in Afghanistan was an effort that required the co-operation of the PM and his 
Cabinet Office (CO) and the various ministries. The Cabinet Office had a defined role 
in co-ordinating ‘….the objectives and activities…’ of the ministries, similarly to the 
role ascribed to its Dutch counterpart and in contrast to the Norwegian organisation.707 
The inter-ministerial co-operation was co-ordinated through a system of Cabinet 
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Committees that from its inception was designed to be flexible and suit each 
government’s needs as to composition and level of involvement.708 The most important 
committee was that of the Cabinet Committee of National Security, International 
Relations and Development (NSID) which was established in its most recent form in 
2007.709 The CO and NSID was a result of conscious effort during the period to 
improve the co-ordination between the actors involved in policy and strategy making. 
The UK was one of the driving forces in NATO in improving this co-ordination 
through efforts such as the Cross-Whitehall Working Group, the Governing Well 
Committee, and the British Military’s doctrinal efforts of Effects Based Approach and 
its military brainchild the Comprehensive Approach. The structure and ideas on how to 
co-ordinate government policy and strategy were thus advanced compared to the two 
other cases, but this does not explain why the UK struggled to implement a co-
ordinated strategy during the period, in particular during the first year of the Helmand 
deployment.  
 
One of the problems was the lack of detailed political involvement in the making 
of strategy prior to 2007. Although the structure was available, the government level 
did not appear to use the organisation to provide clear political direction for the use of 
force. Instead, the political level provided general and aspirational aims without getting 
involved in how the aims were to be reached. Secondly, the level of inter-ministerial 
disagreement and competition was greater than the structure and the ideas behind it 
envisaged. The ideas on co-ordination were to some extent MoD driven, and the FCO 
and DFID did not fully agree with all aspects of the concept, particularly the 
permeation of military concepts in a plan that was to include a large civilian 
component.710 The result was that the strategic and operational levels were provided 
political aims that were not integrated as the planning was to commence, and that the 
relationship between the different ministries was more competitive than constructive. 
The challenge of co-ordinating government actors was a result of real disagreement, 
but it was also a result of rivalry and opposing cultures. As in Norway, the history of 
inter-ministerial co-operation was weak, and the ministries were protective of their 
traditional fields of interest. Both the CO and FCO blocked initiatives for integration 
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and were sceptical towards initiatives that would reduce their traditional roles.711 DFID 
was accused of having developed a culture where it saw itself as ‘….an international aid 
organization…’ rather than an instrument of state power, and naturally struggled to 
transform itself into an actor that could take part in an integrated strategy.712 Between 
2003 and 2006 the structure at the government level was obviously struggling to avoid 
the stove piping that became the desired solution in Norway. During the first year in 
Helmand the structure did not provide the integrated policy required. Towards the end 
of the period, however, both the structure and the interaction moved significantly in 
the direction of a comprehensive approach. The co-ordination between the ministries 
in London, as well as in the field improved with the establishment of the Helmand 
Executive Group (HEG) which organised the relationship between the ministries, and 
reduced some of the friction between the different actors.713 This co-operation in turn 
led to the development of the Helmand Road Map which attempted to balance ends 
and means on the one hand with civilian and military efforts on the other. By 2007, the 
FCO and DFID had accepted the concept of a comprehensive approach, and 
committed its personnel into an integrated structure in Helmand with the FCO 
providing the Provincial Co-ordinator as head of the PRT.714 The strategic organisation 
thus changed significantly in respect to inter-ministerial co-operation during the period. 
 
As in the two other states, the actual transformation of political aims into military 
objectives revolved around the MoD. The British MoD was an integrated organisation 
with a joint political and military leadership. The increased integration leading up to the 
Nott-reforms was a model for the two other MoDs, in particular the 2003 Norwegian 
organisation was inspired by its British counterpart. The MoD during the period of this 
study was headed by the Minister of State for Defence and supported by four politically 
appointed functional ministers to provide political leadership, and was to develop 
defence policy and constitute the senior military HQ in Britain.715 The political 
leadership had two principal advisers, the Permanent-Under-Secretary (PUS) as the 
head of civil servants, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, the head of the Armed 
Forces. Their respective vice chiefs, Vice Chief of Staff Defence Staff and 2nd PUS, 
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headed the MoD HQ through their positions as heads of the central staff. The MoD 
HQ (but not the central staff) included the three service chiefs who were responsible 
for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The ministry was managed through a series of 
committees of which the Defence Council, which included political leadership, the PUS 
and CDS, and the service chiefs, was the most important.  
 
The British model of organisation was designed to centralise and assert political 
control, as well as to centralise military advice in the hands of one military adviser. The 
integrated model in the UK grew out of the idea that it is difficult to separate purely 
political and military tasks when developing strategy, and as such the design was in line 
with the theories of Clausewitz and the civilian supremacist school of civil-military 
relations.716 The civilian supremacist school clearly advocates political involvement in 
the development of strategy for the purpose of civilian control, but it is sometimes 
overlooked that the purpose of civilian control is also to develop effective strategy.717 In 
the UK, as in the two other states, the integration of the MoD was driven by the desire 
to cut cost and control spending. The desire to improve the organisation’s ability to 
make strategy was not first on the agenda.718 The integration reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s were influenced by management theory, not strategic theory.719 This was also 
evident during this period, where the MoD’s own publications described its role in such 
management terms as conducting ‘corporate planning’, ‘allocation of resources’, and 
‘performance measurement’, and describing the Defence Council as the ‘Corporate 
Board’ of the MoD. Just as in the case of Norway and the Netherlands, the 2008 MoD 
publication did not focus on the MoD’s tasks in terms of making and implementing 
actual strategy, but rather its managerial counterparts, that of providing ’leadership’, 
‘strategic vision’ and ‘long-term strategic planning’. Although the CDS’s task in the 
integrated MoD was to be the principal adviser in matters of strategy his role was not 
described as such, instead his role was described as providing input on ‘…policy, 
financial, administrative and operational matters.’720  The MoD’s role in developing and 
implementing strategy was unclear, both vis-à-vis the other ministries and the 
committees, but also in relation to the permanent operational headquarters who was 
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planning and directing the actual operations in Afghanistan.721 A major challenge was 
therefore, to distinguish who in the organisation was charged with the development of 
strategy and also who was in charge of implementing it.  
 
Compared to the two other states in this study the structure of the integrated 
MoD had a more pronounced military involvement. As in the two other states, the 
CDS was designated the principal military adviser, but he was on equal footing with the 
principal civil servant, not subordinate as in the Netherlands and in Norway. 
Furthermore, the service chiefs were involved at the top level of both the Defence 
Council and in the MoD HQ and still retained a right to access both the Secretary of 
State as well as the PM., whereas in Norway and the Netherlands, the service chiefs 
were only part of the CHOD/CDS’ joint staffs. The organisation was thus theoretically 
well designed to generate the military advice necessary in the meeting between the 
political and military levels. Nevertheless, the question of whether military advice was 
adequately generated and given sufficient weight in British strategy was subject to 
severe criticism during the period of this study. Using the Clausewitzian model of 
strategy, military advice should assist in how the political intent may be realised through 
the use of military means. Military advice is to balance the political intent against the 
realities of the actual conflict, which presumably the military forces know more about 
than politicians, and balancing the relationship between political ends and military 
means. As illustrated in the previous chapters, British strategy during the period 
struggled to adapt its political intent to the character of the conflict, particularly the 
reaction of its enemy and the question of whether enough British forces were deployed 
and whether they were adequately organised to realise the political objectives. Whether 
these deficiencies were caused by the lack of military advice provides the question of 
whether there was military advice in the first place, and secondly whether it was given 
sufficient consideration. 
 
To state that the case of the UK illustrates that there was a lack military advice 
provided, as was the case in Norway, seems somewhat off the mark. The British 
military had an elaborate doctrinal platform from which to form its advice, and had 
plenty of operational experience to draw from during the ten years prior to 2003. Its 
operational plans in Afghanistan were well conceived, as was evident in its deployment 
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to Helmand in 2006, where the PJHQ designed a limited and integrated plan that 
appeared to address many of the later challenges before it was altered in August 2006. 
The problem was not that the British military did not have advice to give in the 
strategic process, but that the British military at the strategic level was not sufficiently 
involved in the development and implementation of strategy. Detailed military advice 
appeared to be limited to the operational level. During the Parliamentary hearings the 
actual Helmand strategy was presented by the armed forces minister and the chief of 
operations from the PJHQ, whereas the Defence Staff was involved in the overall 
aspects of force generation, C2 and RoEs.722 This is not to say the Defence Staff’s 
issues were unimportant or that the PJHQ’s thoughts were irrelevant, but the PJHQ 
chief of operations answered questions of strategic nature such as the relationship 
between ends and means, and the way the military forces were to realise the political 
objectives.723  
 
The hearings were of course controlled by Parliament and questions were 
decided by the Committee, however, this is still illustrative that the implementation of 
strategy was in the hands of the politicians and the PJHQ, whereas the Defence Staff 
dealt with co-ordination issues. This reinforces the criticism of Strachan, who during 
the period argued that the apparent strength of the military advice in the British 
organisation of the strategic process was largely illusory. Strachan argued that the 
prerogatives of the military chiefs were not used, and that neither the CDS’ nor the 
chief’s advice were included in the strategic process.724 This was confirmed by the 
chiefs themselves, who claimed that the right to be heard by the prime minister was 
rarely exercised during the period, and that the access to the PM was reserved for the 
CDS. CGS General Dannatt stated that he had only met with Tony Blair once in his 
term as CGS.725 A less quoted statement was Dannatt’s description of his relationship 
with Gordon Brown. Although Dannatt criticised Brown for showing scant interest in 
military affairs, he nevertheless claimed to have met with the PM on three occasions 
during one month in 2009, indicating that the government did seek more military 
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advice from the service chiefs after 2007.726  The overall impression of the period was 
that military advice was centralised and dependent on the ability of the CDS to 
communicate it, an ability questioned by both Strachan and to some extent Dannatt. 
Furthermore, the impact of military advice appeared to be limited at the strategic level 
and replaced by military advice and implementation at the operational level.  
 
The centralisation of the military advice and the parallel strengthening of the 
political control over the armed forces in Britain during the period did present some 
challenges. Although the need to maintain political control over the armed forces is a 
laudable desire, it is questionable whether an emphasis on control is always conducive 
to making good strategy. As argued by Cohen in his repudiation of Huntington’s theory 
of objective control, political control in itself is not enough to produce effective 
strategy. Political control needs to be transformed into political direction and 
constructive engagement with military advisers, and it appeared that this constructive 
engagement was lacking at the strategic level in Britain.727 This was also the point of 
Strachan’s criticism who argued that the politicians were too concerned with soldiers 
‘….about to park its tanks outside Parliament’ and that they had not understood that 
the main function of good civil-military relations was to produce good strategy.728 
Strachan appeared to analyse the overall challenge correctly, that is, despite a 
theoretically adequate organisation, the British government struggled to involve its 
principal military advisers in its strategic decisions and involve them in the actual 
implementation of strategy. This study however, indicates that the cause of the problem 
in Britain, as well as in the two other states, did not lie in a misunderstanding of civil-
military relations and a misplaced desire to keep generals out of politics, but rather a 
desire to manage the armed forces more efficiently. The MoD did not speak of political 
control but management efficiency; as in the two other countries in this study, the main 
focus was the management of resources efficiently and not to generate strategy or 
political control.729  
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The other challenge was the belief in the centralisation of the military advice. 
Given that the right of the chiefs to access the political leadership was illusory, the 
military advice would be channelled through the CDS alone. From a management 
perspective this meant a more efficient process, but it carried with it serious 
disadvantages from a strategic theory perspective. The system of centralisation of 
military advice meant that the political leadership did not allow itself to have a full 
range of alternative military advice, but was limited to what was generated through the 
chain of command and ‘…within the corridors of the Ministry of Defence,…’730 More 
recent studies of the process of making strategy indicate that allowing alternative and 
competing views from outside the formal structure to be examined benefits the process 
rather than harming it.731  
 
The organisation of the process of developing strategy in the UK was significant 
to its strategic behaviour. The organisation explains to some degree the challenges 
described in chapters 1 and 2, as the organisation struggled to co-ordinate the different 
actors within the government needed to develop an integrated strategy. Moreover, it 
explains why the political aims were not well adapted to the realities of the complex 
conflict of Afghanistan, particularly between 2003 and 2006. The efforts to improve the 
organisation after 2006 on the other hand illustrated the willingness and commitment 
of the British government and the actors involved to learn and change while the 
conflict was ongoing. Compared to the two other cases, the organisation of the process 
of strategy in the UK was characterised by its apparent suitability to develop coherent 
and relevant strategy. The organisation had a committee structure designed to co-
ordinate the various government ministries and involve the PM through his Cabinet 
Office, as well as a fully integrated MoD with military officers involved at all levels. 
However, the lack of political-military engagement and inter-ministerial co-operation 
meant that the organisation was not utilised in the same way as in the Netherlands. 
Comparing the two organisations leaves the impression of the benefits of the Dutch 
insistence on clear roles and procedures. Strachan argued the importance on focusing 
on the organisation of the strategic process so as to have a ‘…default mechanism…’ 
against personal differences and lack of competence.732 This study seems to warrant a 
step further, that is, to integrate the different elements of government, civil servants 
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and military officers in making strategy requires not only a relevant organisation with 
clearly defined roles, it also requires set procedures and doctrines to ensure the actual 
participation and engagement of the required actors. This is further emphasised when 
one compares the empirical base of the civil-military relations and strategic theory with 
the realities of modern politics. Both Strachan and Cohen based their criticism of 
contemporary politicians and generals on studies of ‘statesmen and generals’, using 
empirical evidence from the days of Churchill, Clemenceau and BenGurion, all of 
whom had a lifetime of war and politics to draw on before they were charged with 
developing strategy. The reality of this study was that the average time in office for 
British defence ministers between 2005 and 2011 was little over a year: During the 
period of this study Britain went through four different ministers, all career politicians, 
none of whom had extensive experience in defence or security matters. This meant that 
although the UK went through only two Prime Ministers during the same time, there 
was a lack of continuity and experience in operating the organisation of making 
strategy. This high turnover and lack of specific expertise is nothing to lament over, 
instead theory must reflect practice and it appears that having a good organisation is no 
longer enough; the organisation of the process of strategy must be welded together by 
procedures and doctrines, because relying on personalities and structures is no longer 
sufficient.  
 
4) Strategic Outlook 
The UK’s views of force and strategy  
The strategic behaviour of the UK during the period was also influenced by its 
views of force and its utility. The beginning of the period found the British government 
expressing a firm belief that force was ‘….an essential part…’ in realising its foreign 
policy and security objectives and its ability to use force was a ‘….vital component…’ 
of its security policy.733  This belief in the utility of force was borne out by the apparent 
success of the British forces in the later stages of the Balkan conflicts, its experiences in 
Northern Ireland, as well as their responses to the emergencies in Sierra Leone, Kabul 
and Southern Iraq. Compared to the two other cases, the optimism of the British 
government about the utility of force was striking: Whereas Norway at best saw force 
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as a necessary evil only to be used when all other efforts were exhausted, the British 
government was ready to use force actively to bring about political change. The 
optimistic view of force was tied to the leading role that Britain saw itself as holding in 
Europe, but also its view of the conflicts and threats facing British interests during the 
early years of the period. The ability take lead of European coalitions and the British 
ability to use force effectively was central to maintaining Britain’s position within 
Europe. Furthermore, Britain’s outlook was one where direct threats to national 
interests were unlikely, but threats to international and regional stability elsewhere were 
imminent, and importantly, British force and forces could deal with such problems.734 
The UK’s position on the need to use force to maintain international peace and security 
was similar to that of the Netherlands, but the British view was more pronounced 
when it came to the utility of force and the need for Britain to be active in 
administering it. The same may be argued about the UK’s views of the international 
organisations and force. During the early years of the period, the UK’s saw the UN as 
central to the discussion on international use of force, but it was clearly sceptical to 
‘….the limitations of the UN and the difficulties of translating broad consensus on 
goals into specific actions, particularly where proactive military intervention is 
concerned.’735 This was far from the Norwegian view, and also expressed the need for a 
more independent role vis-à-vis the UN than did the Dutch governments.  
 
By the end of the period the British government had gradually changed its 
position from an initial optimism to a more subdued and conservative view. In 2008-
2009 Britain developed its first National Security Strategy as well as a regional strategy 
for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The view of force in these documents was in some ways 
a marked departure from the confident and optimistic view presented five years earlier. 
In 2008 the use of force was described as ‘a last resort’ in support of a ‘value-based’ 
approach to achieving security.736 Whereas the proactive use of force was seen as a 
cornerstone in 2003-4, the view in 2008 was more cautious and argued that ‘preventive 
action’ involving the international community and supporting vulnerable governments 
was the preferred way. This also meant a different approach to the UN. Whilst the early 
period described the limitations of the UN and the need for the UK to take unilateral 
action, the 2008 NSS argued for a ‘rules-based approach to international affairs’ and the 
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need for Britain to use its powers to reform the organisation. The NSS admitted that 
situations could arise where Britain might have ‘….to deal with problems itself’, but this 
need was not linked to the failures of the UN and was provided at the end of a chapter 
as a series of exceptions to the general rule.737  
 
A second marked development concerning the British use of force was the 
development of a multifunctional approach to security. Whereas the 2003-4 defence 
white papers made no mention of the use of other actors when it came to the use of 
force, the 2008 NSS argued for an integrated approach throughout, both domestically 
and internationally.  It emphasised that ‘….security challenges require an integrated 
response that cuts across departmental lines and traditional policy boundaries’ and thus 
a need for all government actors to work together.738 The development during the 
period left a clear impression of change where the optimism concerning the use of 
force was replaced by a more reluctant and perhaps more realistic view of force, its 
utility and limitations. An explanation for the differences was of course the different 
scope of the documents. The early white papers were written by the MoD whereas the 
NSS was a cross-government effort including all actors within the government.  
 
The increased emphasis on international law and integrated government response 
could be explained by the inclusion of the perspectives of the MFA, DFID and the 
Home Office. The change in the view of force could also be explained by the practical 
experiences of the period between 2003 and 2008. In 2003-4, the white papers argued 
that ‘[t]he Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate the successful 
performance of British forces….’ and proceeded to argue that these operations 
validated the British view of force laid out in the 1997 SDR.739 In 2008 the emphasis 
was still on Iraq and Afghanistan, but the conclusions drawn from these conflicts was 
not that they illustrated the utility of force but rather that ‘….our experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has shown, building stability out of conflict or state failure is a complex 
undertaking….’.740 This experience was used to validate the integrated government 
approach that the NSS advocated, but also the need for a multifunctional approach to 
security where economic and societal measures were emphasised rather than the use of 
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force. This was in turn linked to the Helmand Road Map of 2007 where this approach 
was attempted. The view of force and its utility thus went through significant 
alterations during the years between 2003 and 2008, and in many ways brought the 
British view closer to that of the two other states. This development helps explain the 
changes in the strategic behaviour of the UK in the period of this study. 
 
Related to the question of force was the British understanding of strategy. Just as 
the British view of force and its utility underwent a development during the period that 
could be explained by the British experiences, the British understanding of strategy 
underwent significant changes between 2003 and 2008. Throughout the period the UK 
subscribed to the idea of grand strategy where strategy for the use of military force was 
seen in conjunction with strategies for other government activities. The 2001 British 
Defence Doctrine (BDD) used the grand strategy perspective as its point of departure 
for its discussion of strategy, policy and doctrine, and although the term was changed 
to national strategy in 2004, Britain remained committed to the overall idea of grand 
strategy.741 The understanding of the implications of this choice, however, changed 
during the period, particularly in relation to the weaknesses of the grand strategy model.  
 
In 2001, the BDD, ‘….the UK’s military strategic level doctrine,…’ began its 
discussion of strategy by classifying the different levels of war and described the role of 
military strategy in a grand strategy as. ‘….developing and employing military 
forces…’.742 The BDD followed the traditional military school to understanding 
strategy, approaching it by classifying and distinguishing the different levels of military 
activities rather than trying to analyse the phenomenon itself. This initial approach was 
followed by the emphasis on principles of war and war-fighting ethos before the 
operational doctrines were described. This approach was akin to that of Jomini and 
Liddell Hart, and indeed, the 2001 edition of the BDD was thus not far from Liddell 
Hart’s original definition of military strategy, ‘….the art of distributing military means to fulfil 
the ends of policy.’743 The BDD did not address the challenges of its approach, and did not 
explore the boundaries and interaction between the political and military levels beyond 
a discussion of the relationship between policy, military strategy and doctrine. Although 
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the BDD made a brief mentioning of Gray’s model of strategy as a bridge ‘….linking 
policy and operational effect’ and thus that strategy involved how military force was to 
realise political aims, it did not emphasise the practical aspects of strategy, the impact of 
an adversary, or its reciprocal nature. The BDD did not discuss in any depth the 
challenges of distinguishing military strategy from policy in a grand strategy approach 
or the challenges of balancing the various departmental policies. The BDD’s approach 
to strategy also emphasised the links to the operational level and operational concepts 
rather than its link to policy, and argued that ‘….no Armed Forces […] are more joint 
in their thinking.’744On the other hand, the BDD did delve into the problems of overlap 
between the levels in contemporary conflicts, seeing them as ‘….almost an 
irrelevance….’, yet the overall impression was that the BDD did not discuss strategy 
beyond a basic definition and as part of the levels of war.745  
 
The ensuing doctrines followed the emphasis on classification and levels of war, 
but from 2004 it was possible to discern a subtle shift in the views of strategy. The 
2004 doctrine on joint operations commenced with the BDD’s levels, but then the 
subordinate doctrine quickly explored the concept of strategy in much greater detail. 
The JDP-01 deemed it necessary to analyse the relationship between national and 
military strategy, as well as the other elements of the national strategy. The JDP-01 
defined the need for a national strategy framework, and proceeded to discuss strategy 
as process where a discussion on the balance between ends and means should lead to 
an integrated ‘….course of action.’746 It also adopted a more Clausewitzian approach to 
strategy where the measure of strategy and ensuing operations would logically be the 
integrated policy. The doctrine also included in its discussion of strategy a practical 
civil-military relations explanation to the challenges of modern politics and how this 
would shape the form of military advice. The difference in approach between the 
strategic level doctrine and the operational doctrine was noticeable, and although it 
took its cues from the BDD it also represented a noticeable shift in how the UK 
discussed strategy.  
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The shift from the 2001 BDD was in many ways completed by the 3rd edition of 
the BDD published in 2008. The 2008 edition of the BDD kept the grand strategy 
approach but addressed a number of the weaknesses of Liddell Hart’s concept. Firstly, 
its understanding of strategy was not tied to the levels, these were relegated to a chapter 
of warfare; instead the term strategy was immediately discussed in relation to policy. 
The new BDD followed up on the JDP-01’s approach and saw strategy as an iterative 
process between politicians and military officers, rather than a handing down of 
instructions through a series of levels. The 2008 BDD in contrast to the previous 
edition emphasised the difference between strategy and policy and, obviously 
influenced by Strachan, argued that ‘[m]ilitary strategy is not simply another term for 
Defence policy.’  The BDD took a step away from the emphasis on the operational 
level and saw strategy as providing the political ‘….meaning and contest to all 
operational and tactical actions.’ Furthermore, in addition to discussing strategy in 
relation to ends and means, the 3rd edition discussed strategy as conducted against an 
opponent and this in turn meant that strategy ‘…evolves and adapts as circumstances 
change.’ 747 The 2008 BDD took a significant step in the direction of a Clausewitzian 
understanding of strategy that allowed for a more in-depth analysis of strategy and the 
relationship between the different actors. This understanding seemed to derive from a 
different understanding of war and conflict in general in 2008. Whereas in 2001 the 
BDD explained war in relation to a series of principles, the new BDD adopted 
Clausewitz’s nature of war as its point of departure and only then introduced principles 
and operational concepts.748 The different approach to strategy towards the end of the 
period was to some degree also evident in the NSS. National strategies embody the 
essence of the challenges of the grand strategic approach as it attempts to co-ordinate 
many fields of policy. The NSS still embodied most of the criticism directed at the 
grand strategy concept, but although the NSS covered a plethora of issues ranging from 
climate change via imprecise threats such as poverty to the somewhat more tangible 
threat from Islamic terrorism, there was an undertone in the document that strategy 
was not a simple reiteration of laudable policy aims. Its aim was to find out ‘….how we 
will address and manage….’ the threats, and although the document painted broad 
strokes it attempted to describe practical responses to the threats described.749  
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UK doctrine 
The British armed forces entered into the period with a comprehensive and 
internally coherent system of doctrines, covering all levels and forms of conflicts. The 
traditional British scepticism to doctrine was by 2003 a distant memory, as the British 
were the leading European nation in doctrine development during the period.750 This 
process was spearheaded by the centres for doctrine development, first the JDCC, later 
the DCDC, which developed a system of mutually dependent doctrines from the 
overall British Defence Doctrine, to the joint and operational doctrines tied in with the 
service doctrines on specific forms of operations. Compared to the two other states, 
the British system of doctrine was leaps and bounds ahead of Norway, and also ahead 
of the Dutch armed forces through its sheer breadth and depth of doctrinal work. 
 
The challenge of British doctrine during the period was thus not one of 
availability and systematic thought, but direction. At the beginning of the period, the 
British armed forces were focusing on joint operations in the context of high-intensity 
warfare. Its focus was on operational methods and systems enabling its preference for 
manoeuvre warfare, but simultaneously spearheading the European development of 
EBO and NCW (EBA and NEC).751 Both manoeuvre warfare and NEC were clearly 
developed in high-intensity context, and although EBA was seen as having relevance in 
low intensity and complex wars it was clear from the context of the EBA examples that 
it was primarily a concept for force-on-force military engagement. The cue for this 
development was of course taken from the US and NATO, but British doctrine 
development between 2003 and 2006 was not simply one of following the US, but also 
actively improving the concepts. The doctrine of EBA was developed into a new 
concept of comprehensive approach which was explained as the ‘….natural counterpart 
of the EBA,….’ in order to include more effects than just military.752 The British 
comprehensive approach as an idea was quickly accepted by other NATO countries 
and became the military counterpart to more civilian concepts such as integrated 
approach and whole-of-government approach. 
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Compared the Netherlands, the link between the political level’s view of force 
and the armed forces’ doctrines was clearer in the UK. The emphasis on warfighting 
doctrines was linked to the optimistic view of force, as seen in the whitepapers of 2003-
4. On the other hand the emphasis on high-intensity conflict and warfighting during 
the period also came from within the armed forces. Throughout the period the British 
armed forces stressed the importance of its ‘warfighting ethos’ and ‘fighting power’ in 
its doctrinal approach, maintaining that its forces’ ability to ‘….develop and retain the 
physical and moral fortitude to fight’ was ‘essential’ and ‘fundamental’ to British armed 
forces.753 This high-intensity focus of British doctrine was not a problem in itself; the 
question is how it impacted the strategic behaviour in the complex conflict of 
Afghanistan. The main challenges of British doctrine was that low intensity and 
complex conflicts were given relatively scant attention, the operational concepts were 
not adapted to the context of complex and low intensity conflicts, and that the 
fundamental focus on warfighting was to some degree counter-productive in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Compared to the intense development of high-intensity doctrines between 2003 
and 2007, there was no corresponding development in the field of low-intensity 
doctrines in Britain. The UK went into the period with fully developed counter-
insurgency and PSO doctrines, but no new publications emerged until the counter-
insurgency manual was slightly amended in 2007. The introduction of the counter-
insurgency doctrine of 2001 was based on the British experiences with population 
centric counter-insurgency, but its operational practices were firmly linked to its 
warfighting and high-intensity doctrines, particularly manoeuvre warfare. The doctrine 
stated that although some aspects of conventional warfighting ‘….may become 
irrelevant in COIN ….’ it still claimed that manoeuvre warfare could ‘….be readily 
adapted’ to counter-insurgency, and made manoeuvre warfare the starting point of its 
chapter on operations.754 The same applied to the PSO-doctrine which was firmly 
linked to the principles of manoeuvre warfare and the warfighting ethos.755 Hence, the 
doctrines were not developed fully from the premise of low intensity or complex 
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conflicts, but were adapted to fit in with the high-intensity direction of other doctrines. 
The 2001-doctrine was not replaced until 2009, after eight years of counter-insurgency 
operations, indicating that counter-insurgency was not high on the agenda until the end 
of the period. The 2009-doctrine admitted that ‘[m]uch has changed since then [2001].’ 
Whereas the 2001 doctrine had manoeuvre warfare as its operational point of 
departure, the new doctrine’s operational tenets were drawn from classic counter-
insurgency just as its American counterpart FM-3-24.756 The concepts of EBA were 
prevalent in parts of the new doctrine, but when explaining the fundamental aspects of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, the doctrine relied on historical British 
experiences and classic counter-insurgency rather than conventional methods, and thus 
departed from the approach of its predecessor. Throughout most of the period, 
complex and low intensity conflicts were given less attention than its high-intensity 
counterparts and doctrines in the field were directly influenced by high-intensity 
doctrines.  
 
The lack of attention to low intensity conflicts meant that the 2001-doctrine 
gradually was perceived as irrelevant and not up-to-date, with several British officers 
instead relying on the American doctrine until a new doctrine was published.757 The 
neglect of the peculiarities of low intensity conflicts and the corresponding emphasis on 
high-intensity methods meant that the overall doctrinal concept during most of the 
period would be described retrospectively by the CGS in 2009 as: ‘Go Fast, Go First, Go 
Home’.758 Influencing states such as Norway, the UK designed its doctrine to support 
rapid, forceful action, rather than the prolonged campaigns which characterised low 
intensity and complex conflicts in general and in Afghanistan. The experiences that 
shaped the overall view of force also shaped British doctrine between 2003 and 2006; 
the quick successes of Sierra Leone and the Balkans, and for that matter the toppling of 
the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, led British doctrine to neglect its low intensity 
experience and underestimate the impact and importance of long-term commitment. 
This neglect of the longevity of complex conflicts in British thinking was freely 
admitted in the 2008 NSS, which stated: ‘Some aspects of our operational experience 
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since 2003 were not fully predicted, including the enduring nature of the 
operations…..’759 
 
The challenge of balancing the high-intensity thrust of the British doctrine with 
the realities of complex conflicts also became visible during the operations in Helmand 
from 2006 onwards. Although the 2006 PJHQ plan had some peacekeeping language in 
it, it also employed a classic coin-approach of securing the population within the central 
triangle of the province in order to facilitate governance-building and reconstruction. 
The deviation from this COIN-approach and the subsequent deployment and dispersal 
into the North was clearly influenced by Governor Daoud, and his need to maintain his 
standing in the province.760 However, this deviation from a traditional coin-approach 
also fitted neatly with the British armed forces’ aggressive and active doctrine. The 
BDD and other doctrines’ emphasis on the warfighting ethos, manoeuvre warfare and 
activity, appeared to have shaped the mindset of British officers into preferring 
operations akin to conventional force-on-force, rather than the cumbersome and slow 
population-centric approach.761 The preference for kinetic action was reinforced by the 
choice of 16th Air Assault Brigade and later 3 Commando Brigade, units with 
aggressive cultures, as the carriers of British military strategy in Helmand.762 The British 
doctrines made a conventional military approach more desirable from the perspective 
of the British military, an approach that made the original integrated and population-
centric plan difficult to realise. British doctrine, and its lack of focus on complex and 
low-intensity conflict, therefore contributed to the challenges of the UK in Helmand.  
 
The neglect of low-intensity British doctrine during the period is difficult to 
understand. During most of the period, British forces were involved in complex, low-
intensity conflicts, and the British experiences meant that the British counter-
insurgency doctrine was not all wrong when it stated:  
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[t]he experience of numerous “small wars” has provided the 
British Army with a unique insight into this demanding 
form of conflict.763  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated above, the political aims and objectives of the UK 
stressed the longevity of the British commitment in Afghanistan. The British doctrinal 
direction is perhaps best explained as a result of the overwhelming emphasis on the 
high-intensity doctrines that existed internationally and in Britain after 2000, as well as 
the leading role that the UK played in the development of making its concepts 
adaptable to those of the US. Moreover, the leading role that Britain played in military 
operations and in doctrine development during the early years of the period appeared 
to produce a degree of hubris within the armed forces, whereby they appeared to 
perceive themselves as having a natural grasp on complex and low intensity conflicts. 
British armed forces before 2006 claimed to have a ‘unique insight’ in counter-
insurgency and had achieved success ‘…in so many other lower level operations….’, 
and thus considered low intensity conflicts as less important to explore than 
warfighting.764 Lastly, the fact that British doctrine development was lopsided during 
the early years of the period and emphasised fast response as opposed to long-term 
operations, was further testament to the lack political involvement and detailed 
direction from the British government during the years between 2003-2006.765 
Nevertheless, British doctrine, just as the other factors, showed clear signs of adapting 
to the challenges of the Afghanistan conflict towards the end of the period. From 2007 
and onwards the emphasis on the distinct aspects of complex conflicts increased. By 
the end of that year, a temporary doctrine was issued, and by 2009 it was replaced by a 
new coin-doctrine that cut some of the ties to high-intensity warfare and instead 
explored insurgency as a challenge in its own right, including the need for integrated 
operations. These developments did not remedy all the problems described previously, 
but it illustrated the general British commitment to change its strategic behaviour 
between 2007 and 2008. 
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Conclusion 
What characterised the strategic behaviour of lesser coalition states in 
contemporary operations? 
This study set out to answer the question of what characterised the strategic 
behaviour of the three states of Norway, the Netherlands and the UK during the 
commitment to NATO’s Afghanistan operations between 2003 and 2008. The case 
study included three lesser coalition states, all liberal parliamentary democracies, during 
a limited time frame involved in a unique operation, so the potential for general 
deductions and conclusions for the field of strategic theory are limited. However, the 
experiences of the three states provided specific lessons that are of interest historically 
and relevant to countries facing similar challenges such as that represented by the 
complex conflict of Afghanistan. Furthermore, their experiences provide a backdrop 
for a wider discussion and analysis of strategic theory in general. 
Political Purposes and Aims  
Strategic theory and coalitions:  
The case study underscores the necessity to devote more time and effort in 
understanding the coalition aspects of contemporary strategy and investigating the 
individual states’ reasoning behind joining a coalition. This study revealed that whilst all 
three countries were full members of the NATO alliance, involved in ISAF’s 
operations from the outset, and used the alliance’s political aims as their own; all three 
countries joined the coalition based on very different and diverging purposes. This 
meant that their strategic behaviour analysed through the four factors of this study 
differed significantly within the framework of the coalition and the NATO alliance.  
 
The political purposes behind the three states’ use of force in Afghanistan were 
not only different, but even when they were nominally identical, the three states’ 
differed in their interpretations. The Norwegian and Dutch purpose of contributing to 
international peace and security through their commitment to Afghanistan was rooted 
in two very different ideas of what this support to international peace and security 
actually entailed. Norway viewed international peace and security as related to the role 
of the UN, whereas the Netherlands emphasised a more independent interpretation 
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that did not promote the United Nations to such a prominent role. Similarly, the UK 
and the Netherlands shared the purpose of denying Islamists access to bases on Afghan 
soil, but diverged when it came to what this meant. Whereas the British interpretation 
of counter-terrorism was on the whole compatible with that of the US, the Dutch 
counter-terrorism aim developed from its view of an international order which from 
late 2005 was explicitly contrary to that of the US. Furthermore, both the UK and 
Norway operated with independent aims such as the British counter-narcotics aim and 
the introduction of the Norwegian model for civil-military co-operation. These aims 
were developed for domestic rather than coalition purposes and were not always in line 
with the priority or the methods of the coalition. 
 
The diverging purposes and independent aims found in these three cases were 
not simply of academic interest. From the purposes followed three distinctly different 
strategic behaviours with the ISAF coalition and the NATO alliance. The Norwegian 
purpose of supporting the UN meant that its organisation of civil-military co-operation 
went against that outlined by the two other states, and moreover against the preferred 
approach of ISAF. The Dutch interpretation of what supporting international peace 
and security entailed meant that Dutch troops could not operate alongside the 
remaining OEF-troops after 2006. Being that coalitions will remain significant in the 
international use of force and that the smaller countries will continue to bear a 
significant burden within international coalitions, a coalition’s strategy and its 
effectiveness will depend on its understanding of the political reasoning behind each 
coalition member’s participation and their respective room for manoeuvre.  
 
Political intent and strategic logic 
 
All three states in this study struggled to both establish and maintain a strategic 
logic that linked the political purpose behind its participation in the coalition and its 
actual use of force. None of the states explained or discussed at any length the detailed 
relationship between its political purposes, its political aim of establishing a centralised 
Afghan state, or their main objectives and how these were to be realised through the 
use of force. Moreover, there were no discussions in the three governments as to 
alternatives to that of the aim of a centralised Afghan state. It is fair to state that all 
three countries followed the coalition’s overall aims and objectives but the three states 
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clearly communicated its own independent purposes and aims in other fields, thus, 
there were few limitations as to what could have been discussed. 
 
The lack of an established strategic logic was most visible in Norway which 
defined its participation in the conflict and its responsibility in the Faryab province only 
in relation to its general security policies and then reiterated the coalition’s aims and 
objectives. Although consistent during the period, Norway’s twin political purposes of 
support to international peace and security on the one hand and support to the NATO 
alliance on the other, were not mutually consistent in Afghanistan as the UN’s role was 
more limited in the conflict than the Norwegian purposes allowed for. Further, the 
extent and the limitations of the Norwegian purpose of honouring its NATO-
obligations was never discussed or explained as Norway committed its forces to the 
coalition in 2005. This led to the confusing situation in 2006 and 2007 as the coalition, 
headed by the UK and the Netherlands, requested Norway to transfer troops from the 
relatively benign RC North to support the more volatile RC South, provoking intense 
debate within the Norwegian coalition government before deciding that Norwegian 
troops were only to operate within RC North. The challenge of establishing a strategic 
logic in the face of two incompatible purposes also became visible when Norway chose 
to develop its own model of civil-military organisation, arguing that it was enabling the 
UN while de facto going against the chosen ISAF model. This lack of a coherent logic 
based on compatible political purposes and aims meant that Norwegian troops were 
caught between directions from ISAF and from its own government. 
 
The problem of establishing a strategic logic was also prevalent in the case of the 
UK. Just as the two other states, the UK did not discuss alternatives to the aim of a 
centralised state, and as argued by Strachan, a further problem of the UK was that it 
lacked a link between its overall defence policy, its main political aim and its use of 
force in Afghanistan.766 Although the UK struggled to establish a strategic logic, its 
main problem during the period was that of maintaining it. Whereas the two other 
countries maintained their political purposes and the relationships between their 
purposes, aims and objectives, the UK’s overall purpose of denying access to Islamists 
in Afghanistan was set aside during the first four years of this study and only re-
emerged as the operations in Helmand ran into difficulties. Instead, the UK 
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government between 2004 and 2006 advanced the aim of reducing opium traffic as its 
main purpose, and let this purpose influence its strategic behaviour in Afghanistan as it 
played a significant part in the decision to go South as well as choosing Helmand 
province over other provinces. Only after it became evident in 2007 that the ambition 
to reduce the opium trade was incompatible with other aims and objectives was the 
political aim of reducing the opium trade redefined.  
 
The case of the Netherlands initially illustrated the same problems as the two 
other states; its deployments to Kabul, Iraq and Baghlan in many ways struggled to 
establish the relationship between its political intent and its use of force, or did not 
discuss the relationship in any detail. This changed with the challenge of the Dutch 
deployment to the Uruzgan province, as the process of providing political support 
within the Dutch coalition government and in the Second Chamber led the 
government to discuss and scrutinise the assumptions and premises underlying its 
strategic logic in Afghanistan. A series of factors forced the Dutch government to 
develop a more stringent strategic logic and to develop a basic strategy for its 
deployment. The most important factor was that the deployment of Dutch troops to 
the volatile Uruzgan was politically controversial and that the Dutch government had 
to work hard to convince its internal and external opposition about its political intent, 
the need for and the direction of the use of force in Uruzgan.  
 
The ability of the Dutch to develop a more coherent strategic logic prior to the 
other two states illustrates one of the main challenges of lesser coalition partners in 
contemporary conflicts; that of generating enough political and military involvement to 
carry out a strategic process in a conflict that is normally not crucial to the state’s 
survival or national security. In relation to political involvement, this study generates an 
apparent paradox, that is, that the Netherlands, fraught with political instability and 
opposition, was able to develop a coherent, realistic and comprehensive strategy during 
the period, compared to the two other states whose governments were politically stable 
and enjoyed solid parliamentary support for its Afghanistan policies. Whereas the 
Dutch deployment of troops to Uruzgan in 2006 was a politically controversial 
decision, the British decision to deploy to Helmand or the Norwegian decision to 
deploy to Faryab, did not evoke similar political opposition, and both governments 
could rely on solid majorities across the isles on the issue of Afghanistan. In practice, 
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the political opposition and debate in the Netherlands was not a drawback, it rather 
forced the Dutch government to realistically scrutinise its underlying logic and 
assumptions behind its use of force in Uruzgan and engage in discussions on whether 
and how to use force. This is not to say that political dissent in itself was conducive to 
the strategic logic, but the drawn-out political and strategic process before and after the 
Uruzgan-deployment forced the Dutch government to solve real and practical 
problems pertaining to Dutch strategy. 
 
In comparison Norway and the UK suffered from a lack of political involvement 
in the development of the strategy. Although there was a broad consensus about the 
need to participate in conflict, the Afghanistan deployment never involved vital 
Norwegian interests. This made it difficult to generate the political and military 
attention that a true strategic process requires. The Norwegian deployment to 
Afghanistan hence, never appeared to produce the kind of urgency that would make 
the development of an actual strategy necessary. Similarly, the UK’s Afghanistan 
strategy between 2003 and 2006 was not subject to great political scrutiny as it was out-
shadowed by the Iraq-conflict and domestic issues. The first four years were, just as in 
Norway, characterised by a lack of consistent political involvement. However, the UK 
government became significantly more involved in the direction of the use of force 
after the problems of the 2006 Helmand-deployment became evident and this political 
involvement did enable the development of a more coherent strategy. 
 
This study thus illustrates the challenges of generating the political interest and 
involvement needed to develop a strategic logic, but it also illustrates the challenges of 
lesser coalition partners of maintaining a consistent strategic logic over time in a long-
term complex conflict where results are vague and the pace of development is glacial at 
best. During the first three years of this study, when there was little political urgency 
surrounding the Afghanistan conflict, all three countries struggled to establish or 
maintain a consistent strategic logic behind its use of force. Instead the three states 
focused on issues that were easier to explain politically, such as humanitarian issues or 
issues tied to domestic politics, while paradoxically simultaneously communicating the 
need to understand the long-term aspects of the conflict. The interesting point was that 
in the cases of the UK and the Netherlands this communication of issues less relevant 
to the strategic logic changed once the domestic political situation and the situation on 
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the ground created political attention. The restructuring of British Afghanistan policy 
and strategy between 2007 and 2009, and the Dutch deployment discussions in 2005 
and 2007 were both examples of political involvement improving the development of 
the strategic process, giving it direction and purpose. Therefore, this study proves that a 
major problem with lesser coalition partners, their role and their participation in drawn 
out complex conflicts is their ability to establish and maintain a strategic logic that 
provides political direction and purpose to the use of force. On the other hand, the 
remedy was equally clear. Two of the three cases demonstrate that given a sense of 
political urgency, either in theatre or domestically, the political involvement and 
direction can improve significantly. 
 
Were the Political Purposes and Aims Adapted to the Nature of War, 
the Character of Complex Conflicts and Coalition Warfare? 
 
Strategy is the realisation of political aims through the use of force. This means 
that abstract political ideas are to be transformed into tangible results in an 
environment fraught with violence, unpredictability and chance; the nature of all war 
and conflict. For political intent to be realised by the use of force it must at the same 
time provide direction to the instrument of force, but also be adaptable to the changing 
conditions encountered by the instrument. This balance between instrumentality and 
reciprocity was challenging for the three states of this study.  
 
The question of instrumentality and providing a clear direction for the use of 
force was related to the states’ ability to establish and maintain a strategic logic. The 
problem with Norway’s political intent was that although it was consistently 
communicated during the period, its consistency did not amount to clarity. Norway’s 
political logic was not translated into clear ideas about what Norway wanted to achieve 
with its forces in Afghanistan. More importantly, the political intent did not explain 
where, when or how its political purposes, aims and objectives were to be realised 
through the use of force. The Norwegian political purposes of supporting NATO and 
the UN could be achieved passively or actively, but this choice was never discussed. 
Norwegian troops were not sent to RC South in 2006 because the operations there 
were viewed as too aggressive, yet paradoxically, Norwegian troops repeatedly engaged 
the Taliban networks and took its share of casualties within its own province. The 
overall political purposes were not wrong in themselves, but the governments never 
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took their time to explain how they were to be realised. Similarly, lower down the 
hierarchy the political intent was never linked to the actual forces on the ground in the 
Faryab province. In many ways the Norwegian political intent was sound security 
policy, but was not sufficiently practical and detailed to provide direction for strategy. 
This was perhaps best illustrated by its only strategy paper during the period which did 
not provide any details as to when, where and how Norwegian forces were to realise 
the political aims. In the case of the UK, the challenge of its strategic logic in Helmand 
was that the central objectives of security and development were incompatible when it 
came to who was to carry out development within the province and how. This was 
gradually rectified between 2006 and 2008, but it still illustrates how the UK struggled 
to provide clear direction during the first years of this study. Compared to the two 
other states, the Dutch governments provided clearer political direction for how the 
use of force was to realise Dutch political intent by the time of the Uruzgan 
deployment. After 2005 the Balkenende-II and -IV governments were, through its use 
of frameworks and procedures, able to establish a strategic logic that explained where, 
when and how force was to be used in the Uruzgan province. 
 
The study revealed that the lesser coalition members also struggled to adapt its 
political intent to the nature of war and the character of the Afghanistan conflict. The 
lack of adaptation, or reciprocity, was most notable with respect to adapting the 
countries’ political intent in relation to a living adversary. The fundamental tenet of 
strategic thinking, namely that strategy is about realising political ambitions against an 
enemy who will actively and violently oppose and thwart those ambitions, did not come 
easily to the three states. This lack of adaptation and reciprocity was different in each 
state. The Norwegian governments during the period did not adapt or adjust its 
political purpose, aims or objectives in relation to the situation on the ground 
throughout the period. The Norwegian government never mentioned or acknowledged 
that it was confronted by a violent opposing political will, let alone used the term 
enemy, in its political intent or other communication. The Taliban was mentioned in 
relation to its pre-2001 regime but it was never dealt with as an enemy that could 
thwart Norwegian ambitions in Faryab. The Norwegian approach to strategy thus only 
looked at the instrumental or indeed aspirational side of strategy, and did not properly 
account for the changing nature of war and conflict and was unable to take it into 
account. 
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During the early part of the period adapting the political intent to the uncertainty 
of the actual conflict and allowing for reciprocity in the strategic process was also a 
challenge for the UK and the Netherlands. The British government and its forces did 
not adapt its aims and objectives to the living and reacting adversary that the Taliban 
represented in 2006, but instead developed its strategy based on British concerns. A 
similar development was noticeable in the case of the Netherlands prior to 2005, where 
Dutch troops were deployed to Iraq, Kabul and Baghlan without a discussion of 
possible adversaries and its consequences for own political ambitions. However, in 
contrast to Norway, both the UK and the Netherlands adapted their political aims and 
objectives during the period in response to changing conditions on the ground. By the 
end of the period the UK government was willing to adapt its policy in the field of 
counter-narcotics as the troops found them difficult to carry out. Further, it also took 
into account the various actors and their main adversary while developing it new 
strategies in 2008, as well as changing its policies on the balance between development 
and security operations. From 2005 and onwards the Dutch governments took 
noticeably more account of the fact that it was developing strategy in relation to a living 
and reacting foe than during its previous deployments. There were also clear examples 
of the Dutch governments adapting its strategy to the developing situation and 
therefore understanding strategy as a reciprocal process. Its adaptation of its 
reconstruction and opium aims, and its reinforcement of the civilian component of the 
PRT between 2005 and 2008, was markedly different from the process in Norway, and 
preceded that of the UK by at least a year. 
 
In relation to the question of whether the three states’ political intent was 
adapted to the complex conflict of Afghanistan, a similar pattern emerged. All three 
lesser coalition states struggled to some extent to develop strategies that took into 
account the dichotomous intensity level that confronted them in Afghanistan. The 
difference was how long it took for the three states to adapt. The case of the 
Netherlands showed that the political scrutiny and the drawn out process prior to its 
Uruzgan deployment in 2006, as well as the Dutch focus on its adversaries, resulted in 
its strategy taking into account that its troops faced threats along a spectrum of 
intensity, and the increased resistance from the Taliban in 2006 and 2007 was not seen 
as great surprise. This was different from the UK who were obviously caught off guard 
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by the level of resistance from the Taliban in 2006, but then quickly adapted to the 
different intensity levels in Northern and Central Helmand. Moreover, it was very 
different from Norway whose political aims never adapted to the increased challenge 
posed by the Taliban in its province after 2006 or the varying levels of intensity. A 
second problem of the complex conflict of Afghanistan was the challenge of multi-
functionality and co-ordinating the multiple actors operating side by side in 
Afghanistan. On the face of it, the Norwegian political intent appeared well suited for 
the challenges of making strategy in this context as its independent aim of developing a 
Norwegian model of civilian and military co-operation set out to avoid confusion 
between military and civilian actors by separating them and strengthening the UN at 
the regional level. In practice, however, the model’s lack of an integrated organisation 
below departmental level created confusion between the different international and 
Norwegian actors as to who should do what, and left the crucial question of who 
should carry out development in the unsafe areas of Faryab after the Taliban 
insurgency made the situation more violent unanswered. The UK similarly struggled to 
take into account the number of political actors that are the staple of coalition and 
complex warfare. The most significant example of this occurred in 2006 as the UK had 
to change its operational design and thus its strategy as it became evident that the 
Governor of Helmand could not live with the British strategy. Compared to the two 
other states, the Dutch response to the challenges of multi-functionality was better 
adapted to the challenges of operating in a complex conflict. From the outset the 
Dutch political aims appeared to see the Dutch response as a joint military and civilian 
response, from its initial planning through its joint execution which included a gradually 
increasing number of civilian advisers, culminating with a civilian head of the PRT by 
2008.  
 
The challenge of the Netherlands was to maintain political support for the long-
term commitment that was required in the complex conflict of Afghanistan. The 
drawback of the intense political opposition in the Netherlands against the Afghanistan 
mission was that its commitments could not be guaranteed for more than two years at 
the time. A commitment that ended prematurely in 2010 with the fall of the 
Balkenende-IV government. Similarly, the political opposition created difficulties for 
the Netherlands when it came to its participation in the ISAF-coalition. In contrast to 
the UK and Norway, the Dutch governments were explicitly prevented from allowing 
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its troops to co-operate with OEF-forces after 2005, creating a difficult situation for 
Dutch troops which de facto relied on US guarantees for reinforcements within their 
province. On the other hand, the Dutch political and military limitations were clearly 
communicated and unmistakable to all other members of the coalition. More 
problematic was the Norwegian approach to coalition warfare, which publicly adhered 
to the goal of the Riga-summit of minimising national caveats, while at the same time 
using NATO’s command and control relationship to limit its commitments to RC 
North, and when asked to reinforce RC South had to decline because of internal 
dissent in the coalition government.  
 
The contrast between Norway and the Netherlands also illustrated that the desire 
to limit national caveats is a treacherous path as it attempts to disguise the fact that all 
coalition members join a coalition with its own objectives. By pressuring lesser 
coalition states to hide the political and operational limitations of their participation and 
pretend that they are in line with the lead nation on all accounts, the coalition sets itself 
up for surprises and subsequent dissent when the realities of each country’s political 
commitment is revealed. This study indicates that it is easier for a coalition to utilise its 
members’ strengths and avoid their weaknesses if their political limitations are clearly 
stated and communicated. This study also serves as a reminder that although NATO 
was a long standing permanent alliance, the fundamental aspects of state sovereignty 
and the state’s prerogative of the use of force, and thus strategy, is still crucial to 
understanding the strategic behaviour of lesser coalition partners. 
 
The three cases illustrated that the challenge of lesser coalition partners in 
adapting their political intent to complex conflicts was connected to the previous 
problem of generating enough interest at the political and strategic levels in order to 
provide continuous scrutiny and direction of the use of force. This was needed in order 
to continuously adapt and modify the political intent to suit the practical application of 
force. The necessary interest at the political and strategic levels was difficult to achieve 
in the cases of Norway and the UK, whereas in the case of the Netherlands, the 
political engagement was enabled through the intense political opposition and 
subsequent scrutiny. From this may be drawn two observations: firstly, political 
concord is paradoxically not always conducive to strategic efficiency and coherence as it 
does not promote scrutiny and analysis of the crucial step of transforming the political 
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intent into practical use of force. This is not to say that all political opposition was 
productive in this study and that all agreement was counterproductive, the question was 
whether there was sufficient political interest to analyse thoroughly the link between the 
political intent and use of force – or in other words develop strategy.  Secondly, this 
indicates a fundamental challenge with lesser coalition partners who join coalitions in 
order to realise political ends that lie outside the immediate conflict and are not of vital 
interest to the state, or join coalitions to realise independent aims. These states may be 
unable to generate the political (and military) involvement necessary to develop a 
relevant strategy to the actual conflict at hand, unless a shock is provided to the system, 
such as the 2006 Helmand deployment provided the UK. Without a shock to its 
system, a lesser coalition member may do as Norway; which developed political aims 
not adapted to the reality of the conflict in Afghanistan and did not see the need to 
develop a strategy for its use of force. 
 
 
The Organisation of the Strategic Process 
The three cases illustrated the need for strategic theory and lead nations to take 
into account the political reasoning and limitations of the lesser partners in 
contemporary coalitions. The study also indicates that the many challenges that the 
three states experienced with their political intent and the development of coherent 
strategy could be explained by studying how the states organised their process of 
strategy. Furthermore, this study indicates that some of the traditional assumptions and 
theories concerning the organisation of the strategic process were not applicable in the 
context of lesser coalition partners in complex conflicts. The three cases were chosen 
because of their similar constitution and political culture, and the three states’ choice of 
an integrated political and military strategic organisation. The integrated model has 
been perceived as instrumental to strategic effectiveness, an effect not borne out by the 
results of this study. The three organisations were all integrated but produced vastly 
different results, indicating that there is no link between an integrated organisation and 
the development of coherent strategy.  
 
In all three cases the integration of the political and military levels was not carried 
out with increased strategic effectiveness as the main incentive. The arguments for 
integration were based on economic and financial efficiency and the need to manage 
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the armed forces efficiently, and in order to achieve this: political control. The potential 
strategic effect of integrating the political and military levels of strategy was mentioned 
by the Norwegian government as it changed its organisation in 2003, but the main 
emphasis was on establishing political control with its armed forces, as was the case of 
its British role model. In the cases of the Netherlands and the UK, development of 
coherent strategy was not at the forefront of the reasoning on integration; instead the 
emphasis was on effective management of budgets and resources. Effective 
management of the defence sector is a laudable aim, but the theory behind an 
integrated MoD was that integration of the political and military levels would lead to 
strategic effectiveness.767   
 
The primary factor of an integrated strategic organisation was the integration 
between political intent and military expertise, but the way this was done varied 
significantly between the cases. In the case of Norway, the lack of detailed and practical 
direction of the use of force correlated with the unclear and weak role of military 
advice. No office or unit was charged with the task of developing strategy within the 
MoD, and the responsibility of the CHOD was that of senior military adviser while 
having no operational command of the armed forces deployed to the theatre. In 
addition, the number of staff officers available to generate military advice was cut by 
50% as the ministry and defence headquarters was integrated, so even if the role of 
military advice had been clear it was uncertain whether the Norwegian military had 
resources or the intellectual drive to provide it. The situation was far better in the two 
other cases, but even though the British organisation suffered from none of the 
shortages in intellectual capacity or resources, it still suffered from organisational 
deficiencies when it came to blending military advice with the political intent within the 
MoD. The main challenge was the lack of involvement of the senior military advisers in 
the development of the practical strategy in Afghanistan and too much faith in a 
centralised military organisation where the unclear role of the CDS made it easier to 
give responsibility for the use of force in Afghanistan to the operational level. The 
problem in both Norway and the UK was that that although the operational HQs 
could design relevant military plans they were unsuitable vehicles for the political 
integration and discussions that were needed to clarify inter-ministerial and coalition 
policy prior to the deployment of troops. The role of military advice was somewhat 
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different in the Netherlands as it appeared to influence the strategy to a larger extent 
than in the two other countries. Military advice and considerations were incorporated in 
the political decisions and briefings given by the Dutch governments and it was 
discussed in greater detail. This was firstly related to the challenging political situation 
which required the Dutch governments to argue their case for the use of force in 
parliament, but it was also related to the Dutch strategic organisation which provided a 
clear role for its CDS. The Dutch CDS was senior military adviser to the Dutch 
government and partook in the policy deliberations of the Central Staff, but equally 
important he was in operational command of the Dutch Armed Forces and responsible 
for the execution of Dutch military operations. He was thus involved in the 
development and execution of Dutch strategy to a much larger extent than his 
Norwegian and British counterparts. 
 
The second aspect of the organisation of the strategic process was the integration 
of the various actors needed to develop a multifunctional strategy. Once again three 
similarly organised organisations produced different results. The Norwegian 
organisation was based on principles designed to fully integrate policy in the case of an 
all-out war and to maintain separation between ministries in all other situations. Prior 
to 2007, the ministerial level had no institution to co-ordinate policies between the four 
main ministries involved in Afghanistan, and even after 2007 the only co-operative 
measure was an informal meeting at state secretarial level. This was very different from 
the British organisation, which had an elaborate and permanent organisation of inter-
ministerial committees and sub-committees in order to co-ordinate government policy. 
The problem with the British organisation was that it was not properly utilised when 
developing strategy in Afghanistan. In both MoDs it was unclear what its 
responsibilities were with respect to developing a strategy for Afghanistan and both 
organisations seemed to delegate this task to its joint headquarters, subsequently 
circumventing the opportunity for a direct meeting between the political intent and the 
practical military concerns concerning the use of force. In both cases this was reflected 
in the actual operations on the ground where civil-military co-operation became a 
contested topic during the implementation of the British strategy and it contributed to 
the choice of the Norwegian model where separation rather than integration was the 
chosen method. The case of the Netherlands illustrated a different approach whereby 
the integration of the various political and military actors was tied together by an 
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integrated organisation, but also by a series of procedures and formats that forced 
political involvement and co-operation between the actors within the strategic 
organisation. The Dutch organisation was similarly organised to the British, but the 
actual integration at policy and ministerial level was ensured by a series of committees 
overseen by a strong Ministry of Internal Affairs, led by the Prime Minister, with the 
task of co-ordinating overall government policy. The integration of the Dutch strategic 
process was visible in that all presentations of the Dutch Uruzgan deployment were 
jointly chaired by three ministers. Furthermore, the organisation of the strategic process 
was more powerfully overseen by the Second Chamber than in the UK and Norway, 
which led to a holistic and elaborate discussion on the premises and assumptions of the 
Dutch governments. The Dutch governments were required not only to inform the 
Second Chamber about the deployments to Afghanistan but also to present its 
decisions within the format of an established framework which explored the 
relationship between Dutch political ends, means, ways, and how this related to the 
Dutch use of force. These procedures that enabled political involvement, integration 
between the different actors and elaborate discussion in the Dutch strategic process 
were codified in public documents meant to clarify ‘….the rules of the game….’ to all 
parties involved in the process.768  
 
The findings of this study make it difficult to reconcile the claim of the 
proponents of the integrated strategic organisation that ‘….integrated civil-military 
structures at the strategic level provide better results in complex PSOs.’769 The three 
states of this study all had integrated structures, yet these organisations produced vastly 
different outcomes. This study did not use any non-integrated cases as control 
mechanisms but the significant differences in outcome between similarly integrated 
organisations in the different cases do seem to warrant the claim that there is not a 
strong correlation between strategic effectiveness or coherence, and an integrated 
structure such as the MoDs of this study. Whilst this study does not support the claim 
that an integrated MoD in itself produces strategic coherence or efficiency, the prime 
example being Norway, the study does support the link between strategic coherence 
and efficiency on the one hand and a generally integrated approach to civil-military 
relations on the other. The case of the Netherlands illustrated the benefits of an 
integrated and holistic approach to the development of government policy, strategy, as 
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well as operations. Whilst the proponents of an integrated organisation such as an 
MoD operated from the premise that an integrated structure would adopt an integrated 
or comprehensive approach to the development of strategy,  the cases of the UK prior 
to 2006 and Norway illustrates that the right structure does not guarantee a right 
approach. In the UK the lack of an integrated approach was caused by neglect and 
inter-ministerial disagreement, but in Norway the government deliberately opted 
against mechanisms to integrate policy, discouraged development of military advice, 
and developed its own segregated model for operations. This study therefore suggests 
that there has been an over-emphasis on the choice of structures rather than on how 
strategic organisations actually operate and the level of integration and co-operation in 
a state’s civil-military relations in general.    
 
The three cases indicate that focus on the organisation of the strategic process 
was crucial to ensure political involvement, co-ordinate the development of policy, 
ensure the meeting between politicians, bureaucrats and military, as well as to co-
ordinate the various actors on the ground. The traditional approach in strategic theory 
and civil-military relations has been to focus on institutions and structures as the 
‘….default mechanism….’ in order ensure proper organisation of the strategic 
process.770 This study suggests that this focus on structures and institutions was not as 
relevant to the three cases as the traditional theories claims. The theories of strategic 
organisation and civil-military relations are based on different foundations than was the 
case in this study. Most of the theory of strategic organisation and civil-military 
relations is founded on the empirical evidence from large existential conflicts which 
naturally generate political interest, and not the complex contemporary conflicts. The 
theory is also dominated by empirical evidence from large powers such as the US and 
not adapted to contemporary parliamentary democracies. Furthermore, the theories of 
existing civil-military relations appear to presuppose the presence of experienced 
statesmen, officers and bureaucrats with an extensive background in the fields of 
security or defence. Both Strachan and Cohen based their criticism of contemporary 
politicians and generals on studies of ‘statesmen and generals’, using empirical evidence 
from the days of Churchill, Clemenceau and Ben-Gurion, all of whom had a lifetime of 
war and politics to draw on before they were charged with developing strategy.771 The 
realities of the three cases of this study was that experienced statesmen and politicians 
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were far and few between when it came to directing the practical aspects of strategy. 
The average time in office for British defence ministers between 2005 and 2011 was 
little over a year. During the period of this study Britain went through four different 
ministers, all career politicians, none of whom had much experience in defence or 
security matters. This meant that although the UK went through only two Prime 
Ministers during the same time, there was a lack of continuity and experience on the 
political side of the strategic organisation. In the two other cases, the turnover was less 
noticeable, but none of the ministers of defence of the Netherlands or Norway had any 
previous experience with security policy, strategy or directing the use of force. Instead, 
the ministers in the study embodied more of the ‘dialogue of unequals’ and the 
‘unequal dialogue’ than Cohen argued. The ministers were professional politicians, 
politically experienced and well educated and often with a broad political background 
from various fields, but inexperienced in the fields of war and conflict. This high 
turnover and lack of specific expertise is nothing to lament over but must be 
understood as the reality of contemporary strategy, and thus that the theories of 
strategy and civil-military relations must reflect this reality instead of clinging to past 
ideals.  
 
This study indicates that the Netherlands was better able than the two other cases 
to adapt its organisation and structures and to generate and utilise military advice in 
relation to the realities of contemporary strategy. It appears that having a good 
organisation is no longer enough; the organisation of the process of strategy must be 
welded together by written procedures and doctrines that explain the ‘rules of the 
game’ and how a chosen country makes strategy to the novices of the strategic process. 
Procedures are essential to account for the challenges of political involvement, to adapt 
the political intent to the realities of complex conflicts, and to take into account the 
challenges of organising the process of developing strategy involving a large number of 
inexperienced and disparate actors. 
 
Strategic Outlook 
In addition to the organisation of the strategic process, the three states’ prevailing 
beliefs, assumptions, and theories concerning the use of force also helps understand 
their strategic behaviour. The three states’ understanding of force and strategy differed 
significantly. In the case of the UK, between 2003 and 2006 the British strategic 
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decision makers expressed an optimistic and positive view of the utility of force and the 
utility of its armed forces. Coming off the successes of Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the 
early deployments to Afghanistan, the British government expressed a view of force 
that relied heavily on the use of military force compared to other tools available. It was 
positive that its armed forces were up to the task of succeeding in future complex 
conflicts and that Britain was capable of using force without relying on the 
international society. The corresponding Dutch understanding of force, although not as 
optimistic and positive, expressed a similar belief in the utility of force in international 
society and that force might have to be used outside UN auspices. The Norwegian 
perspective of force was strikingly different as both governments argued strongly for 
the use of force only as a last resort and after 2005 made its use of force contingent on 
UN-support. In contrast to the UK, the Norwegian government did not see the utility 
of its armed forces, instead arguing for the utility of other tools and actors. 
Paradoxically, the British and Norwegian beliefs seem to explain their strategic 
challenges in their respective areas. The British belief in the utility of force seems to 
explain their almost cavalier approach to the conflict prior to 2006 and the challenges 
of co-ordinating the various actors in London and on the ground in Helmand. The 
Norwegian lack of belief in the use of force explains the unwillingness to link actual 
forces to the actual challenges of the Faryab province and to provide detailed directions 
for the use of force.  
 
The picture of British strategic behaviour and outlook would not be complete 
without also noticing the significant changes between 2006 and 2009. British strategic 
behaviour was on the receiving end of severe criticism, but it appears that the criticism 
did not always take into account the significant developments during the latter part of 
the period. One of the most significant developments were the changes in the British 
understanding of the term strategy and what it entailed. The three cases illustrate the 
challenges of lesser coalition states with respect to understanding and defining strategy, 
and the effect this had on their strategic behaviour. In practice, all three states suffered 
from the lack of a precise definition of strategy as their understanding did not clearly 
distinguish politics from strategy. The term strategy seemed to describe any activity 
made to achieve a goal, and any activity carried out at the strategic level, however 
mundane. This lack of precision noted by Michael Howard was clearly evident and 
helps explain the challenges that the three states faced when it came to developing 
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political aims and adapting them to the practical challenges of complex conflicts, as well 
as designing relevant organisations. The lack of precision when discussing strategy 
appeared to be related to the choice of the grand strategy perspective, which was the 
preferred perspective of all three states at the beginning of the period. Particularly the 
Norwegian and British views of strategy made, as pointed out by Strachan, politics and 
strategy virtually indistinguishable. This meant that strategy became a mere reiteration 
of political aims, and the practical implications of strategy received scant attention; the 
when, where and how of strategy was relegated to the operational level which was to 
realise policy through the much desired joint approach. The view of strategy before 
2006 thus helps explain why the governments of Norway and Britain did not involve 
itself in the practicalities of the use of force; it was their understanding of strategy. 
 
The choice of the grand strategy perspective was explained by the need to co-
ordinate the various policy fields of the governments. The problem was that in the 
cases of Norway and the UK prior to 2006, this organisation of this co-ordination was 
wanting, either by choice or neglect. The Clausewitizian perspective, which emphasises 
the links between politics and the use of force and its relationship to the nature of war, 
was less prominent than the grand strategy perspective initially. However, in the cases 
of the Netherlands and the UK the understanding of strategy gradually moved towards 
a more Clausewitzian perspective as both states sought to ameliorate the shortcomings 
of the grand strategy perspective with respect to distinguishing policy from strategy, as 
well as adapting their political intent to the volatile situation in the theatre. In the 
Dutch case, the 2005 NDD displayed a clear understanding of strategy as distinct from 
policy, but equally important the political scrutiny after 2005 forced the strategic 
organisation to explain in detail the use of Dutch force and relate it to the conditions 
on the ground. The British view of strategy shifted to a much more practical and 
reciprocal approach after 2007, where strategy was no longer seen as a reiteration of 
policy but instead ‘….the ways and means required to achieve stipulated ends, 
conditioned by the environment and prospective opponents.’772  Whilst there were no 
attempts in Norway to clarify or discuss its chosen understanding of strategy, the cases 
of Britain and the Netherlands after 2006 were clear attempts to employ the best of 
both strategic perspectives by focusing on the co-ordination of policy and various 
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actors, while simultaneously focusing on the actual use of force on the ground and how 
it related to the changing situation on the ground.  
 
Finally, the study illustrates the challenges of the lesser coalition partners with 
respect to the development of doctrines guiding the actual use of force. The study 
showed clearly that updated, relevant and conflict-specific military doctrines made 
development of relevant and coherent strategies easier. In the case of Norway, there 
were no PSO- or COIN- doctrines at all as all doctrine development during the period 
was concentrated on high-intensity concepts such as manoeuvre warfare, EBO, and 
NCW. The lack of relevant doctrines helps explain the weakness of Norwegian military 
advice and the lack of strategic and operational alternatives, but it also explains the lack 
of detailed directions to Norwegian troops from the political level and downwards. 
Although the British armed forces operated on a comprehensive doctrinal platform, 
second in scope only to the US, it also suffered from a similar over-emphasis on high-
intensity doctrines as did Norway. The British armed forces spearheaded the 
development of new warfighting concepts such as EBA and NEC. The problem with 
this emphasis on warfighting and its corresponding ethos was that the doctrines and 
ideas more relevant to complex wars were neglected, apparently based on the mistaken 
belief that British forces already had a ‘….unique insight….’ into such conflicts.773 
While countries such as the USA and the Netherlands were developing its doctrines 
between 2003 and 2006 to cope with insurgencies, the UK did not update its doctrines 
until after 2007. In contrast to the two other states, the Netherlands entered into the 
period with a comprehensive doctrinal framework and an updated set of doctrines in 
the fields of COIN and PSO. The doctrines of the Netherlands’ armed forces were 
developed specifically for the Dutch political and legal settings which made the existing 
doctrines updated and easily compatible with Dutch political intent, making the military 
advice provided in the development of Dutch strategy more relevant than in the other 
two countries. The study thus suggests that efforts spent on ensuring that relevant, 
updated and conflict specific doctrines exist for the use of force do have an effect on 
the ability to produce relevant military advice and a coherent strategy. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that there is a clear link between a state’s 
strategic outlook and its strategic behaviour, but also that a state’s strategic outlook may 
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change and adapt quickly as events unfold. The case of the UK between 2006 and 2008 
displayed how in a short period of time the UK’s strategic leadership showed an 
impressive commitment to changing its perceptions of the utility of force and strategy. 
Although the changes far from rectified the initial problems created in 2006, the British 
changes in political intent, adaptation, organisation and strategic outlook significantly 
changed the UK’s strategic behaviour towards a more coherent strategy.  
 
Final Words 
“The men that fought at Minden, they was rookies in their time….. “774 
Rudyard Kipling 
 
The premise of this study was that the use of coalitions and alliances in future 
international operations will continue unabated or even increase. This will make the 
importance of the contributions from the lesser coalition partners vital. This study 
illustrates the need for coalitions, lead nations and other coalition members to 
realistically understand each individual member’s strategic behaviour in order to make it 
contribute effectively.  
 
The study suggests that in some fields, strategic theory needs to adopt a more 
realistic and less idealistic approach to contemporary strategy. To a larger degree than 
today, strategic theory must include the coalition perspective in its discussions and view 
coalitions from a perspective of utility rather than vulnerability as is the tendency in 
much of the classic literature on strategy. Furthermore, strategic theory must not treat 
the political limitations of each coalition member as something that may be wished 
away, but rather accept and explore it so that each coalition member’s scope of 
participation may be understood and utilised. The question of idealism also arises when 
it comes to the understanding of who are the makers of modern strategy in lesser 
coalition states. The soldiers and statesmen meeting to develop strategy are not the 
experienced statesmen and officers of the existential conflicts of the 20th century that is 
so often the preferred choice of strategic theorists. Strategy and civil-military relations 
are conducted more than ever by inexperienced career politicians and technocratic 
officers who have never had a ‘whiff of cordite’. Theories on the development of 
strategy and civil-military relations must take this as their starting point and look 
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towards the development of organisations and procedures rather than lamenting about 
the current state of affairs. 
This study indicates that lesser coalition partners are able to develop coherent 
strategies when their strategic behaviour and attention is directed towards achieving the 
goals of the coalition. However, the study also reveals the challenges of lesser coalition 
states in generating political interest and involvement, adapt its political intent, strategic 
organisation and strategic outlook to the actual complex conflict at hand, when the 
coalition member’s rationale for the use of force is not directly related to the actual 
conflict. A fundamental challenge for coalition strategy and effectiveness is thus to 
identify a coalition member’s true political scope and limitations and realistically gauge 
a members’ abilities when it comes to developing strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 258 
 
Sources 
Primary Material  
 
A: Published  
(i)  Official Documents 
 
The Netherlands: 
Bot, B.R., and H.G.J. Kamp. Brief for the Second Chamber by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
and Defence on 3 November 2005 ((Kamerbrief 22 December 2005: Nederlandse bijdrage 
aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan)) Main Dossier 27 925,  189 (The Hague: The 
Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2005) 
Bot, B.R., H.G.J. Kamp, and A.M.A. Ardenne-Van der Hoeven. Brief by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Development Co-Operation on Baghlan Deployment 28 June 
2004 ((Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse zaken, van Defensie en voor 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 28 juni 2004)) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 133 (The 
Hague: The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2004) 
———. Brief for the Second Chamber 22 December 2005 on Dutch Participation in ISAF 
Operations in Southern Afghanistan ((Kamerbrief 22 December 2005: Nederlandse bijdrage 
aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan)) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 193 (The Hague: The 
Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2005) 
———. Brief for the Second Chamber on Dutch Participation in ISAF Operations in Southern 
Afghanistan (Kamerbrief 22 December 2005: Nederlandse bijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-
Afghanistan) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 193 (The Hague: The Second Chamber 
of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2005) 
———. Brief by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Development Co-Operation 20 
October ((Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse zaken, van Defensie en voor 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 20 oktober)) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 237 (The 
Hague: The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2006) 
———. Brief by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Development Co-Operation 20 
October ((Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse zaken, van Defensie en voor 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 20 oktober)) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 237 (The 
Hague: The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2006) 
Bot, B.R., Minister of Foreign Affairs, . "The Dutch Approach:  Preserving the trinity 
of politics, security and development " In The SID and NCDO Conference on 
Security and Development The Hague, 2006. 
Government of the Netherlands. Final Evaluation - Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 
- 2010 (The Hague: The Government of the Netherlands 2011) 
———. The Constitution of the Netherlands February 2013, 2012 2012]. Available from 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/. 
Netherlands Defence Staff. Netherlands Defence Doctrine (The Hague: Netherlands 
Ministry of Defence 2005) 
Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Introducing the Central Staff of the Netherlands Ministery of 
Defence [sic] BZDR6601/N/E (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Defence 
2006) 
——— Final Evaluation PRT Baghlan (Eindevaluatie PRT Baghlan 5 juli 2004 - 30 september 
2006) (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2007) 
 259 
———. Introduction Bundle (Introductiebundel 2007) (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of 
Defence 2007) 
———. The Future Policy Survey (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2010) 
———. Why to Afghanistan? The Netherlands' Ministry of Defence, 2010 [cited 12 July 
2010]. 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (MFA). The Netherlands in Afghanistan 
BZDR6601/N/E (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development 
Cooperation of the Netherlands, Department for Communication 2006) 
Netherlands Ministry of General Affairs. Organisational Structure, 2012 2012]. Available 
from 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/az/organisatie/organogram/secretaris
-generaal. 
Royal Netherlands Army. Military Doctrine Vol. ADP I, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine 
Publication. The Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 
1996 
———. Combat Operations - Fundamentals Vol. Army Doctrine Publication II - part A, 
Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication. The Hague: Doctrine Committee of 
the Royal Netherlands Army, 1998 
———. Combat Operations - Combat Operations Against a Regular Enemy Force Vol. Army 
Doctrine Publication II - part B, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication. The 
Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1998 
———. Peace Operations. Vol. Army Doctrine Publication III, Royal Netherlands Army 
Doctrine Publication. The Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands 
Army, 1999 
———. Combat Operations - Combat Operations Against an Irregular Force  Vol. Army 
Doctrine Publication II - part C, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication. The 
Hague: Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 2003 
Teeuw, Peter. The Dutch Approach in Uruzgan ((Den nederlandske tilnærmingen i Uruzgan)) 2 - 
07 (Oslo: Dutch Army 2007) 
The Netherlands Institute of Military History Enduring Freedom (The Hague: 2009) 
The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands. Permanent Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence: The Deployment of Dutch Apache Helicopters to Afghanistan 
(De vaste commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Defensie) Dossier 27925 no 117 
(The Hague: The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2004) 
———. Motion from the Representative van Baalen Dossier no 25-1636 (The Hague: The 
Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands 2005) 
The Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Netherlands (Tweede Kamer). 
"Parliamentary Proceedings on Budget of Ministry of Foreign Affairs." The 
Hague, 23 November 2005. 
Verhagen, M.J.M., E. van Middelkoop, and A.G. Koenders. Brief by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Co-Operation 30 November 2007  ((Brief van 
de ministers van Buitenlandse zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 30 
November)) Main Dossier 27 925,  no. 279 (The Hague: The Second Chamber of 
the Parliament of the Netherlands 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 260 
 
The United Kingdom: 
Blair, Tony. Coalition against International Terrorism, House of Commons Debate 4 October, 
2001 (London: House of Commons 2001) 
Brown, Gordon. Gordon Brown in House of Commons Debate, December 12, 2007 (London: 
House of Commons 2007) 
———. HC Debate 12 December 2007 (London: 2007) 
———. "Transcript of Speech and Q and A Given by Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
in London on Friday, September 4 2009." In Prime Minister's Speech, edited by 
IISS. London: IISS, 2009. 
CGS. Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine (London: CGS 1996) 
———. Army Field Manual - Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational 
Guidelines) (London: CGS 2001) 
———. British Army Field Manual - Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency (London: CGS 
2009) 
DCDC. British Defence Doctrine JDP 0-01 (Shrivenham: CDS 2008) 
Defence-Select-Committee. Annual Report for 2002 - Second Report of the session 2002-2003 
HC 318 (London: The Stationary Office 2003) 
———. The UK deployment to Afghanistan: Fifth Report of Session 2005-06 HC 558 
(London: The Stationary Office 2006) 
———. UK Operations in Afghanistan: The Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-2007 HC 408 
(London: The Stationary Office 2007) 
———. Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2 August 2009. 
———.Operations in Afghanistan - Written Evidence Published as HC 554 (London: The 
Stationary Office 2010)  
———. Operations in Afghanistan - Oral Evidence HC 554ii, Published as HC 554ii 
(London: The Stationary Office 2010) 
———.Operations in Afghanistan: Fourth Report of Session 2010-2012, Volume I, 2011. 
(London: The Stationary Office 2010 
———.Operations in Afghanistan: Fourth Report of Session 2010-2012, Volume II, 2011. 
(London: The Stationary Office 2010 
DFID Evaluation of DFID's Country Programmes: Afghanistan 2002-2007 (London: 2009) 
——— Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations - Briefing Paper C: Links 
between Politics, Security and Development (London: 2010) 
Foreign-Affairs-Select-Committee. Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan HC 302 
(London: The Stationary Office 2009) 
HMGovernment. The National Security Strategy: Security in an Interdependent World CM 7291 
(London: The Stationary Office 2008) 
———. UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward (London: The Stationary 
Office 2009)  
JDCC. British Defence Doctrine (Shrivenham: CDS 2001) 
———. Joint Operations JDP 01 (Shrivenham: JDCC 2004) 
———. The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations JWP 3-50 (Shrivenham: 
JDCC 2004) 
———. The Comprehensive Approach JDN 4/05 (Shrivenham: JDCC 2006) 
Ministry of Defence. Army Field Manual - Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic 
and Operational Guidelines) (London: CGS 2001) 
———. Delivering Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper (London: 2003) 
———. Organisation MoD, 2008 [cited December 13 2008]. 
Reid, John. Statement on Afghanistan, House of Commons Debate 26 January 2006 (London: 
House of Commons 2006) 
 261 
.Stockwell, A.J., ed. Malaya - Part II The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953. Edited by S.R. 
Ashton. Vol. Series B Volume 3, British Documents on the End of Empire. London: 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, 1995 
 
Norway: 
Antila, Solveig The Implementation of 'Integrated Strategic Leadership' (ISL) Stortingsproposisjon 
nr. 55, 2001-2002: Gjennomføringsproposisjonen - utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av 
Forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005 Norwegian Centre for Project Management (Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2007) 
Lilland, General Jon Berge. Norwegian Comprehensive Efforts in Afghanistan (Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2010) 
Norwegian-Cabinet. Norwegian Coalition Government Political Platform 2005-2009 (Soria 
Moria Erklæringen) (Oslo: 2005) 
Norwegian Government. Revised Instructions for The Chief of Defence (Revidert instruks for 
forsvarssjefen (sic)) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2003) 
———. A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian  Efforts in Faryab Province in Afghanistan, 
March 2009  (Strategi for helhetlig norsk innsats i Faryab-provinsen i Afghanistan, mars 
2009) (Oslo: Norwegian Government 2009) 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold. Minister of Defence's Statement to 
Parliament , 2 June 2005 (Forsvarsministerens redegjørelse for Stortinget) (Oslo: 
Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) 2005) 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, Strøm Erichsen, Anne Grete. Statement to Parliament: 
Military Contribution to Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Redegjørelse for Stortinget: 
militære bidrag til operasjoner i Afghanistan og Irak) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence (Forsvarsdepartementet) 2005) 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petersen, Jan. Minister of Foreign Affairs' Statement 
to Parliament 15 December 2003 (Utenriksministerens redegjørelse for Stortinget) (Oslo: 
Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) 2003) 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Status of Norwegian Contribution to ISAF and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Status norske bidrag til ISAF og "Enduring freedom) (Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2003) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 45: 00/01 (Stortingsproposisjon nr. 45, 2000-
2001 ) 'The Reorganisation of the Armed Forces in the period 2002-2005' (Oslo: 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence (Forsvarsdepartementet) 2001) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 55, 2001/2002: Implementation Proposition - 
Additional Framework for the Reorganisation of the Armed Forces 2002-2005 
(Stortingsproposisjon nr. 55, 2001-2002: Gjennomføringsproposisjonen - utfyllende rammer 
for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence (Forsvarsdepartementet) 2002) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper 42, 03/04 (Stortingsproposisjon nr 42, 2003-2004) 
(Oslo: 2004) 
———. Strength and Relevance (Styrke og Relevans) (Oslo: Norwegian Department of 
Defence 2004) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 48, 07/08 (Stortingsproposisjon nr 48 2007-
2008) White Paper 48:07/08 (Oslo: 2008) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 1, 2005-2006 (Stortingsprp 1, 2005-2006, ) 
(Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2006) 
 ———. Stortingsproposisjon nr 48 2007-2008 (Norwegian Government White Paper) (Oslo: 
2008) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 1, 2008-2009 (Budget proposal) (Stortingsprp 1, 
2008-2009, ) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2008) 
 262 
———. Norwegian Strategic Concept (Evne til innsats) (Oslo: Norwegian Department of 
Defence 2009) 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, (FD), Norwegian MFA (UD), Norwegian MJ (JD). A 
Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, 
Afghanistan (Oslo: FD/UD/JD 2009) 
Norwegian MoD (FD), Norwegian MFA (UD), Norwegian MJ (JD). A Strategy for 
Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan 
(Oslo: FD/UD/JD 2009) 
Norwegian Ministry of Justice. A Vulnerable Society: Challenges for Security and Readiness 
Efforts in Society (Norsk Offentlig Utredning, NOU 2000:24, Et sårbart samfunn - 
Utfordringer for sikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet) NOU 2000:24 (Oslo: 
Norwegian State Information Service 2000) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 17: 01/02, Societal Security: The Road to a Less 
Vulnerable Society (Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17, 2001-2002 , Samfunnssikkerhet: Veien til 
et mindre sårbart samfunn) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Justice 2002) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 39: 03/04, Societal Security and Civil-Military 
Co-operation (Stortingsproposisjon nr. 39, 2003-2004 , Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-
militært samarbeid) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Justice 2004) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 22 07/08: Societal Security: Co-ordination 
(Stortingsproposisjon nr. 22 2007-2008, Samfunnssikkerhet: Samvirke og samordning) 
(Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Justice 2008) 
———. Norwegian Government White Paper no 29: 11/12, Societal Security (Stortingsproposisjon 
nr. 29 2011-2012, Samfunnssikkerhet) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Justice 2012) 
———. Strength and Relevance (Styrke og Relevans) (Styrke og Relevans) (Oslo: Norwegian 
Department of Defence (Forsvarsdepartementet) 2004) 
Norwegian Prime Minister's Office. Met with the President of Afghanistan (Møtte 
Afghanistans president) (Oslo: Norwegian Government 2008) 
Norwegian Secretary of State for Defence, "Norwegian Soldiers' Participation in 
Arrests in Afghanistan ", ed. Ministry of Defence (Oslo: Norwegian 
Government 2006)(Letter to Amnesty Norway) 
Norwegian Staff College, (FSTS). Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 2000 
(Oslo: Chief of Defence 2000) 
———. Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 2007 (Oslo: Chief of Defence 
2007) 
———. Norwegian Defence Joint Operations Doctrine (Oslo: FST (Norwegian Defence 
Staff) 2007) 
Petersen, Jan. Minister of Foreign Affairs' Statement to Parliament 15 December 2003 
(Utenriksministerens redegjørelse for Stortinget) (Oslo: Norwegian Parliament 
(Stortinget) 2003) 
Stoltenberg, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Accession Declaration of the Stoltenberg II 
Government 19 October 2005 (Tiltredelseserklæring fra regjeringen Stoltenberg II) (Oslo: 
Prime Minister's Office 2005) 
Strøm Erichsen, Anne Grete. Statement to Parliament: Military Contribution to Operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Redegjørelse for Stortinget: militære bidrag til operasjoner i 
Afghanistan og Irak) (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2005) 
 (MoD), FD. Stortingsproposisjon nr. 45, 2000-2001 (Norwegian White Paper) 'The 
Reorganisation of the Armed Forces in the period 2002-2005' (Oslo: 
Forsvarsdepartementet (Ministry of Defence) 2001) 
———. Stortingsproposisjon nr 48 2007-2008 (Norwegian Government White Paper) (Oslo: 
2008) 
 
 263 
 
 
 
 
 
Other:  
Abdullah, A. Letter to United Nations Security Council of 13 October 2003 S/2003/986 (New 
York: UNSC 2003) 
Barth Eide, E, AT Kaspersen, R Kent, and K von Hippel Report on Integrated Missions: 
Practical Perspectives and Recommendations 2005) 
Byman, D Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on 
Terrorism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2005) 
COMISAF. Commander's Initial Assessment ISAF HQ/US Forces Afghanistan 2009) 
Dorman, Andrew M Transforming to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom 
Experience (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College 2008) 
Echevarria, AJ. Toward an American Way of War Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2004) 
Eikenberry, Karl. "IISS Military Leader's Forum - Summary." IISS, London, 10 April 
2006. 
Fortin, Dany. "Sharing the Burden: How Effective is a Multinational Force in the 
Contemporary Operational Environment." US Army War College, 2007. 
Hartz, Halvor A. Co-operation or Confusion - Norwegian Police and Military Together in Police 
Training in Afghanistan Samarbeid eller samrøre - Norsk politi og militære sammen om 
politiopplæring i Afghanistan (Oslo: NUPI 2009) 
ISAF. ISAF troops in numbers 28 July International Security Assistance Force 2007) 
———. ISAF troops in numbers 28 July International Security Assistance Force 2008) 
IISS The Military Balance 2008 (London: 2008) 
Kjølberg, Anders, and Tore Nyhamar Small States in International Operations (Kjeller: 
Norwegian Defence Research Institute 2011) 
Lantis, Jeffrey S. Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism Advanced Systems and 
Concepts Office (Washington: Department of Defense 2006) 
London Conference on Afghanistan The Afghanistan Compact (London: London 
Conference on Afghanistan 2006) 
NATO. Riga Summit Declaration (Brussels: NATO 2006) 
Parry, William H. Multinational Operations and the National Security Strategy: The Modern 
Melian Dialogue (Carlisle, PA: 2000) 
Petraeus, General David. "Afghan Q and A." in Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): 97-98 
UNSC. Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 21 to 28 November 2008 
S/2008/782 (New York: United Nations Security Council 2008) 
———. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1833 (New York: 2008) 
United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: 
United Nations Secretariat 2008)  
USAF. Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1 17 November 2003 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center 2003) 
USDOD. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense 
2006) 
———. National Defense Strategy (Washington: Department of Defense 2008) 
USJCS. Joint Publication 01 - Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: 
Incorporating Change 1 (Washington: DOD 2007) 
 
 
 
 264 
 
 
 
 
(ii)  Speeches 
Barth Eide, Secretary of State MoD, Espen. Why is Norway in Afghanistan? How can we 
best complete our mission? (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee 2007) 
Dannatt, General Sir Richard. "The Challenge for Defence in the Next Decade " In 
Chief of General Staff's Speech, edited by IISS: IISS, 2009. 
———. "Soldier First - Developing the Force." In RUSI Land Warfare Conference. 
London 23 June, 2009. 
Devold, Kristin Krohn. Minister of Defence's Statement to Parliament , 2 June 2005 
(Forsvarsministerens redegjørelse for Stortinget) (Oslo: Norwegian Parliament 2005) 
Diesen, Sverre, CHOD Norwegian Armed Forces. "Status and Challenges in the 
Armed Forces (Status og utfordringer i Forsvaret)." In The Chief of Defence Annual 
Speech. Oslo Military Society, 2007. 
Hutton, Rt Hon John. "Speech to the IISS 11 November 2008." In Remembrance Day 
Conference at IISS, edited by IISS. London: IISS, 2008. 
Mattis, General Jim. "Alliance Perspectives on Current Operations." In RUSI Land 
Warfare Conference. London 23 June, 2009. 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, Strøm Erichsen, Anne-Grete. Our Engagement in 
Afghanistan (Vårt engasjement in Afghanistan) (Oslo: Oslo Military Society 2008) 
PBS. Tony Blair's Speech 7 October 2001 Public Broadcasting Service, 2001. Available from 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/combating/diplomacy/blair_10-
7.html 
Reid, John. "The Challenges of Modern War." King's College London: KCL, 2006. 
Richards, General Sir David "Preparing for Future Challenges." In RUSI Land Warfare 
Conference. London 24 June, 2009. 
Stoltenberg, Norwegian Prime MinisterJens. The Prime Minister's Speech at the NATO 
Summit (Statsministerens tale på NATO-toppmøtet) (Oslo: SMK 2008) 
Strachan, Hew. "One War, but Joint Warfare." In RUSI Land Warfare Conference. 
London 24 June, 2009. 
Straw, Jack. "The Challenges ahead for Afghanistan." In Foreign Secretary's Speech, edited 
by IISS. London: IISS, 2004. 
Strøm Erichsen Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete. "Vårt engasjement in Afghanistan (Our 
engagement in Afghanistan)." In Afghanistan Conference Oslo Military Society Oslo: 
Oslo Military Society 2008. 
Wall, General Sir Peter. "Alliance Perspectives on Current Operations." In RUSI Land 
Warfare Conference. London 23 June, 2009. 
 
 
 
B: Unpublished documents 
UK Army, Unpublished post operational interviews. 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 265 
Secondary Material 
 
(i)  Books: 
Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. London: Touchstone, 1985 
Bailey, Jonathan, Richard Iron, and Hew Strachan, eds. British Generals in Blair's Wars. 
Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013. 
Bond, Brian. Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought. London: Cassell, 1977 
Borgersrud, Lars. Konspirasjon og kapitulasjon : nytt lys på forsvarshistorien fra 1814 til 1940. 1. 
oppl. ed. Oslo: Forlaget Oktober, 2000 
Broadbent, Ewen. The Military and Government: From Macmillan to Heseltine, RUSI Defence 
Studies. London: Macmillan, 1988 
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson. Who guards the guardians and how : democratic 
civil-military relations. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006 
Bryman, Alan. Social Research Methods. 3rd edition ed: Oxford University Press, 2008 
Børresen, J, G Gjeseth, and R Tamnes. Norwegian Defence History: Alliance Defence in 
Change.(Norsk forsvarshistorie: allianseforsvar i endring, bind 5 ). 5 vols. Vol. V, 
Norsk forsvarshistorie bind 1-5. Bergen, Norway: Eide forlag, 2004 
Cicero. On Duties - De Officiis XXITranslated by Walter Miller. Edited by Jeffrey 
Henderson. 2001 ed, The Loeb Classical Library. London: Harvard University 
Press, 2001 
Clark, Wesley K. Waging modern war : Bosnia, Kosovo, and the future of combat. New ed. 
Oxford: PublicAffairs, 2002 
Clausewitz, Carl von, and Werner Hahlweg. Vom Kriege : Hinterlassenes Werk des General 
Carl von Clausewitz. Edited by Werner Hahlweg. 16 Aufl / Vollständige Ausg. im 
Urtext mit historisch-kritischer Würdigung von Werner Hahlweg ed. Berlin: F. 
Dümmler, 1952 
———. Vom Kriege : hinterlassenes Werk. 19 Aufl / Vollständige Ausg. im Urtext mit 
historisch-kritischer Würdigung von Werner Hahlweg ed. Bonn: Ferdinand Dümmlers 
1991 
Cohen, Eliot A. "Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II." In Grand Strategies 
in War and Peace, edited by Paul Kennedy. London: Yale University Press, 1991. 
———. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York; 
London: Free Press, 2002 
Cooper, Robert. The Breaking of Nations - Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century. 
London: Atlantic Books, 2004 
Corbett, Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London, 1911 
Desch, Michael C. Civilian control of the military : the changing security environment. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999 
———. Power and military effectiveness : the fallacy of democratic triumphalism. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008 
Diesen, Sverre. Military Strategy: An Introduction to the Logic of Power.(Militær strategi: En 
innføring i maktens logikk). Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 1998 
Dorronsoro, Gilles. The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan. Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment, 2009 
Feaver, P, and RH Kohn. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 2001 
Fergusson, James. A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan. 
London: Bantam, 2008 
Finer, S. E. The Man on Horseback : The Role of the Military in Politics, Books that matter. New 
York: Praeger, 1962 
 266 
Freedman, Lawrence, Paul Hayes, and Robert O'Neill. War, Strategy, and International 
Politics - Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992 
Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought : From the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 
Giustozzi, Antonio. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in 
Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, 2007 
Gray, CS. Strategic Studies: a Critical Assessment. London: Aldwych, 1982 
———. Modern Strategy. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 
———. Strategy for chaos: revolutions in military affairs and the evidence of history. London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002  
———. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005 
———. Strategy and history : essays on theory and practice, Cass series: strategy and history. 
London: Routledge, 2006 
———. The Strategy Bridge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 
Gjeseth, Gullow. The Army in Transformation:1990-2005 (Hæren i omveltning: 1990-
2005). [Bergen]: Vigmostad & Bjørke, 2008 
Greenfield, Kent Roberts. American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration. Second 
print ed. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 1982 
Hazelbag, Lenny. "Political decision-making of the mission in Uruzgan, a 
reconstruction." in NL - Arms:  Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 
(2009): 251-276. 
Heuser, Beatrice. Reading Clausewitz. London: Pimlico Random House, 2002 
Hoffman, Frank G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, VA: 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007  
Hofstede, Geert H. Cultures and Organizations : software of the mind ; intercultural cooperation 
and its importance for survival. Pbk. ed. London: HarperCollins, 1994 
Howard, Michael Eliot. Soldiers and Governments : Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations. 
London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957  
———. The Causes of Wars and Other Essays. London: Unwin, 1984 
———. The Lessons of History: Yale University Press, 1991 
———. Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction: Oxford Paperbacks, 2002 
Huntington, S. P. The Soldier and the state. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2002. 
Reprint, 19th print 
Høiback, Harald, and Palle Ydstebø, eds. Krigens vitenskap- en innføring i militærteori. Oslo: 
Abstrakt Forlag, 2012. 
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait. Second ed. New 
York: Free Press, 1971 
Jomini, Baron de. The Art of War Translated by G.H: Mendell and W.P. Craighill. 
Edited by Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvaas. Reprint of 1862 edition ed, The 
West Point Military Library. Westport CT: Greenwood Press Publishers 
Kennedy, P. M. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1991  
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla - Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. 
London: Hurst & Company, 2009 
Liddell Hart, BH, Paris or The Future of War, To-Day and To-Morrow. London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co, 1925 
———. The Ghost of Napoleon. London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1933 
———. The Strategy of Indirect Approach. London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1941 
———. The British Way in Warfare - Adaptability and Mobility. 1942 ed. Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1942 
———. Vestens Forsvar (Defence of the West). Norwegian ed. Oslo: Dreyer, 1950 
 267 
———. Strategy: the indirect approach. Third revised and enlarged ed. London: Faber and 
Faber, 1954 
Luttwak, E.N. Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace: Harvard University Press, 2001 
Mackinlay, John. Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Vol. Whitehall 
Paper no 64, Whitehall Papers. London: The Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence and Security Studies, 2005 
Mao Tse-tung. On Protracted War, 1938 
Marshall, Thomas J., Phillip Kaiser, and Jon Kessmeier Problems and Solutions in Future 
Coalition Operations (Carlisle, PA: 1997) 
Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe." In Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by 
Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press, 1986. 
Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars - The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict." In Strategic studies : a reader, edited by T. G. Mahnken and J. A.  
Maiolo. London: Routledge, 2008. 
McMaster, HR. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam: Harpercollins, 1997 
Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein. The Making of Strategy - 
Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996 
Murray, Williamson, and Richard Hart Sinnreich. The Past as Prologue : The Importance of 
History to the Military Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 
Olsen, John Andreas (ed). On New Wars. Edited by Anna Therese Klingstedt, Oslo Files 
on Defence and Security. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 2007 
Paret, P. Understanding war: essays on Clausewitz and the history of military power: Princeton 
University Press, 1992 
———. Clausewitz and the State: The Man, his Theories, and his Times. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007 
Paret, P, GA Craig, and F Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
age: Princeton University Press, 1986 
Richards, General Sir David. "European Armies: The Challenge." in Adelphi Papers 48, 
no. 400 (2008): 53-62. 
Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force - The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Allen 
Lane, 2007 
Stockwell, A.J., ed. Malaya - Part II The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953. Edited by S.R. 
Ashton. Vol. Series B Volume 3, British Documents on the End of Empire. London: 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, 1995. 
Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London: Routledge, 1991 
———.The Politics of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 
———. The British Army, Manpower and Society Into the Twenty-First Century: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2000 
———. Clausewitz's On War: A Biography. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007 
———. "War and Strategy." In On New Wars, edited by John Andreas Olsen, 13-27. 
Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007. 
Strachan, Hew, and Andreas  Herberg-Rothe. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian WarTranslated by Rex Warner. 2nd revision ed. 
London: Penguin, 1972  
Tootal, Colonel Stuart. Danger Close. London: Hachette UK, 2009. 
Tsebelis, G. Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics: Univ of California Press, 
1990 
Ulriksen, Staale. Den Norske Forsvarstradisjonen - Militærmakt eller Folkeforsvar. Oslo: Pax 
Forlag, 2002 
 268 
Walzer, Michael. Obligations: Essays on disobedience, war and citizenship: Harvard University 
Press, 1970  
Warden, John A. The air campaign: Planning for combat: iUniverse, 1998 
Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades. "The Roots of Dutch Counterinsurgency - Balancing and 
Integrating Military and Civilian Efforts from Aceh to Uruzgan." In The U.S. 
Army and Irregular Warfare 1775-2007: Selected Papers From the 2007 Conference of 
Army Historians. Washington: Conference of Army Historians, 2008. 
Yin, Robert K. Case study research: design and methods. Fourth ed. Vol. 5, Applied Social 
Research Methods Series. Los Angeles: Sage, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii)  Articles and periodicals: 
 
Andres, Richard B., Craig Wills, and Thomas E.. Griffith jr. "Winning with Allies: The 
Strategic Value of the Afghan Model." in International Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 
124-160.  
Bacevich, A. J. "Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction?" in Joint forces quarterly 6 (1994): 76-
79. 
———. "Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver." in Armed Forces 
& Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 447. 
———. "The paradox of professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the challenge to 
civilian control, 1953-1955." in Journal of Military History 61 (1997): 303-334. 
Behrens, CBA. "Which Side was Clausewitz On?" in The New York Review of Books 14 
(1976). 
Betts, RK. "Is Strategy an Illusion?" in International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 5-50 
Betz, DJ. "No Place for a Civilian?: Russian Defense Management from Yeltsin to 
Putin." in Armed Forces & Society 28, no. 3 (2002): 481 
———. "Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People." in Contemporary 
Security Policy 28, no. 2 (2007): 221-243. 
Betz, D., and A. Cormack. "Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy." in ORBIS 53, no. 2 
(2009): 319-336. 
Biscop, Sven. "Afghanistan: Where is the Strategic Debate?" (Afghanistan: waar is het 
strategisch debat?) in Internationale Spectator 62, no. 11, November (2008): 573. 
Bland, D. L. "A Unified Theory Of Civil-Military Relations." in Armed Forces & Society 
26, no. 1 (1999): 7 
Burk, J. "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations." in Armed Forces & Society 29, 
no. 1 (2002): 7. 
Byman, DL. "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism." in 
International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 79-115. 
Cebrowski, AK, and JJ Garstka. "Network-centric warfare: Its origin and future." in 
USNO Proceedings 124, no. January 1998 (1998): 28-35. 
Chin, Warren. "Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in 
Helmand Province, Afghanistan." in Defence Studies 10, no. 1-2 (2010): 215-247. 
Clark, Wesley. "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead." in Parameters 1999, 
no. Winter (1999): 2-14. 
Colletta, Damon. "Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s 
Testimony before the Iraq War " in Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 1 (2007): 109-
121. 
 269 
Desch, Michael. "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies." in 
International Security 24, no. Summer (1999): 172-180. 
Dimitriu, George , and Beatrice de Graaf. "The Dutch COIN approach: three years in 
Uruzgan, 2006-2009." in Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 3 (2010): 429-458. 
Dobbie, C. "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping." in Survival 36, no. 3 (1994): 
121-148. 
Duffield, John S. "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies." 
in International Security 24, no. Summer (1999): 156-161. 
Echevarria, AJ. "Clausewitz: Toward a theory of applied strategy." in Defense & Security 
Analysis 11, no. 3 (1995): 229-240. 
———. "On the Clausewitz of the Cold War: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in 
On War." in Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 1 (2007): 90. 
———. "Is Strategy Really A Lost Art?" in Strategic Studies Institute, no. September 13 
(2013). 
Egnell, Robert. "Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British 
Counterinsurgency?" in International Affairs 87, no. 2 (2011): 297-315 
Evans, Michael. "From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War." 
in Naval War College Review LVII, no. No. 3 (2003): 132-150. 
Farrell, Theo. "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies." in 
International Security 24, no. Summer (1999): 161-168. 
———. "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program." in 
International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 49-72. 
Farrell, T., and S. Gordon. "COIN machine." in The RUSI Journal 154, no. 3 (2009): 18-
25. 
Feaver, Peter D. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the 
Question of Civilian Control." in Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-
178. 
———. "Anatomy of the Surge." in Commentary-New York-American Jewish Committes- 
125, no. 4 (2008): 24 
———. "Civil-Military Relations and the Surge." In IUS, 2009 
———. "The Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision." 
in International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 87-125. 
Freedman, Lawrence. "Calling the Shots: Should Politicians or Generals Run Our 
Wars?" in Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 188-194. 
———. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Vol. no 379, Adelphi Papers. London: IISS, 
2006 
Freedman, Lawrence, Paul Hayes, and Robert O'Neill. War, Strategy, and International 
Politics - Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992 
Gabriëlse, Robbert. "A 3D Approach to Security and Development." in The Quarterly 
Journal, no. Summer (2007): 67-73. 
Gates, Robert. "Afghan Q and A." in Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): 81-82. 
Gooren, Robert H.E. "Soldiers in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach." in Military 
Review 86 no. 2 March- April (2006): 54-60. 
Gray, Colin, S. "Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture." in 
Comparative Strategy 26, no. 1 (2007): 1-20.  
———. "Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners." in Survival 52 June-July, no. 3 
(2010): 159-178. 
Græger, Nina, and Halvard Leira. "Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: 
From a Local to a Global Perspective." in Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the 
Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 1 (2005): 45-66. 
 270 
de Haas, Marcel. "Dutch Defence Doctrine." in The Officer Magazine 18, no. 1 (2006): 
24-27.  
Heier, Tormod. "Too Much Self Censorship (For mye selvsensur)." in Norges Forsvar 09, 
no. 7 (2009).  
Hoffman, F.G. "Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military 
Relations." in ORBIS 52, no. 2 (2008): 217-235. 
Honig, JW. "Interpreting Clausewitz." in Security Studies 3, no. 3 (1994): 571-580. 
Howard, M. "Are We At War?" in Survival 50, no. 4 (2008): 247-256.  
———. "A Long War?" in Survival 48, no. 4 (2006). 
Hughes, G. "A ‘Model Campaign’Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in 
Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975." in Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009): 271-
305. 
Janowitz, Morris, Forces Inter-University Seminar on Armed, and Society. Civil-military 
relations : regional perspectives. Beverly Hills ; London: Published in cooperation 
with the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society [by] Sage, 1981 
Jervell, Sverre. "Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy in a New Age. Norway and the 
Atlantic Division after the Cold War." (Norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk i en ny 
tid. Norge og det atlantiske oppbruddet etter den kalde krigen.) in The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee Internet Texts, no. 15 (2003). 
Johnson, Thomas H. "The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night 
Letters)." in Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (2007): 317-344. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." in International Security 19, 
no. 4 (1995): 32-64. 
Jones, Seth. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency." in International Security 32, no. 4 
(2008): 7-40. 
Kilcullen, DJ. "Countering global insurgency." in Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 
(2005): 597-617. 
King, Anthony. "Understanding the Helmand campaign: British military operations in 
Afghanistan." in International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010): 311-332. 
Knutsen, Bjørn Olav. "Red and Green Policy: Continuity or Change? (Rødgrønn politikk: 
Kontinuitet eller endring)." ([Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy in a New Age. Norway 
and the Atlantic Division after the Cold War]) in Minerva 24 April (2007). 
Korski, Daniel. "British Civil-Military Integration - The History and Next Steps " in The 
RUSI Journal 154, no. 6 (2009): 14-24. 
Lieven, A. "Afghanistan: An unsuitable candidate for state building." in Conflict, Security 
& Development 7, no. 3 (2007): 483-489. 
Lindley-French, Julian. "The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views." in Survival 51, 
no. 1 (2009): 83-96. 
Mackinlay, John, and Randoplh Kent. "A new approach to complex emergencies." in 
International Peacekeeping 4, no. 4 (1997): 31-49. 
Marshall, Alex. "Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern 
Counterinsurgency." in Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (2010): 233-258. 
Mattis, JN, and F Hoffman. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." in Proceedings - 
United States Naval Institute 131, no. 11- November (2005): 2. 
McCartney, H. "The military covenant and the civil-military contract in Britain." in 
International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010): 411-428. 
McMaster, HR. "On War: Lessons to be Learned." in Survival 50, no. 1 (2008): 19-30. 
Mileham, Patrick. "Amateurs, Conscripts, Citizens, Professionals: How Do Armed 
Forces Measure Up? ." in Defense & Security Analysis 21, no. no 2 (2005): pp. 
213-216. 
 271 
Milton, Major General A.A. "British Defence Doctrine and the British Approach to 
Military Operations." in The RUSI Journal 146, no. 6 (2001): 41-44. 
Neumann, Iver B., and Henrikki Heikka. "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: 
The Social Roots of Nordic Defence." in Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the 
Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 1 (2005): 5-19. 
Porch, Douglas. "Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940." in International 
Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 157-180. 
Price, Richard. "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies." in 
International Security 24, no. Summer (1999): 169-172. 
Pritchard, James, and MLR Smith. "Thompson in Helmand: Comparing Theory to 
Practice in British Counter-insurgency Operations in Afghanistan." in Civil Wars 
12, no. 1-2 (2010): 65-90. 
Ricks, T. E. "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society." in Atlantic-Boston- 
280 (1997): 66-78. 
Rietjens, S.J.H. "Managing Civil-Military Cooperation Experiences from the Dutch 
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan." in Armed Forces & Society 34, 
no. 2 (2008): 173-207. 
Riscassi, Robert W. "Principles for Coalition Warfare." in Joint Forces Quarterly 1993, no. 
Summer (1993): 58-71. 
Roberts, Adam. "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan." in Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): 29-
60. 
Scales jr., Robert H. "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions " in Parameters 1998, 
no. Winter (1998): 4-10. 
Schissler, Mark Coalition Warfare - More Power or More Problems? (Newport, RI: 1993) 
Silkett, Wayne A. "Alliance and Coalition Warfare." in Parameters 1993, no. Summer 
(1993): 74-85. 
Simpson, Keith. "Frock coats, mandarins and brass hats: The relationship between 
politicians, civil servants and the military." in The RUSI Journal 137, no. 1 (1992): 
57 - 63. 
Strachan, Hew. "The Civil-military gap in Britain." in Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 2 
(2003): 43-63. 
———. "The lost meaning of strategy." in Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 33-54. 
———. "Making Strategy: Civil–Military Relations after Iraq." in Survival 48, no. 3 
(2006): 59-82. 
———. "War and Strategy." In On New Wars, edited by John Andreas Olsen, 13-27. 
Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007. 
———. "Strategy and the Limitation of War." in Survival 50, no. 1 (2008): 31 - 54. 
———. "The Strategic Gap in British Defence Policy." in Survival 51, no. 4 (2009): 49-
70. 
Soeters, Joseph L. "Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country 
Study." in Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 1 (1997): 7-32. 
Suhrke, Astrid. "A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in 
Afghanistan." in International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2 (2008): 214-236. 
Tharoor, Shashi. "Should UN peacekeeping go 'back to basics'?" in Survival 37, no. 4 
(1995): 52-64. 
Vego, M. "The NCW Illusion: The Human Element Not Technology is the Key to 
Victory." in Armed Forces Journal 144, no. 6 (2007): 17. 
Warden III, John A. "The enemy as a system." in Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (1995): 40-55. 
Wong, L., and D. Lovelace. "Knowing When to Salute." in ORBIS 52, no. 2 (2008): 
278-288. 
 272 
Yaeger, Jeffrey W. "Coalition Warfare: Surrendering Sovereignty." in Military Review, no. 
November (1992): 51-63. 
Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades. "Hearts and Minds or Search and Destroy? The Teachings of 
Classic Counter-Insurgency." ('Hearts and minds' of 'search and destroy'? Leren van 
klassieke counter-insurgency) in Militaire Spectator 176, no. 7 and 8 (2007). 
———. "To COIN or not to COIN." in Militaire Spectator 177, no. 3 (2008): 120-122. 
Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades, and Arthur ten Cate. "A gentle occupation: unravelling the 
Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003-2005." in Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 1, 
March 2012 (2012): 117-143. 
 
 
 
(iii) Reports 
Advisory Council on International Affairs Crisis Management Operations in Fragile States - 
The Need for a Coherent Approach (The Hague: 2009) 
Angus Reid Global Monitor. Dutch Still Divided on Afghanistan Mission Angus Reid 
Global Monitor, 23 April, 2008. Available from http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/30510/dutch_still_divided_on_afghanistan_mission/ 
Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme. "De Nederlandse militaire missie in 
Uruzgan: voorwarden voor verlengen of niet verlengen." in CSCP Policy Brief, 
no. 1 (2007). 
Coker, Christopher. "The Future of War: What are the New Complexities?" In On New 
Wars, edited by John Andreas Olsen, 83-103. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies, 2007. 
de Coning, Cedric, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia, and Ståle Ulriksen Norway's 
Whole- of- Government Approach and its Engagement in Afghanistan (Oslo: 2009) 
Egnell, Robert Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations (Stockholm: 
Swedish Defence Research Institute, 2008) 
Frantzen, Henning- A. "Proper war" and "war in reality": the changing concept of war, IFS Info. 
Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2002 
Glenn, Russell W All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War (Santa Monica, 
CA: 2012) 
Gompelman, Geert Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and 
Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province (Medford, MA: Tufts University Feinstein 
International Center 2011) 
Klem, M.H. Dutch Security Policy in a Changing World Web publication no. 42 (The Hague: 
WRR 2010) 
Korski, Daniel, and Richard Gowan. Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of 
Europe's Civilian Capacities (London: 2009) 
Laugen Haaland, Torunn. "Small Forces with Global Outreach: Role Perceptions in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War." PhD, University of Oslo, 2007. 
The Liaison Office The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan 2006-2010: A TLO Socio-political 
assessment (Kabul: 2010) 
Richards, General Sir David. "European Armies: The Challenge." in Adelphi Papers 48, 
no. 400 (2008): 53-62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 
 
 
(iv) Newspapers 
Almendingen, Berit. "CHOD Diesen Does not Regret the Word 'Nonsense'." Nettavisen 
2008. 
Berglund, Nina. "Majority Supports Troops in Afghanistan." Aftenposten (English edition), 
5 February 2008. 
Biles, Peter. "Iraq inquiry: Army 'almost seized up' in 2006." BBC, 28 July 2010. 
Chivers, C.J. "Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan." The New York Times, 6 
April 2007. 
Evans, Michael."David Miliband: Nato troops stuck in an Afghanistan 'stalemate." 
Timesonline 2009. 
Flintoff, Corey. "Troops May Head To Afghanistan Lacking Strategy." National Public 
Radio, 28 January 2009. 
Furberg, Kristoffer. "The CHOD's Power is Reduced." Nettavisen, 30 January 2008 
Gjerstad, Tore. "Fire at NATO." Dagbladet, 13 August 2008  
Grammaticas, Damian. "Dutch 'Success' in Afghan Conflict." BBC News, 3 July 2009. 
Hammer, Anders Sømme. "The Armed Forces Want to Carry out more Development." 
Dagsvisen, 18 March 2008. 
Johansen, Marianne. "Was Told off for Providing Food to Afghans (Fikk kjeft for å gi 
afghanere mat)." Verdens Gang, 20 April 2008. 
Kelly, Mary Louise. "With New Boss, Gates Shifts Focus to Afghanistan." National 
Public Radio, January 27 2009. 
Kranenburg, Mark, and Derk Stokmans. "Will the Dutch government fall over troop 
deployment?" NRC, February 19 2010. 
Miles, Donna. "Gates: NATO Must Increase Assets, Cut Caveats in Afghanistan." 
American Forces Press Service, 25 October 2007. 
Ruud, Solveig, and Kristine Meek. "Will not Send Troops to Afghanistan (Sender ikke 
styrker til Afghanistan)." Aftenposten, 18 October 2006. 
Solberg, Rune, Lt Col Norwegian Army. "Development Gone Astray (Bistand på ville 
veier)." In Aftenposten. Oslo: Schibsted, 2010, Dec 6. 
Stoltenberg, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens. "Why Norway is in Afghanistan." (Derfor 
er Norge i Afghanistan) in Aftenposten (2007). 
Strachan, Hew. "Want to understand the war? Ask the generals." The Times, March 17 
2010. 
Tran, Mark. "Former army chief attacks government over Afghanistan troops request." 
The Guardian, 6 October 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
